Aspiring to a Higher Rank. Swedish Factor Prices and Productivity in International Perspective 1860-1950 by Prado, Svante
 
 
 
 
ASPIRING TO A HIGHER RANK 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
Aspiring to a Higher Rank 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Swedish Factor Prices and Productivity  
in International Perspective 1860–1950 
 
 
 
 
 
Svante Prado 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GOTHENBURG STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY   1 
GOTHENBURG STUDIES IN ECONOMIC HISTORY replaces the former 
series under the title Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, 
Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs universitet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Svante Prado 2008 
Cover design: Siri Reuterstrand 
 
ISBN 978-91-86217-00-6 
Published by Department of Economic History,  
School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg 
Printed by GESON Hylte Tryck, Kungsbacka, 2008 
 
 
 
Distribution 
Department of Economic History 
School of Business, Economics and Law 
University of Gothenburg 
P.O. Box 720, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden 
www.econhist.gu.se 
 
Full text electronic issue 
www.econhist.gu.se 
 
 
 
 
Till min morfar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Aspiring to a Higher Rank: Swedish Factor Prices and Productivity in International Perspective, 
1860–1950.  
Gothenburg Studies in Economic History 1 (2008) 
ISBN 978-91-86217-00-6 
 
Author: Svante Prado 
 
Doctoral Dissertation at the Department of Economic History, School of Business, Economics and 
Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 720, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden. (Written in English) 
 
Distribution: The Department of Economic History, School of Business, Economics and Law, 
University of Gothenburg, Box 720, SE-405 30 Göteborg, Sweden. 
 
This dissertation consists of four chapters which expand on the Swedish economic development in an 
international perspective between 1860 and 1950. The overarching theme is how the Swedish rise, 
from backwardness to prosperity, is best understood. Chapter 1 identifies two types of recent 
convergence literature which venture into explorations of the causes of convergence at disaggregated 
levels of GDP per capita. The first has measured convergence in terms of movements of land prices 
and real wages for unskilled workers, and stressed the significance of external forces, such as trade, 
mass migration and capital flows. The other has established comparative levels of labour productivity 
for different sectors of the economy, and shown that these levels in the manufacturing sector have 
remained stable in the long-run. 
 The introductory chapter is followed by two chapters which examine factor prices, while chapters 
4 and 5 focus on productivity.  
 Chapter 2 shows that previous accounts of factor price convergence have overestimated the 
Swedish catch up because of their reliance on a flawed real wages series for unskilled workers. When 
a more representative wage series is used and compared to similar real wage series for the UK and 
the US, much of the alleged catch up slips away. Convergence did take place but at a slower pace 
than was previously claimed. The third chapter tempers the claim by the recent convergence literature 
that the Swedish wage-rental ratio increased steeply before World War I. By using a more 
representative series of land prices it is shown that the Swedish wage-rental ratio moved in a manner 
similar to other protectionist countries’ wage-rental ratios, which fits well with the protectionist turn 
in Swedish trade policy in 1888. The chapter concludes that domestic growth forces overwhelm the 
importance of external factors and trade policy in understanding the evolution of the wage-rental 
ratio. 
 The fourth chapter establishes comparative levels of Swedish labour productivity in the 
manufacturing industry vis-à-vis the UK and the US and shows that Swedish convergence was 
manifest around the turn of the century and in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, there is no sign of stability 
in the long-run evolution of relative productivity levels. As a follow up to this finding, the last chapter 
penetrates deeper into productivity patterns in the Swedish manufacturing industry. It shows that 
whereas the magnitudes of real cost reductions among industries were quite unevenly distributed until 
the turn of the century, a more uniform pattern began to assert itself in the decade preceding World 
War I. That invites efforts to search for common underlying stimuli, what economists and economic 
historians refer to as a general purpose technology (GPT). One that may have exercised an impact on 
productivity is electricity. 
 
KEYWORDS: convergence, comparative productivity, TFP, factor prices, real wages, employment, 
land prices, industrialisation, GPT, GDP, economic growth, Swedish historical national accounts, 
manufacturing, labour productivity 
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Chapter 1 
Setting the Scene 
Two Visions of Convergence 
1.1. Introduction 
Probing into the causes of the rise and long-term evolution of prosperity is to 
enter the heartland of economic history. It has been a recurrent theme in the 
historiography of economic history as well as closely related disciplines, at least 
since the founding father of economics, Adam Smith, laid the foundation for an 
inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Though the questions 
were posed long ago, the answers range widely as all the differentiating aspects 
of economic growth are being brought to the surface. This thesis reflects on 
some of the most salient features that figure in discussions of the rise of 
prosperity from a long-term historical perspective, for instance the measurement 
of the constituent components and proximate sources of economic growth. It is 
justified by an interest in forwarding our understanding of the Swedish case; 
from being a relatively backward country in the mid-nineteenth century – 
standing in the shadows of the forerunners of industrialisation and economic 
growth – to embarking on a growth process that would put it on an equal footing 
with most of the richest countries in the wake of Word War II. Doing so 
inevitably calls for efforts to improve the foundation on which our conjectures 
on Swedish economic development in an international perspective rest, implying 
that a great deal of this thesis is concerned with the establishment of quantitative 
evidence of relative performance. These efforts make it embody an important 
aspect of the economic history discipline – that improved understanding of the 
forces governing economic growth is a corollary of the establishment of reliable 
facts. The ability to advance our arguments is of little avail if the facts are 
missing or misleading. In Robert Fogel’s opinion: ‘the major obstacle to the 
resolution of [most of the issues in history and economics] … is the absence of 
data rather than the absence of analytical ingenuity or credible theories’ (quoted 
from McCloskey 2000 p. 86). Furthermore, few would disagree with the view 
that to set Swedish economic development in relation to other countries is a sine 
qua non for challenging our long-held perceptions about the attributes of 
Swedish economic history. Yet it is rarely seen. This thesis takes this 
prerequisite at face value, by explicitly addressing issues of factor prices and 
productivity in Sweden vis-à-vis other countries in the latter half of nineteenth 
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century and the first half of the twentieth. Two of the chapters judge Swedish 
performance against the background of the US and the UK. The UK makes a 
suitable reference point in being the forerunner of industrialisation and modern 
economic growth, as well as Sweden’s most important trading partner in the 
nineteenth century, while the US, by superseding the UK as the leader in 
economic performance, and by receiving the great bulk of Swedish emigrants in 
the latter half of the nineteenth, serves perfectly as another reference point. 
The attempt to counterpoint Swedish economic development against that of 
other countries’ trajectories brings it into close affinity with the literature 
preoccupied with past experiences of convergence or divergence. This literature 
spawned in the 1990s after two seminal articles by Baumol (1986) and 
Abramovitz (1986), which confirmed empirically what Gerschenkron’s (1962) 
historical narrative had hinted at, namely that relatively backward countries 
enjoyed gains from certain fundamental conditions arising directly from the 
initial – and continuing – differences in levels of output and productivity. On the 
other hand, countries which started on much higher levels of output and 
productivity could not expect to grow as rapidly as those starting behind. 
Something in what Feinstein (1991) aptly summed up as ‘benefits of 
backwardness and costs of maturity’ entailed great scope for catching up. 
Convergence was manifest among OECD-countries in the golden years, roughly 
coinciding with the 1950–1973 era (Baumol 1986; Baumol & Blackman 1989), 
but far less so in an expanded sample of countries and in other historical eras 
(De Long 1988). Thanks to the growing number of countries for which the Penn 
World Tables1 and Angus Maddison (1991, 1995, 2003) provided estimates of 
long-term GDP, labour input and other macroeconomic indicators, a stream of 
literature has poured forth to further testify to the negative correlation between 
initial income levels and subsequent growth rates and identify the fundamental 
conditions from which the scope for catching up derived. However, most of the 
articles and books on convergence rarely venture beyond a study of the different 
growth rates of GDP per worker/man hour that the different countries achieved 
in a particular time period and in relation to their initial levels. Many salient 
features of the catching up process remained concealed owing to the high level 
of aggregation. Partly as a result of a dissatisfaction among some economic 
historians caused by the shortcomings of the previous convergence literature to 
come to grips with the fundamental conditions governing the catch up potential 
of a backward country, two strands of convergence literature emerged in the 
1990s, representing different ways to dissolve the underlying components of 
GDP. They occupy central place in this thesis. 
The point of departure of the first approach is the basic premise that the 
growth of GDP per worker is ‘nothing more than a sum of per unit factor returns 
weighted by specific factor endowments per worker’ (Williamson 1995b p. 142). 
                                                 
 
1  http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
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Sorting out the growth rates for the different factors across countries makes 
possible a study of convergence or divergence in factor prices. Most of the 
inspiring work with a commitment to tracing and explaining the movement of 
factor prices world-wide from a long-term historical perspective is associated 
with Jeffrey G. Williamson and presented to a wider readership in the book 
Globalization and History: the Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic 
Economy, co-authored with Kevin O’Rourke. Chapter 2 and 3 set the focus on 
his approach to convergence. The other approach, dealt with in chapter 4, tries to 
assess the relative productivity performance of different sectors of the economy; 
a disaggregation of GDP per worker/man hour. Stephen Broadberry is single-
handedly responsible for bringing this approach to bear on a long-term 
convergence context, but the methodology on which his measures rely has a long 
pedigree (Rostas 1948, Paige & Bombach 1959). In his earlier works most 
attention was paid to the manufacturing industry, reflecting a long-standing 
tradition among social scientists to attribute to it a number of outstanding 
properties in the development process (Kaldor 1966, Cornwall 1977, Bairoch 
1982). In later works more sectors have entered the picture (Broadberry 2002, 
2006). Chapter 5 is the follow up to chapter 4, and penetrates deeper into 
productivity patterns in the Swedish manufacturing industry. 
1.2. Factor prices 
1.2.1. Wages 
The story of globalisation and factor price convergence starts with the evidence 
of dramatic decline in transport cost owing to the application of steam and iron 
to railroads and ocean shipping and investment in transportation infrastructure in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. This created opportunities for labour and 
goods to move more freely, in particular after the abolishment or at least 
tempering of many countries’ tariff barriers and the removal of laws imposing 
severe restrictions on the movement of people. The idea behind factor price 
convergence draws inspiration from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international 
trade, which explains trade patterns across countries by the relative supply of 
different factors of production. Relative factor endowments govern comparative 
advantages; countries will specialise in the production of those goods requiring 
intensive use of the abundant factor, and import goods requiring intensive use of 
the scarce factor. Relative factor endowments also affect relative incomes. 
Countries with a short supply of labour and a plentiful supply of land have a 
large wage-rental ratio, while countries rich in labour and short of land have a 
small wage-rental ratio. Mass migration changes the relative magnitudes of 
labour to land ratios, which in turn affect the incomes accruing to labour and 
land owners. International trade leads to product price convergence, which 
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generates factor price convergence, according to the theorem known as Stolper-
Samuelsson. 
The focus of chapter 2 is the movement of comparative real wages, one of the 
factor prices which represent cornerstones in globalisation and factor price 
convergence literature. Although comparing real wages instead of GDP per 
capital was nothing new, Williamson in his seminal article from 1995 was, to my 
knowledge, the first scholar to provide the arguments for substituting the real 
wages of unskilled workers for GDP per worker/man hour when addressing 
issues of convergence (Williamson 1995b). He skilfully and single-handedly put 
together a sample of real wages capturing 15 countries, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity in three benchmark years, and national series of real wages linked 
to the benchmarks and spanning the 1830–1990 era in its entirety. On the basis 
of this sample of real wages for unskilled workers, Williamson told a story of 
how mass migration, trade and capital flows caused a factor price equalisation in 
the pre-World War I Atlantic economy. The coefficient of variation for the 
sample of PPP-adjusted real wages declined, which pointed to an integration of 
the global labour markets. In addition, whereas previous studies had found little 
or no significant convergence in GDP per worker/man hour in the pre-World 
War I period, Williamson claimed that convergence in unskilled real wages had 
taken place. Mass migration from the Old to the New World caused real wages 
for unskilled workers in the land-scarce but labour-abundant Old World to catch 
up with real wages for unskilled workers in the land-abundant but labour-scarce 
New World. The real wage experience of the Old World was, however, far from 
uniform. Real wage levels in the large countries in Europe, France, Britain and 
Germany, did not approach American levels, but the countries on the northern 
fringe of Europe, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, along with Ireland, accounted 
for most of the narrowing gap between the Old and the New World. 
The Swedish experience exercises an influence, which is larger than mere 
country size justifies, on the way in which the globalisation story unfolds. The 
Swedish real wage catch up was manifest according to Williamson’s evidence. 
The US/Sweden ratio dropped from 410 to 157 between 1870 and 1914. If 
accurately depicted, this pointed to a previous unknown dimension of the growth 
of Swedish wages in an international perspective, for how could this massive 
contraction of the US/Sweden wage gap be reconciled with the US/Sweden GDP 
per capita ratio which remained essentially flat in the same period? Was Swedish 
mass migration, by draining the supply of labour relative to other factors of 
production, responsible? The answer is that Williamson’s Swedish wage series 
for unskilled workers is fatally flawed; it does not represent an accurate account 
of the Swedish pre-World War I wage record for unskilled workers. 
Williamson’s tenacious endeavour to compile comparable units of unskilled 
workers, based on the tenuous evidence of wages available in the pre-World War 
I era, forced him to rely on a tiny number of occupations. The lack of wage 
series for Swedish unskilled construction workers, the most commonly used 
reference of raw, unskilled labour, made it necessary to add Bagge et al.’s 
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(1933) various wage series for unskilled workers together to form an overall 
measure. Before 1887 though, unskilled iron workers alone accounted for the 
movement in Williamson’s Swedish series. The steep acceleration of Swedish 
unskilled iron workers’ wages explains the startling contraction of the 
US/Sweden real wage ratio in the 1870s. There is nothing to indicate the 
existence of a sharp twist in the movement of the skilled to unskilled wage ratio 
in the available evidence of Swedish skilled and unskilled wages. Instead, the 
evidence favours the notion that return to skill was time-invariant. Thus it should 
be inconsequential whether we use a wage series for unskilled, skilled or the 
average manufacturing worker to compare with the American and British. When 
a more encompassing wage series, a modified version of Bagge et al.’s (1933) 
average series for manufacturing, is compared to Williamson’s American and 
British unskilled wage series, the marked reductions of the wage gaps in the 
1870s slip away. The narrowing of the Swedish real wage gaps, in relation to the 
US and the UK, which did take place occurred above all from the mid-1890 on. 
In the US/Sweden comparison the evidence of convergence becomes even more 
attenuated if a wage series for manufacturing workers is substituted for 
Williamson’s American unskilled wage series. In sum, the new and more 
representative wage comparisons in chapter 2 refute Williamson’s evidence of a 
precipitous decline in the UK/Sweden and the US/Sweden real wage ratios. The 
claim that the wage gap collapsed was based on a misrepresentation of facts. 
1.2.2. Land prices 
Whereas the evolution of relative real wages was dealt with in Williamson 
(1995b), the price of land was the focal point in O’Rourke et al. (1996). The 
article documented land prices between 1870 and 1914 in some of the Old and 
New World countries for which Williamson previously had assessed the 
development of real wages, making it possible to explore the evolution of wage-
rental ratios. The evidence of wage-rental ratios tended to confirm the idea of 
factor price equalisation as a result of globalisation forces. The wage-rental 
ratios of the countries in the Old World increased, while they declined, in fact 
precipitously, in the New World countries. According to the authors this 
indicated that, apart from factor price convergence, globalisation also brought 
changing fortunes for labour and landowners. The large inflow of labour to the 
New World made land a scarcer factor, which benefited land owners. As they 
already resided in the upper part of the income league, globalisation contributed 
to increase American inequality. In the Old World the supply of labour 
diminished, which led to an improved position for labour relative to landowners. 
Thus, globalisation there was a levelling force. So, the story of globalisation and 
factor price convergence was told. 
The Old World sample was sub-divided into one group labelled protectionist 
and another group labelled free trade. The justification for the two labels was 
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that some European countries tried to mitigate the negative impact that imports 
of cheap grain would have on the incomes of large land owners. This 
protectionist stance would lead to a slower increase of the wage-rental ratios 
than in the free trade countries where forces of globalisation were allowed to 
exert an unrestricted influence on relative factor prices. The Swedish wage-
rental ratio increased as steeply as the wage-rental ratios in the other Old World 
countries with free trade labels. Sweden was therefore labelled free trade despite 
the compelling evidence showing that large farm owners rallied successfully for 
increased tariffs in 1888 to stem the flow of cheap grains from the New World 
(O’Rourke & Williamson 1999 p. 54). Chapter 3 documents an alternative and 
more representative series of Swedish land prices, which makes the wage-rental 
ratio move more in line with the other Old World, protectionist countries, 
thereby reconciling the contradictory evidence of the Swedish protectionist trade 
policy and O’Rourke et al.’s (1996) evidence of the evolution the Swedish 
wage-rental ratio. The Swedish terms of trade (agricultural prices/industrial 
prices) developed very favourably for farmers in the twenty years preceding 
World War I. This favourable development was due to the rapid price increase 
of animal products. Swedish farmers changed their output composition in favour 
of animal products at the expense of crop products, which boosted land prices. 
That explains the sluggish manner in which the wage-rental ratio increased. 
Furthermore, the article subtly makes the point that the external forces, 
repeatedly stressed by Williamson and his co-authors, were overwhelmed by 
domestic growth forces,2 for, a priori, we should expect the wage-rental ratio to 
increase in response to forces associated with sustainable economic growth. 
Both theory and history bear witness to the close link between economic growth 
and structural transformations on the one hand and the evolution of relative 
factor prices on the other. To appreciate fully the force with which 
industrialisation and accumulation of capital exercise an impact on the evolution 
of the wage-rental ratio, let us turn briefly to some stylized facts about the 
economic growth process.3 What is known as income elasticity signals how the 
proportions in which consumers allocate their growing incomes to different 
categories of expenditure change as time goes by. Income elasticity for food is 
lower than for manufactured goods and services, and for farm products income 
elasticity is even lower than for food as processing and marketing add to the 
final value of food. As income elasticity for food is below unity, the growth of 
the farm sector lags behind the growth of GDP. This is called Engel’s law and is 
                                                 
 
2  Harley (2007) also argues that the lens through which Williamson’s globalisation story is seen, 
the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory and Stolper-Samuelsson theorem, is too narrow. Yet his 
argument is centred on the role of the frontiers in peripheral areas of the Atlantic economy. 
Globalisation is about the incorporation of these areas with respect to the creation of 
infrastructure, institutions and a number of additional historical and theoretical issues. 
3  A more formal treatment of this subject is presented in Bohlin & Larsson (2006). 
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one of the most attested regularities in economics. Thus, the farm sector is bound 
to decrease, which distinguishes it from industry and service sectors. Apart from 
this distinguishing feature, the farm sector shares the following two 
characteristics with other economic activities: First, the expected rate of return 
on capital in agriculture, whether in the form of farm land, buildings or tractors, 
does not display any long-run trend (Kaldor 1961). Second, the growth of wages 
for agricultural workers, the most important cost item for farmers, tracks the 
growth of wages elsewhere. In addition, wages grow in parallel to GDP per man-
hour, ignoring for a moment the intermittent changes in the income distribution 
between wages and profits, and the growth of GDP per man-hour does not fall 
short of the growth of GDP; at the very least it outstrips the growth of output in 
agriculture. With those fundamental conditions in mind we turn to the reality of 
the farmer. The yield of the rented land determines to a great extent the rental a 
tenant is prepared to pay a landowner. The larger the difference between the 
yield per land unit and the required rate of return, the more he is willing to pay 
in rent. The growth of yield per land unit is dependent on the growth of sales 
revenues minus the growth of costs. The growth of sales revenues per land unit 
is the sum of growth in prices and volume. Engel’s law imposes a constraint on 
the growth of volume so what remains to make the growth of land rentals track 
the growth of wages is increased productivity and improved terms of trade. The 
long-term evidence suggests that neither of these two counteracting forces has 
been at work: the terms of trade (agriculture/industry) have moved up and down 
but have not shown any long-run tendency to increase, and productivity in 
agriculture has at least not outgrown productivity in industry. The upshot of it all 
is that the increase in the wage-rental ratio is a corollary of economic growth. 
How come, then, Williamson and his co-authors have documented evidence 
of declining wage-rental ratios in the latter half of the nineteenth century, an era 
in which economic growth must have exerted a strong force on the way relative 
factor prices evolved? What prevented the wage-rental ratio from obeying the 
logic of economic growth? The answer rests with the historical, indeed unique, 
context. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, land was practically free or 
could be purchased at very low prices in areas like the US and Australia. In 
relation to the Old World the land to labour ratio was very high. A soaring 
number of immigrants in newly settled areas transformed into private holdings 
the land that previously had belonged to the indigenous population. Land was 
given a price. The land to labour ratio declined as the frontier drew to a close; 
and the final closing of it coincided with the transport revolution which made the 
world wide open to exports of agrarian products from the newly settled 
territories. The price of land rose rapidly from very low levels, and it is no 
wonder the wage-rental ratio declined. The persistent neglect of the fundamental 
importance of the vast disparities in levels of land prices between the Old and 
the New World, which were present in 1850, makes the late nineteenth century 
Atlantic economy look like the perfect illustration of how globalisation brought 
forth a factor price convergence; just like the Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicted. 
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In fact, the occurrence of this factor price equalisation merely illustrates the 
influence of historical contingencies. Domestic growth forces, which form the 
subject of the two remaining chapters, matter more. 
1.3. Productivity 
1.3.1. Comparative perspective 
In a long list of influential articles Stephen Broadberry, either single-handedly or 
in joint efforts, has tried to study convergence at disaggregated levels of GDP. 
Although the methods on which his assessments rely can be traced back to 
Rostas (1948), he has applied them skilfully to an in-depth study of long-term 
convergence of comparative labour productivity at sector levels. He has 
demonstrated that GDP falls short as a measurement unit when probing into the 
causes of convergence or divergence in history. The point of departure is to 
attempt to estimate comparative levels of labour productivity for different 
industries and then to combine these into an overall benchmark for the 
manufacturing industry. This is called the industry of origin approach and aims 
to compare output levels by industry. The method has mostly been used to 
estimate relative productivity in manufacturing industries, but may well serve to 
estimate relative levels in other sectors. One way to establish comparable levels 
of labour productivity is to measure physical output per worker, for instance tons 
of cement per worker. This method has mostly been used in pre-World War II 
benchmarks because it requires homogenous and easily comparable goods and 
official statistics which report physical quantities to a greater extent. In post-
World War II benchmarks the net value per worker method has been used 
instead. It transforms net output in each country’s currency into a single unit of 
pay by so-called unit value ratios. Unit values are product values divided by 
physical quantities. The weighted unit value ratio represents a quasi exchange 
rate, comprising semi-finished products but omitting transport costs, distributive 
margins and imported products. To look at a longer sweep of history requires 
time series of labour productivity for each country, adjusted to the benchmark 
for one year. Any additional benchmarks control for consistency between 
benchmarks and time series projection. 
An outstanding feature of Broadberry’s and others’ efforts to trace the 
movements of US/UK and Germany/UK comparative labour productivity ratios 
back to the mid-nineteenth century is the long-term stability of relative 
productivity in the manufacturing industry. For instance, in the US/UK 
comparison, the two-to-one gap in labour productivity had already been 
established in the mid-nineteenth century. Swings around this relative level 
occurred, especially during wars, but without a long-run tendency to alter the 
two-to-one American lead. In the aggregate, the US overtook the UK as the 
leading country at the end of the nineteenth century and raced ahead during the 
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twentieth century. The evidence of stability in the comparative productivity ratio 
in manufacturing on the one hand, and catching up and falling behind in the 
aggregate on the other, calls into question the idea that the manufacturing 
industry holds the key to understanding convergence. Convergence in the 
aggregate comes about mainly through structural transformation whereby 
relatively backward countries raise average productivity by transferring labour 
from agriculture to industry and other modern sectors of the economy. An older 
literature, some of which was focussed on convergence, stressed the role played 
by the transfer of knowledge; late starters can borrow technological innovations 
in physical plant and machinery as well as best-practice procedures from 
advanced nations.4 Although the transfer of knowledge embraces a wide array of 
economic and social practices and modes of operation applicable in sectors other 
than manufacturing, Broadberry’s evidence nevertheless challenges the enduring 
importance the older literature attached to technological progress, capital 
accumulation and growth in dynamic manufacturing industries to explain 
convergence. In Broadberry (1997) he also provided some tentative indications 
of comparative evidence in other countries. Sweden along with Norway, 
Denmark the Netherlands and Germany form a sample labelled ‘Northern 
Europe’. These countries’ productivity levels relative to the UK show, first, that 
the level of labour productivity was quite close to the British at the beginning of 
the twentieth century and, second, that the ratios remained fairly unchanged 
during the twentieth century. The Swedish series stretched from 1913 to 1989 
with a benchmark in 1935. 
So how does Broadberry explain the stability of the productivity ratios in 
manufacturing? His framework to explain the unchanged US/UK productivity 
ratios in manufacturing throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century is 
centred on the role of initial technological choices, and the capital accumulation 
which follows once the use of a particular technology has been established. After 
a specific adaptation of a new technology has taken root that initial choice will 
have an enduring influence on the future path productivity follows. Thus, he 
appeals to the idea of path dependence to explain the persistence in comparative 
productivity levels over time. Countries adapt new technologies to fit country-
specific circumstances, which implies that convergence will not take place 
unless countries imitate the most efficient technologies in the leading country 
without transforming them according to local circumstances. The initial choice 
of technological adaptation depends on factor endowments. The whole idea is 
firmly rooted in the long-standing debate about American versus British 
technology choices in response to different factor endowments. That makes the 
framework ambiguous in a wider country perspective. In addition, it is difficult 
                                                 
 
4  Gomulka 1971, Cornwall 1977, Nelson and Wright 1992 all emphasize the role of technology 
transfer in explaining catching up while Abramovitz (1986) and Feinstein (1991) include other 
factors as well.  
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to translate the idea of initial technology choice into palpable historical 
evidence. Therefore, chapter 4 keeps that part of Broadberry’s convergence 
conjecture out of the account. 
From a Swedish perspective there are at least two reasons as to why we 
should pay Broadberry’s long-term productivity evidence due attention. First, his 
conjecture of stable productivity ratios in manufacturing is a challenge thrown 
down to the numerous minds of Swedish economic history that have accorded 
great importance to the many new and dynamic manufacturing industries that 
sprang up in the last decades of the nineteenth century and gathered further pace 
after the turn of the century. Did the perception of Swedish economic historians, 
that the manufacturing industry propelled the economy forward and laid the 
foundation for Swedish catching up with the core, lead us astray as to the true 
importance of manufacturing? Second, it does not take long to figure out that 
Broadberry’s conjecture put into a Swedish late nineteenth century context is 
well-nigh impossible to reconcile with Williamson’s real-wage picture, which 
showed that the UK/Sweden and the US/Sweden real wage ratios literally 
plummeted between 1870 and 1914. The great virtue of economics, and 
especially national accounts, is the firm restrictions imposed on our different 
measures; they all must add up in a consistent manner. If the Williamson and 
Broadberry pictures are true, a manifest reallocation of Swedish incomes, from 
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GRAPH 1.1. The movement of UK/Sweden productivity and real wage ratios, 
1869–1913 (Sweden=100) 
Note: The series of labour productivity is interpolated during the First and Second World 
Wars.  
Sources: Real wage ratios, see chapter 2, graph 2.9 (series titled modified); productivity ratios, 
see chapter 4, graph 4.1 
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capital to labour, must have occurred because there is an intrinsic link between 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector and the benefits accruing to 
workers and capitalists. Clearly, there is no evidence of a massive income 
reallocation in favour of labour. So, either one or both of the two pictures are in 
error. The second chapter documented that Williamson’s Swedish real wage 
series for unskilled workers rested on a faulty foundation. The Swedish wage 
level did catch up with the British and American but at a much slower pace than 
Williamson’s comparison made us inclined to believe. So what about 
comparative labour productivity ratios? 
In chapter 4 an attempt is made to use the industry of origin approach, either 
the physical quantity per worker method or net value per worker method, to 
establish three successive benchmarks of US/Sweden and UK/Sweden 
comparative labour productivity, for 1909, 1924 and 1935. Time series of 
comparative labour productivity spanning the period between 1869 and 1950 are 
furthermore linked to the benchmark of 1924. The long-term evidence suggests 
that the growth of Swedish labour productivity relative to British and American 
was impressive. Before the Swedish catch up began in earnest around the turn of 
the century there was a two-to-one British lead. The first Swedish acceleration in 
1900 reduced 80 per cent of the distance and the second in the 1930s wiped out 
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GRAPH 1.2. The movement of US/Sweden productivity and real wage ratios, 
1869–1913 (Sweden=100) 
Note: The series of labour productivity is interpolated in 1869–1879, 1879–1889 and during 
the First and Second World Wars. 
Sources: Real wage ratios, see chapter 2, graph 2.8 (series titled modified adjusted to a 
benchmark in table 2.4 for all manufacturing industries based on wage data from Albert Rees); 
productivity ratios, see chapter 4, graph 4.2. 
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the remaining gap, convergence was a fait accompli, and Sweden surged ahead 
of Britain. The US/Sweden comparison bears a striking resemblance to the 
timing and magnitude of the two episodes of Swedish catch up on Britain, but 
the remaining distance in 1950 stood at 150, reflecting American superiority. 
The investigation thereby puts flesh on the bare bones of the perception of 
Swedish economic historians that the manufacturing industry was the engine of 
growth, propelling convergence forward. In addition, it brings the evidence of 
pre-World War I movements of relative real wages and relative labour 
productivity together in a consistent manner, as graphs 1.1 and 1.2 make 
immediately apparent.5 
Chapter 4 also underscores the importance of structural transformations to 
understand the course economy-wide convergence follows. The ratios of the 
GPD per capita series show that Sweden was catching up interruptedly on 
Britain but failed to narrow the American lead at the whole economy level. The 
answer rests with the initial level and evolution of sectoral shares of 
employment. Sweden and the US gained from an initial and sizable share of the 
labour force engaged in agriculture, a sector with low value added per worker, 
which testified to their delayed acceleration of economic growth in relation to 
the UK. The onset of sustainable growth reallocated labour from agriculture to 
industry and services, sectors with higher value added per worker, which raised 
the average level of value added per worker. The movement of these sectoral 
shares of employment completes the convergence picture chapter 4 intended to 
establish. 
1.3.2. Yeast or mushrooms? 
The results in chapters 2 and 3 thus downplay the significance of the external 
factors that Williamson with co-authors equates with the rising force of 
globalisation in the latter half of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
century. Instead, chapter 4 redirects our attention to the advances across a broad 
frontier within the Swedish manufacturing industry, which put Sweden on a path 
towards convergence in labour productivity and real wages in relation to the US 
and the UK. There is no need to appeal to the theorem of factor price 
equalisation and exhaust the short list of evidence of factor prices and factor 
proportions to uncover the factors responsible for catching up. We may, instead, 
come closer to laying bare the underlying factors if we attempt to gather 
consistent evidence of industry-specific data for output and input in the 
manufacturing sector. And that is what chapter 5 sets out to accomplish. The 
                                                 
 
5  There are uncertainties surrounding the American relative wage level, as well as the growth of 
wages after 1890, which makes it difficult to establish a robust comparison of wages in the US 
vs. wages elsewhere. If an alternative American wage series is used the Swedish wage 
convergence slips away altogether. 
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prerequisite for this enterprise, it hardly needs saying, is access to official 
statistics. Sweden represents a fortunate case in the sense that the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics appeared in the mid-nineteenth century and were published 
annually thereafter.6 To put the appearance of the Swedish Industrial Statistics 
into context it suffices to mention that the Bristish Cenus of Production was 
published in 1907 for the first time and appeared every second year thereafter, 
and the US Census of Manufactures was first published in 1810 and appeared 
decennially until 1909. However, the Swedish Industrial Statistics suffer from a 
number of flaws that circumscribe their usefulness in exploring growth rates of 
output, labour input and productivity in the nineteenth century. Important areas 
of what we today consider manufacturing industries proper, such as sawmills, 
dairy and flour mills, were excluded. The guiding principle behind this exclusion 
was that economic activities closely related to the agriculture and forestry 
sectors did not belong to manufacturing. These activities accounted for a 
considerable share of the manufacturing industry and their omission leaves a 
deep impression in the Swedish Industrial Statistics until at least 1896. Yet, 
Jörberg’s (1961) enquiry into the growth and fluctuations in the Swedish 
manufacturing industry rested on the notion that the coverage in the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics was, if faulty, at least representative. His authoritative 
affirmation of the usefulness of the Swedish Industrial Statistics justifies the 
recycling of it to address those issues that he, for lack of complementary 
information, left out of his account. The great supply of prices for final products 
that, thanks to Ljungberg (1990), is readily available, paves the way for 
exploration of productivity issues by industry. 
Successive efforts to fill in the output gaps in the Swedish Industrial Statistics 
were made within the first and the fifth generations of the Swedish Historical 
National Account, where Lindahl et al. (1937) represent the first and Schön 
(1988) the second. They have managed to bridge many of the insufficiencies by 
drawing on alternative sources and using a series of ingenious assumptions. 
Their accomplished records have improved our knowledge about output growth 
for the industries that were ignored or insufficiently covered by the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics. However, we have scarcer evidence of the number of 
workers in these industries, which obstructs a straightforward enquiry into 
productivity growth rates for manufacturing as a whole. Jungenfelt (1966) was 
the first scholar who tried to match Lindahl et al.’s estimated output levels for 
excluded industries with employment, but Schön has since raised the output 
levels for excluded industries further. Chapter 5 therefore contains an endeavour 
to remedy the inconsistency between Schön’s higher output levels for excluded 
industries and Jungenfelt’s previous employment estimates, which related to 
Lindahl et al.’s lower level of output. The methodology used in chapter 5 to 
match employment and output draws inspiration from Verdoon’s law, which 
                                                 
 
6  Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik. D. Fabriker och manufakturer. 
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establishes a positive relationship between growth of output and growth of 
productivity. Industry-specific elasticities are used to extrapolate backwards 
from the year in which a previously excluded industry entered into the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics. Both the trend and level of the new series of employment 
for the manufacturing industry are very similar to Jungenfelt’s series, vindicating 
previous studies relying on either the trend or the level of Jungenfelt’s 
employment series in conjunction with Schön’s output series. 
The classification of the numerous industries starts from the modern, post-
1913 Swedish Industrial Statistics’ allocation into 9 groups of industries based 
on the kinds of raw materials being processed, with the exclusion of the ninth 
group, public utilities, and handicraft production. Each group is then furthermore 
sub-divided so as to include 28 industries in 1868, a number which increases 
gradually to 41 industries after 1898. The large number of industries included in 
the sample calls for an analytical tool to bring order to a vast variety of growth 
experiences across industries and over time. Harberger (1998) proposed two 
distinct characteristics of the overall pattern of growth experiences formed by 
industries or by firms within an industry: Either the pattern is uneven and 
resembles mushrooms or it is even and resembles yeast. The mushroom 
metaphor is justified by the unpredictability with which mushrooms crop up in a 
field whereas the yeast metaphor draws on the evenness with which yeast cause 
bread to rise. Harberger showed some late (1970–1994) twentieth century 
evidence of total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates in American industries 
and Mexican firms. He concluded that the growth process resembled mushrooms 
rather than yeast. High rates of TFP growth were largely localised to a few 
industries, while the majority of industries and firms achieved modest growth 
rates and some even suffered from negative growth rates. Furthermore, there was 
no persistence in the rank of industries. Shortly after ascending to the peak of the 
growth rank table, industries descended to the bottom. Harberger also introduced 
the expression ‘real cost reduction’, which is defined as the extent to which 
output would have increased within a time period had the industry operated with 
the same quantity of material, capital and labour inputs as in the initial year. It 
distils the essence of what economic agents seek to accomplish, namely to 
reduce costs, be they labour, capital or intermediate consumption. These real 
cost reductions are additive over all industries, which brings the possibility of 
attributing to each industry its contribution to the total sum of real cost 
reductions undertaken in a specific timeframe. Ranking industries by TFP 
growth rates in descending order, along with each industry’s value added in 
initial year’s prices, the cumulative sums of real cost reductions show, somewhat 
surprisingly, perhaps, that sometimes less than 50 per cent of the industries 
(share of initial value added) accounted for the 100 per cent of real cost 
reductions. The contributions from the remaining industries enjoying real cost 
reductions were offset by those who were burdened with real cost increases. The 
share of industries adding to the 100 per cent cumulative sum of real cost 
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reduction provides a measure of how unified the pattern of real cost reductions 
was between two points in time. 
The endless squabble over the use and implication of TFP warrants a minor 
note on how a measure of TFP was attained. TFP indicates the efficiency with 
which capital and labour are used to produce final output and amounts to no 
more than the weighted sum of the growth of labour productivity and the growth 
of capital productivity, weighted by each factor’s share of income. Its property is 
best understood through an accounting identity which shows how gross output in 
current prices can be dissolved into quantities of labour, capital and material 
inputs on the one hand and their respective remuneration, wages, return on 
capital and prices of input materials on the other. This duality has proved to be 
useful in historical studies because if there is a shortage of quantity data prices, 
which are usually in better supply, can be used instead. The result is what is 
frequently referred to as the dual approach to TFP and has served as an 
analytical tool for assessing productivity in both agriculture and manufacturing 
in several historical studies. However, whereas there is often sufficient 
information at hand on wages, prices of materials and prices of final goods, the 
returns to capital tend to escape our attempts to measure it, either because of 
scarce supply of historical observations or because our proxies suffer from 
logical inconsistency. The latter concerns most of all the use of the interest rate 
as a proxy for the returns to capital. It is quite time invariant and it is a foreign 
element introduced into an accounting identity. In chapter 5 I argue that the dual 
approach to TFP is inapplicable in the absence of information on the returns to 
capital. The only solution available is to return to the primal definition of TFP, 
that it equals the weighted sum of the growth of labour productivity and the 
growth of capital productivity, and furthermore assume away the impact of 
capital productivity on TFP, meaning that output and the capital stock grow in 
parallel. That turns the grand story of TFP into nothing but the growth of labour 
productivity times labour’s share of income; a neat solution. Evidence in the 
manufacturing industry buttresses the assumed constancy of the output to capital 
ratio, but as we enter the realm of industry-specific trajectories we can no longer 
overlook the fact that the capital to output ratio was subjected to episodes of 
sharp increases or decreases, widening the possible margin of error for the 
estimated TFP growth rates by industry. 
The investigated era is divided into five overlapping time periods which 
coincides with Jörberg’s (1961) special investigations into the primary material 
underlying the Swedish Industrial Statistics in 1872, 1880, 1889, 1897, 1903, 
1912.7 It shows that prior to the last sub-period in 1903–1912, the growth 
patterns in each of the four preceding sub-periods were quite uneven. Less than 
                                                 
 
7  The reason these years were chosen as start and end points in the sub-periods is that Jörberg 
(1961) compiled additional information from the primary material which can be used to further 
explore the determinants behind the productivity patterns in future works. 
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60 per cent of the industries (measured as share of initial value added) accounted 
for the 100 per cent of real cost reductions. The average TFP growth rates were 
rather moderate in these four sub-periods and most of the overachieving 
industries were quite small. In addition, there was a lack of persistence in the 
rank of industries according to their achieved TFP growth rates. The formal test, 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, failed to single out any sustained rank 
across time periods. The overall message conveyed by the empirical 
investigation into the pattern of real cost reductions before 1903 points squarely 
to a growth process which resembles mushrooms a lot more than yeast. 
Still, in the last sub-period a tendency towards a more even growth pattern is 
discernible. The period coincides with the turning point in the manufacturing 
industry around the turn of the century, which shifted the growth rate of labour 
productivity upwards until 1912. Chapter 4 documented the fact that this period 
marked the beginning of the Swedish catching up in labour productivity in 
manufacturing with the US and the UK. A remarkably large share of the 
industries (94 per cent of initial value added, or 32 out of 39 industries) 
contributed to the 100 per cent of real cost reductions. The coefficient of 
variation, whether for TFP or real cost reductions, was roughly halved in relation 
to the previous sub-periods. A commonality of TFP growth rates prevailed. 
The hunt for the determinants of our observations justifies the attempt to 
assign to the pattern of real cost reductions a label which aptly summarises the 
experience of a vast number of industries. If we gravitate towards the yeast label 
it is appropriate to think of a factor, let us imagine a technology with a great deal 
of spillover, which impinges significantly on a wide variety of manufacturing 
processes. One such example is the concept of general purpose technology 
(GPT). It is said to have great scope for improvement, broad externalities, many 
technological complementarities and eventually become widely used (Lipsey et 
al. 1998). The steam engine, electricity and information and communication 
technology have figured prominently in the economic history literature as 
examples of GPTs. Yet it is important to keep in mind the compelling evidence 
showing that the eventual realisation of a GPT’s potential is a long-delayed and 
far from automatic process. Thus, we cannot expect to find a clear cut 
connection between growth patterns and a GPT in operation. What we perhaps 
can expect to find is an even growth pattern and a matured GPT. If, on the other 
hand, our observed productivity growth rates refuse to form a yeast-like pattern, 
it may be more apt to imagine cost reductions, as Harberger (p. 5) put it: 
‘stemming from 1001 different causes’. That vision is a challenge to the whole 
idea of modelling. It renders elusive the relentless quest for generic explanations 
to account for our historical evidence. 
The pro-mushroom evidence in the manufacturing industry prior to the turn 
of the century questions whether a GPT was at work. The difficulty of coming 
up with generic explanations for the pattern of real cost reductions translates into 
a prerequisite to place each industry-specific trajectory firmly in the historical 
context, and to detail the state of knowledge under which each industry operated 
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in order to account for all their idiosyncratic upturns and downturns over time. 
Simply put, evidence of mushroom-like patterns of real cost reductions cries out 
for more history. 
On the other hand, the uniform pattern of real cost reductions, which began to 
manifest itself after the turn of the century, invites efforts to search for a specific 
underlying factor whose dynamic properties spill over into a wide array of 
manufacturing processes and continue to reverberate long after its infusion. The 
most likely GPT candidate in the years preceding World War I is electricity. 
Electrification of Swedish industry accelerated in the 1900s owing to the scarcity 
of domestic supply of fossil fuel, abundance of hydropower and energy-intensive 
industries; around the turn of the century roughly 10 per cent of all motive 
power was electrified and by the outbreak of World War I that share had 
increased to 50 per cent. Schön (2000a) believes that electricity was the new 
technology on which a new development block was created in the 1890s. 
Electricity was an infusion of new motive power into various manufacturing 
industries. In contrast to the steam engine, which mainly benefited large 
production units, a package of electricity-based industrial process innovations 
made possible the mechanisation of smaller production units as well. The 
foremost advocates of electricity as a GPT in the US in the interwar years, David 
and Wright (2005 p. 141), maintain that ‘electrification saved fixed capital by 
eliminating heavy shafts and belting, a change that also allowed factory 
buildings themselves to be more lightly constructed’. In an earlier article David 
(1990) argued though that the transformation of industrial processes by electric 
power technology did not gain momentum until the period 1914 to 1917. 
Swedish evidence of a broad productivity surge after the turn of the century and 
rapid electrification is a possible nexus which deserves more attention in future 
works. 
1.4. Conclusions 
The identification of two recent and potentially fruitful ways to decompose the 
components of the movement of GPD per worker/man hours has inspired this 
investigation of Swedish economic development in an international context. The 
first is proposed by Jeffrey G. Williamson and his collaborators. With their 
globalisation tale they try to convince us that factors external to each country in 
the late nineteenth century Atlantic economy sufficed to dictate convergence by 
altering those relative factor proportions that have an immediate bearing on the 
rewards accruing to capitalists, labour and land owners. Still, any convincing 
story should be bolstered by compelling evidence. After all, it is the various 
country experiences in the Atlantic economy that form the plot in the 
globalisation story, and each of these affects, uniformly – the countries included 
in the sample are not weighted by size – the manner in which the story unfolds. 
My sceptical inquiry of the Swedish wage evidence of unskilled workers, which 
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Williamson uses, shows that the evidence is based on a biased sample of 
workers. It is a fallacy to claim, as he does, that the Swedish wage gaps vis-à-vis 
the US and the UK contrasted spectacularly between 1870 and 1913. For sure, 
wages in Sweden grew faster than in the UK, but only from around the turn of 
the century. Whether they also performed better than US wages depends on the 
choice of US wage series.  
Chapter 3 on land prices and the Swedish wage-rental ratio likewise modifies 
the previous literature’s claim that factor prices simply obeyed external factors. 
Instead, the chapter directs our attention to domestic growth forces. The 
evolution of land prices is governed by productivity in agriculture and the 
composition of animal and crop products. The new wage-rental ratio, which 
chapter 3 documents, increases more slowly than it was thought previously. 
Hence, the first part of the thesis casts doubt on the usefulness of studying 
convergence without bringing domestic growth forces into the picture. 
The second way to decompose the components of the movement of GDP per 
capita/man hours, proposed by Stephen Broadberry, is to examine productivity 
by sectors. Chapter 4 takes into serious account his suggestion that relative 
productivity ratios in manufacturing may remain stable over time while 
economy-wide convergence is caused by structural transformation. The chapter 
compares the growth of Swedish labour productivity with that of the UK and the 
US between 1869 and 1950. Swedish convergence was manifest from around the 
turn of the century and in the 1930s. Hence, the Swedish manufacturing industry 
is the place to search for the convergence forces that caused real wages for 
Swedish workers, whether labelled skilled, unskilled or manufacturing, to 
outgrow the wages of British and American workers. The Swedish experience 
contrasts with Broadberry’s previous evidence of long-term stability in the 
evolution of comparative US/UK productivity ratios in manufacturing. As in the 
globalisation story, Sweden, however peripheral and insignificant in terms of 
sheer size, was on a trajectory which makes our assessment and understanding of 
convergence more complete.  
The final chapter takes a closer look at the Swedish manufacturing industry 
for the period 1868 to 1912. It assigns to the overall pattern of productivity 
growth rates in five sub-periods either the yeast or the mushroom label, 
depending on whether real cost reductions were uniformly distributed or 
scattered widely across industries and over time. The mushroom label 
summarises the nature of the growth process before the turn of the century, 
whereas the evenness with which industries underwent real cost reductions in the 
pre-World War I decade justifies the yeast label. The exploratory search for 
common stimuli, which may have caused the growth pattern to resemble yeast 
rather than mushrooms, concludes that electricity is a possible yet unproven 
candidate. The issue that remains is whether electrification was sufficiently 
established to impinge on the array of different manufacturing processes before 
World War I. 
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Chapter 2 
Fallacious Convergence?  
Williamson’s Real Wage Comparisons 
under Scrutiny 
2.1. Introduction 
A great deal of the economic history literature of the past twenty years has 
appealed to words like convergence and globalisation. Perhaps the unabated 
interest in our current era of globalisation has made history-oriented scholars 
more apt to turn to previous globalisation eras to throw light on contested issues. 
From the vantage point of the present it seems the appearance of Jeffrey G. 
Williamson’s (1995b) article The Evolution of Global Labour Markets since 
1850: Background Evidence and Hypotheses marked a turning point by 
providing input for new ways of thinking about converging and diverging forces 
in the Atlantic economy.8 His was the first work to present real wage levels 
adjusted for purchasing power parities for a large sample of countries, making it 
possible to answer old questions and ask new ones about integration of 
international labour markets. Important evidence was provided by a decreasing 
coefficient of variation in the real wage sample as a whole, thus pointing to a 
general income convergence in the Atlantic economy. Thus convergence was not 
only a feature during the Golden years between 1950 and 1973 as previously 
was claimed. Another piece of evidence well worth our attention was the 
diminishing income gap between the Old and the New World; the labour-
abundant Old World caught up with the labour-scarce New World with mass 
emigration serving as the prime mover of contraction. The US is the telling 
example of a New World country, with an unexploited frontier, a low labour to 
land ratio and high relative real wages. Declining transport costs, the advent of 
laisser-faire, and unexploited real wage gaps in the mid-nineteenth century 
created opportunities for European labour to seek out employment in the US and 
elsewhere in the New World. The mass migration that followed brought about a 
real wage convergence, as labour became a scarcer factor in Europe and a more 
                                                 
 
8  Williamson and his collaborators have elaborated the idea of factor price convergence in more 
than fifty articles (McInnis 2000). As late as in 2007, Williamson (2005) was the second most 
cited article in the economic history journals (Vaio and Weisdorf 2008). 
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abundant one in the US.9 This story was aptly summarised in the book 
Globalization and History (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). 
Although most of the articles and books that retold and refined this story 
approached the Atlantic economy as a whole, it is in fact the Scandinavian 
countries which account for most of the real wage convergence found in the 
sample (graph 2.1). The grand globalisation tale of the late nineteenth century 
progresses without the core – France, Germany and Britain.10 It is therefore a 
matter of some weight to take a look at Sweden, the largest country in 
Scandinavia, the region which propelled the Old World’s wage levels towards 
the New.11 In addition to the evidence of the extraordinary Swedish wage catch 
up with the US and the UK which has an impact on the manner in which the 
globalisation tale unfolds, the idea of factor price convergence, as caused by 
                                                 
 
9  Williamson (1995b) changed the focus of concern from domestic factors along the lines of 
Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz (1986), and Baumol (1986) that had imbued writings up to 
then to external ones, such as trade and migration. He also substituted real wages and other 
factor prices for GDP records, capital accumulation, and structural transformation as a 
performance measure. 
10  Scandinavia’s outstanding achievement was therefore subject to further elaboration in 
O’Rourke and Williamson (1995a, 1995b) and the rest of the periphery was dealt with in 
O'Rourke and Williamson (1997). 
11  Ljungberg (1996) contains the only critical discussion of O’Rourke and Williamson’s two 
articles (1995a, 1995b) which addressed explicitly Scandinavia’s role in the globalisation tale. 
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GRAPH 2.1. American/European real wage ratios, 1870–1913 
Sources: An augmented and revised data set, based on Williamson (1995b table A2.1) with 
some revisions made in O’Rourke and Williamson (1997). 
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external globalisation forces, has also crept into the language of Swedish 
economic history. In fact, it holds a prominent position in the most influential 
book on the economic history of Sweden, Schön (2000b p. 225), who used 
Williamson (1995b) real wage series in illustration of the thesis that Swedish 
mass emigration to the US drove a wedge into the development of wages and 
GDP per capita in 1870-1910. The growth of wages outstripped the growth of 
GDP per capita.12 
The chapter discusses the way levels and movements of Swedish wages have 
been compared to the US and the UK. This is done by considering all the steps 
in the construction of wage comparisons over time: first, estimating relative 
price levels of consumables, so-called purchasing power parities (PPP); second, 
establishing comparable levels of real wages for a benchmark year; and third, 
linking time series of real wages to the benchmark to cover a longer sweep of 
history. This chapter shows that the second and third steps are crucial. Our 
perception of wage gaps depends on the choice of workers underlying the 
benchmarks. The use of construction workers, especially skilled ones, gives the 
impression of wide pay distances between American and European workers. 
Wage benchmarks based on manufacturing workers tend to narrow these 
distances. Furthermore, the chapter documents the fact that the unskilled wage 
series used for Sweden is unrepresentative and does not constitute an accurate 
account of Swedish real wage experience for unskilled workers. Swedish real 
wage growth has been significantly overestimated, which in turn has caused an 
upward bias as to the magnitude of convergence taking place between the Old 
and the New World. The deceptive picture of wage convergence painted by 
Williamson stems from his reliance on a flawed Swedish wage series for so-
called urban unskilled workers. The use of wage series for unskilled workers 
turns on the searchlight on the movement of skilled to unskilled pay ratios. The 
issue at stake is whether it is justifiable to use a wage series for unskilled 
workers behaving differently from more inclusive wage series. The chapter 
modifies the Swedish wage series which implies that much of the alleged 
narrowing of the wage gaps between the US and the UK and Sweden slips away. 
It also brings forth a complete new comparison, based on wage series for 
manufacturing workers. 
2.2. Real wage benchmarks 
Williamson (1995b) deals with the years 1830 to 1988 divided into three sub-
periods: before World War I (1830–1913); the interwar-years (1914–45); and the 
                                                 
 
12  The idea is further detailed and elaborated in Schön (2006). See also Herlitz (2002) for a 
discussion of the impact of O’Rourke and Williamson’s globalisation story on Schön’s 
interpretation of Sweden.   
ASPIRING TO A HIGHER RANK 
 32 
post World War II-era (1946–88).13 Each sub-period contains a benchmark year 
that establishes the real wage levels in relation to the UK for all the countries in 
the sample. The sub-periods are covered by national real wage series linked to 
respective benchmarks. The appendix contains the data sources and methods. 
The first part of it consists of national series for real wages for all countries; the 
second establishes real wage benchmarks for each sub-period; and the third links 
the national wage series with the respective benchmarks. The exception is the 
UK series that are left unaltered, set equal to 100 in each benchmark year. Thus 
all series are expressed in relation to the UK allowing for cross-country 
comparisons. The method partly avoids the problems inherent in historical 
comparisons of GDP provided by Bairoch (1976), first, and Maddison (1982, 
2003), later, whose series only in practice – not in theory – admit comparisons 
far off the reference point (Prados de la Escosura 2000; Ward and Devereux 
2003). A quick glance at a country’s relative standing in 1835 in Williamson’s 
data set is thus a real wage ratio 70 years off the reference point (the benchmark 
year of the first sub-period is 1905), which is to be compared with what 
Maddison offers in terms of a GDP ratio 165 years away from its benchmark. 
2.2.1. New Purchasing Power Parities 
Williamson uses PPPs to transform different currencies into pounds. The 
basket of goods consists of food items and housing (rent). His large sample of 
countries allows an upper limit of 13 in terms of the number of items included in 
the household budget. The food items and rent are weighed by their relative 
importance in a typical household budget, and the weights are average budget 
shares for the USA, the UK, Sweden, Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy. The 
average budget weights represent a pattern of consumption for a typical urban 
consumer living in a quite affluent society at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. They are probably not representative of less affluent countries such as 
Brazil, Spain and Portugal. What we have learned from the extensive literature 
on international comparisons is that using exchange rates for converting 
different currencies into a single unit of pay inevitably overestimates income 
gaps between rich and poor countries (Heston and Summers 1980; Hansson 
1988, 1991). American levels of output per worker in the manufacturing sector 
appear to have been twice as high as British wages, indicating a potential for 
high relative wages in the US (Broadberry 1994). Most of the manufacturing 
sector in the US was exposed to the world market in providing tradable goods. 
Rapid growth rates of wages followed in traded-goods industries but workers’ 
mobility between sectors also led to rising wages in non-traded-goods industries 
                                                 
 
13  Since the publication of Williamson (1995b) the data set has been revised twice. The correct 
British series is set out in Williamson (1995a). In O’Rourke and Williamson (1997) further 
revisions include Portugal, Spain, Norway and the Netherlands. 
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and service sectors, which entailed higher prices there. The known and certain 
fact of high wage levels in the US should lead us to suspect that the higher prices 
in sectors other than those oriented towards the world market raised the cost-of-
living in the US relative to other countries. Thus US/Sweden wage ratios 
calculated by PPP should come out more favourably for Swedish workers than 
ratios calculated by official exchange rate. The mismatching of sample years in 
Williamson (1995b) obstructs, however, a straightforward interpretation of 
estimated price relations. Data used for establishing the Swedish and 
Argentinean PPPs refer to 1914, for the US 1909 and for all the other countries 
1905. To establish new PPPs we simply change the sample year from 1914 to 
1909 and 1905 to render the prices of consumables directly comparable with the 
US and UK respectively. Ljungberg (1990), complemented by Myrdal (1933) 
provides prices for the same products as in the Board of Trade14 in the UK 
(1908) and in the US (1911), the same sources as used by Williamson. The 
Swedish prices refer to country averages, as the prices in Board of Trade. I have 
used Fisher ideal indices to establish PPPs for each binary country comparison, 
as in formula (2.1), where *ip  represents prices of good i  in Sweden and ip  
prices of good i  in the US or the UK, and *iθ is Swedish expenditure weights 
and iθ  British or American. 
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1
θ θ
= =
   
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p p p p  (2.1) 
The estimated PPP:s and the official exchange rates in table 2.1 confirm what 
has just been outlined on expected incongruities between PPP and exchange rate. 
The official exchange rate is 38 per cent higher than the average Swedish/US 
price relation of typical consumer goods, and the corresponding disparity for 
Sweden/UK ratios is 10. Thus, it sets in relief high relative cost-of-living in the 
US, an important factor to reckon with when establishing international wage 
relatives. 
                                                 
 
14  Report of an inquiry by the Board of Trade into Working Class Rents, Housing and Retail 
Prices together with the rates of wages in certain occupations in the principal industrial towns 
of the United Kingdom and United States of America. 
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2.2.2. Workers underlying Williamson’s real wage benchmarks 
The workers underlying the wage benchmarks in Williamson (1995b) are so-
called unskilled and skilled urban workers, classified in accordance with a 
standard outlined by the Board of Trade (1908, 1911). They belong to building 
and engineering. This approach follows a long tradition of comparing wages of 
artisans or construction workers (Phelps Brown and Hopkins 1956; Allen 2001). 
A paucity of data for workers belonging to sectors other than construction may 
justify this choice; otherwise, a more inclusive measure is preferable. Referring 
to construction workers only will imply a strong US wage level bias as the 
construction workers there appear to have had the advantage of being very well-
paid in relation to their European peers. The selection of this narrow definition 
of workers has overestimated the wage distance between Europe and the US 
(Shergold 1982). Extremely high wages were paid to a skilled minority of 
American workers but more modest wages to the unskilled majority (Allen 
1994). In fact unskilled US workers did not do any better than the British until 
TABLE 2.1. Estimated PPP:s for Sweden/UK 1905 and Sweden/US 1909  
 Budget weights  Price ratios 
 Sweden  UK US 
 kr per 
pound 
kr per 
dollar 
Tea and coffee 0.04 0.07 0.07  6.28 1.48 
Sugar 0.08 0.06 0.05  33.91 4.87 
Bacon and sausage 0.04 0.06 0.05  14.23 2.72 
Beef and veal 0.06 0.18 0.20  11.37 2.98 
Pork 0.04 0.02 0.06  12.94 3.45 
Lamb and mutton 0.00 0.06 0.04  12.55 3.34 
Cheese 0.03 0.03 0.02  21.17 3.12 
Butter and margarine 0.19 0.13 0.11  12.53 2.13 
Potatoes 0.04 0.06 0.07  14.32 1.27 
Flour and meal 0.09 0.06 0.08  16.33 2.78 
Bread 0.13 0.14 0.08  22.95 2.39 
Milk 0.20 0.08 0.09  9.19 1.67 
Egg 0.06 0.06 0.09  13.80 2.72 
Total food 0.75 0.80 0.73    
Rent per three room 0.26 0.20 0.27  20.35 3.13 
       
PPP     16.47 2.71 
Official exchange rate     18.18 3.74 
Ratio of exchange rate to PPP     110 138 
Note: The budget weights do not sum to unity because of round figures. 
Sources: Budget weights from Williamson (1995b, table A3.2). British and American prices of 
consumables from Williamson (1995b, table A3.1) and Swedish from Ljungberg (1990) and 
Myrdal (1933). Rent from Williamson (1995b, table A3.1). 
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the years ensuing 1906 (Phelps Brown 1977).15 A further argument against the 
use of construction workers is that they produced mostly for local markets in 
which unionisation prevailed and competition was restricted. Firms operating 
within the manufacturing industry were more likely to meet stiff competition 
from abroad, which set apart their workers’ wage conditions from the rest of the 
economy. 
For Sweden Williamson matches the Board of Trade’s (1908, 1911) sample 
of wages for American and British skilled and unskilled construction workers 
with that of Bagge et al.’s (1935) for Swedish skilled and unskilled municipal 
workers.16 Swedish municipal workers belonged mostly to the construction 
sector at this time, yet table 2.2, which compares the Swedish and 
British/American sample of workers labelled skilled, indicates a worrisome lack 
of correspondence; in sum, like has not been compared with like.17 The 
discrepancy between the samples of skilled workers will not matter a great deal 
if wages for different occupations in the building trade were uniformly 
                                                 
 
15  In the US, skills of the kind represented by engineering and building workers were probably in 
short supply, while in Scandinavia a great many (landless) people had gained knowledge of 
handicraft production because of the short season for traditional agricultural works (Gadd 
2005). 
16  Bagge’s et al. (1935) summary statistics of wages for municipal workers comes from a special 
investigation published two years earlier (Kommunalarbetarnas löner i Sverige 1865–1930). 
17  Lack of details in the Swedish investigation prevents a similar comparison of unskilled 
workers. 
TABLE 2.2. Correspondence between Board of Trade’s sample of skilled 
construction workers in the US and the UK and the sample of municipal 
workers in Sweden 
American and British sample Swedish sample  
Bricklayers   
Masons   
Carpenters X  
Stonemasons   
Joiners   
Cabinet makers   
Plumbers X  
Plasterers   
Iron workers   
Stucco workers   
Painters   
Blacksmith X  
Pipe layers X  
Pavers X  
Blasters   
Sources: For the US: Board of Trade (1911); for the UK: Board of Trade (1908); and for Sweden: 
Kommunalarbetarnas löner i Sverige 1865–1930. 
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distributed. If that is the case it would make Swedish municipal workers a 
reasonable proxy for construction workers to be compared to the Board of 
Trade’s sample. Be that as it may, a more serious problem with Williamson’s 
comparison is his use of weekly average earnings instead of hourly. Average 
working hours per week for municipal workers were around 59 in Sweden in 
1909 (Bagge et al. 1935 p. 15), while weekly working hours were 47 in the US 
(Board of Trade 1911 p. xix). The US construction workers happened to belong 
to the lucky ones who enjoyed a less strenuous workday around the first decade 
of the twentieth century (Shergold 1982), while in Sweden municipal workers 
toiled as many hours as the average Swedish worker (Arbetsstatistik 1911). 
Adjusting Williamson’s estimated US/Sweden wage gap (building workers) for 
working hours expands it from 179 to 245.18 
2.2.3. New real wage benchmarks for manufacturing workers 
Wage ratios for workers in sectors other than agriculture will probably show a 
somewhat different picture of wage distances between workers in the three 
countries. Wage ratios differ widely by industries, however, which poses a 
potential problem for establishing wage benchmarks. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show 
the wide ranges among the wage ratios. The UK/Sweden ratios range from 94 
for engineering to 149 for textile, and the US/Sweden ratios from 128 for saw 
mills to 304 for skilled workers in building. What does the true picture look like? 
Let us instead try to establish a benchmark based on manufacturing workers. 
                                                 
 
18  The average of skilled and unskilled building workers from Board of Trade’s (1911) sample is 
245. 
TABLE 2.3. UK/Sweden real wage ratios, 1905 
  Feinstein Board of Trade 
Textile hourly 149  
Mining hourly 142  
Engineering hourly 94  
Weighted average hourly 118  
    
Manufacturing, annual annual 92  
    
Agriculture weekly 104  
Building hourly 109  
Building, skilled  hourly  116 
Building, unskilled hourly  101 
    
Williamson weekly  114 
Sources: the UK: Feinstein (1990, 1995), Board of Trade (1908); Sweden: Bagge et al. (1933, 
1935). 
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Within the context of his historical national accounts, Feinstein has refined 
existing evidence of British nominal and real wages in a number of important 
works. In Feinstein (1995) he reported British average weekly earnings for 
workers in engineering, mining and textile. If we weight these industries by their 
shares of employment in 1911, based on information from Feinstein (1990), we 
can establish a reasonable measure of weekly average earnings in 
manufacturing. These weekly earnings need to be converted to average hourly 
earnings to make them comparable to Swedish measures. Bienefeld (1972) 
provides the denominator by reporting weekly working hours for the different 
industries. British working hours were on average 53.3 in the manufacturing 
sector. 
Turning to Swedish wage data, we still rely on the Bagge et al. (1933) 
documentation of average hourly earnings for manufacturing workers as a whole 
and a number of separate industries. However, the way these wages were 
constructed requires a minor digression in order to justify a slight modification 
of their wage levels. As no official wage statistics existed before 1913, 
information on wages was attained from archival sources. The authors tracked 
the movement of wages for a sample of representative workers. That method is 
sometimes called kinetic since it records the movement of wages better than it 
establishes the average wage level of all workers in a particular industry. The 
authors used cross-sections to compare wage levels of the selected workers with 
the average level of all workers in a particular concern. These cross-sections 
were made for 1865, 1885 and 1905 and it was found that in most cases the 
wage level of the selected workers was on average five per cent higher than the 
average of all workers. Accordingly, we have lowered the hourly earnings as 
reported by Bagge et al. (1933) by five per cent. The UK/Sweden wage 
TABLE 2.4. US/Sweden wage ratios, 1909 
 
 
Douglas 
Rees Board of 
Trade 
Textile hourly 149 135  
Mining hourly 175   
Metal  yearly 203 182  
Saw mills hourly 128   
Food yearly 153   
Wood pulp  yearly 147 121  
     
All manufacturing industries hourly 184 136  
     
Agriculture weekly 156   
Building hourly 278   
Building, skilled hourly   276 
Building, unskilled hourly   214 
     
Williamson weekly   179 
Sources: the US: Douglas (1930), Rees (1961) and Board of Trade (1911); Sweden: Bagge et al. 
(1933, 1935). 
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benchmark for manufacturing based on hourly earnings then becomes 119. That 
is very close to the benchmark of 114 which Williamson drew on, although it 
seems a mere coincidence that his benchmark tallies so well with ours since his 
was based on weekly earnings for construction workers and ours on hourly 
earnings in manufacturing. 
For the US/Swedish comparison, matters are a bit trickier. Douglas (1930) 
and Rees (1961) present two completely different pictures of average wage 
levels for the US manufacturing sector. By using different samples they arrive at 
very different results.19 Using Douglas data for the manufacturing sector as a 
whole gives a US/Sweden benchmark of 184, but after exchanging Rees for 
Douglas the gap narrows to no more than 136! Rees claims that Douglas’ wage 
levels are too high because of his reliance on union rates. It is worth reiterating 
Rees’ argument against union rates as a measure of labours’ actual rewards. 
Firstly, union rates tend to be more stable through time than earnings actually 
received by union members, and secondly, and for the present context most 
importantly, as the lion’s share of workers were not unionized, levels of union 
rates were too high.20 Rees persuasively demonstrates how Douglas’ reliance on 
union rates raised the estimated wage levels above factual levels. Other indirect 
evidence further reinforces the impression that the lower US/Sweden wage ratio 
for manufacturing workers holds. The thorough investigations undertaken by 
Shergold (1982) and Phelps Brown and Browne (1968) show that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century the majority of US workers enjoyed a real 
income lead by no more than around twenty per cent in relation to the British. If 
we further assume a safe ground for the UK/Sweden comparison, which showed 
a less than twenty per cent British advantage, Douglas’ wage levels seem 
implausibly high. In Rees’ estimate the pieces of wage evidence are brought 
together in a consistent manner. 
However, comparative levels of labour productivity in the manufacturing 
sector may provide additional evidence used to discriminate between the two 
possible US/Sweden wage relatives. Chapter 4 provides estimates of 
comparative levels of labour productivity for Sweden, the UK and the US. The 
US/Sweden productivity benchmark for 1905 was 252, which indicates that if 
anything the relative wage level of 136, implied by Rees’ American wage data, 
is remarkably low. The labour productivity benchmark is closer to the relative 
wage level of 184 implied by Douglas’ American wage data. The UK/Sweden 
                                                 
 
19  This controversy should not be confused with the one on the growth of American real wages in 
1890-1914. Rees constructed a different cost-of-living index increasing less than Douglas’ 
which made his real wage series grow faster. Their series for nominal wages recorded similar 
rates though. 
20  According to one estimate around 11.6 per cent of the work force in manufacturing were 
unionized in 1910 (Rees 1961 p. 21). In Douglas sample, however, union rates were given a 
weight of 31.5 per cent, and the rest came from payroll industries. 
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comparison brings the same incongruity if to a smaller extent; the benchmark of 
labour productivity is 160 and the relative wage level is 118. A relative level of 
labour productivity far off the relative wage level may indicate that distributional 
considerations play an important part. In this case it suggests that the share of 
value added accruing to labour was higher in Sweden than the UK and the US. 
Yet it is important to remember that productivity differences do not translate 
directly into real wage differences – recalling the discussion on PPP in relation 
to official exchange rates – because prices of the consumables underlying the 
estimated PPP increase relatively more in the productivity leading country. The 
estimates of comparative labour productivity levels do not reflect these 
implications. Furthermore, Broadberry (1994) has shown that the American 
productivity level was around twice the British in the first decade of the 
twentieth century when at the same time Shergold (1982) showed that the 
American wage lead was no more than around twenty per cent. As we cannot 
expect parity between relative real wage and labour productivity levels we 
should attach more importance to Shergold (1982) and Phelps Brown and 
Browne’s direct evidence of comparative wage levels.21 Since the relative wage 
level implied by the use of Douglas’ American wage data is difficult to reconcile 
with what this literature unfolds concerning the American wage level in relation 
to the British it is my conjecture that Rees’ American wage data is closer to the 
truth. 
2.3. Real wage series and movement of pay ratios 
The choice of series for nominal wages and cost-of-living index influences 
any comparison of real wage levels far off the reference point, as do 
interpretations of relative movements. While the wage benchmarks in 
Williamson (1995b) were based on a mixture of skilled and unskilled 
construction workers, his real wage series represent unskilled workers in 
manufacturing. Williamson’s justification for basing comparisons on male urban 
unskilled workers only, instead of a more encompassing wage measure, is that 
less skilled workers in different industries were subject to similar demand and 
supply forces which did not derive from industry-specific developments of new 
technologies. Another argument he has put forward is that the great bulk of 
                                                 
 
21  There is a recent literature (van Zanden 1999, Allen 2001, 2005, Broadberry and Gupta 2006) 
which attempts to compare wage levels between India and Britain, and between the developed 
parts of north-western Europe and the less-developed parts of southern, central and eastern 
Europe. While comparisons based on the silver content of the currencies indicate a large gap 
between the developed country or region and the less developed country or region, the gap 
diminishes significantly in comparisons of the amount of food wages could purchase. This 
indicates higher productivity in the developed country or region which brought higher prices 
and nominal wages. 
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emigrants from the Old World were unskilled. The argument that the choice of 
workers matters turns on the assumption of pay ratio movement in one direction 
or another. For instance, if mass migration over the Atlantic made unskilled 
workers in the New World worse off while benefiting the unskilled workers 
remaining in Europe, changing pay ratios must have followed suit (unless 
levelling forces set in with strength enough to revert the trend). The label 
unskilled is, however, very elusive, and it will become clear below that scant 
wage information for most countries in the nineteenth century makes it a highly 
questionable exercise to construct wage series for unskilled workers instead of 
resorting to series comprising more workers. On the other hand, wage 
comparisons of aggregate measures bring into consideration the potential effects 
of labour heterogeneity on earnings. What, in fact, are we comparing? Growth 
patterns and fluctuations in the constituent series underlying the final index vary 
widely. More rapid and more volatile changes in some industries compensate for 
slower growth and more stable patterns in other industries. What we hope to 
achieve with the use of an aggregate measure is the general direction of change. 
An aggregate measure is the best option at hand as long as there is a paucity of 
wage data for comparable, well defined groups of workers. And, furthermore, no 
agreement has been reached on any turn of the series displaying pay ratios 
between skilled and unskilled workers in the nineteenth century. The unsettled 
debate surrounding inequality in the late nineteenth century cautions against the 
use of real wage series for unskilled workers exhibiting a markedly different 
behaviour from series for wages for workers as a whole. 
2.3.1. Swedish evidence 
The Swedish real wage series in Williamson (1995b) refers to a real unskilled 
industrial wage index from Bagge et al. (1933) who present series for hourly 
earnings for various skilled and unskilled workers but no separate skilled and 
unskilled series for manufacturing as a whole. Williamson pieced together four 
of the separate unskilled series: iron, wood pulp, sugar and engineering.22 
However, before 1888 his final unskilled series includes only the series for 
unskilled iron workers. Below, we will contrast Williamson’s series for wages 
for unskilled workers with a series for wages for manufacturing as a whole 
(skilled and unskilled). This latter series is based on the separate wage series in 
Bagge et al. (1933), but differs somewhat from their series for average 
manufacturing which until now has represented the natural reference point of 
wage movement for Swedish industrial workers in the nineteenth century. The 
difference stems above all from a different weighting of the constituent wage 
series as the digression in Appendix 2..2 informs. Graph 2.2 which puts the two 
                                                 
 
22 This information cannot be found in the appendix in Williamson (1995b) but I have on request 
received the missing link from the author. 
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series, Williamson’s unskilled and manufacturing as a whole, together indicates 
a significant discrepancy before the 1890s. The series for iron workers causes 
this deviant pattern; disagreement disappears after 1888 when the series consists 
of more occupations. Williamson’s unskilled series starts from a lower level, 
attains the modified Bagge et al.’s series in 1892 and they accompany each other 
in the following years. The computed growth rate for Williamson’s unskilled 
series is more rapid, especially if the starting point is 1870 when the series for 
unskilled workers dips, suggesting that rewards to unskilled workers progressed 
more rapidly than rewards to manufacturing workers between 1870 and 1913. 
This point deserves further emphasis: 1870 is the first year from which real wage 
data are available for all the countries in Williamson’s sample. Results from 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models refer therefore – for the sake of 
comparability – to the years between 1870 and 1913.23 
One way of checking the implied divergence of the skilled-unskilled pay 
ratio suggested by graph 2.2 is to construct an index of all skilled-unskilled wage 
                                                 
 
23  See O’Rourke and Williamson (1995a, 1995b, 1997). 
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GRAPH 2.2. Real wage series for manufacturing and unskilled workers in 
Sweden, 1860–1913 (1900=100) 
Sources: Wages: unskilled workers from Williamson (1995b table A1.1). The series for 
manufacturing workers represents a modified series based on the industry specific wage series 
in Bagge et al. (1933), set out in Appendix 2.1. Cost of living: Myrdal (1933 table A column 
17, budget b). 
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ratios presented in Bagge et al. (1933, 1935).24 Only the series for iron workers 
and municipal workers in Stockholm cover the years before 1887, making it 
provisional in the extreme to say anything about the movement of pay relatives 
before that year.25 I have constructed a combined series by splicing the different  
indices and adjusting the level to the average wage level in 1903 in order to fill 
up as long a time span as possible. Graph 2.3 contains the three-year moving 
                                                 
 
24  Lundh et al. (2004) compiled daily and annual wage series for skilled and unskilled workers 
for nine regions in 1861–1913, based on Bagge et al. (1933, 1935), monographic firm or 
branch studies and data from the archive of the Tariff Commission of 1876 (Tullkommiten). 
The overwhelming impression from these wage series, if admittedly based on a graphic 
inspection of mine, is that the gap between skilled and unskilled workers’ wages in the nine 
regions remained unchanged. 
25 In a local study of Bredsjö ironworks (Larsson 1986) confirms the tendency of a narrowing 
gap between skilled and unskilled iron workers in the 1870s and 1880s. This tendency 
coincides with a turning point with respect to the way workers were paid. A rigid wage policy 
gave gradually way to more market based principles in which productivity and market 
conditions came to be more important. Less skilled workers benefited more from this transition 
than their masters did, perhaps as a result of a larger weight given to piece work and higher 
productivity. As for the fortune of unskilled workers in branches other than iron, we simply 
know next to nothing. 
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GRAPH 2.3. Skilled/unskilled wage ratios in Sweden, 1861–1912 
Note: A combined index of the different skilled/unskilled wage ratios for workers in the 
following industries: iron 1860-1913, engineering 1903-1913, wood 1890-1913, paper pulp 
1895-1913, municipal workers in Stockholm 1860-1893, and municipal workers in all towns 
in 1894-1913. The combined series is a three-year moving average. 
Sources: The series of iron workers from Larsson (1986) and all the other series from Bagge et 
al. (1933). 
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average of the combined series. It fails to capture any long-term movement in 
either direction.26 
Day rates for a male agricultural worker represent another indicator of the 
relative price of unskilled workers. The comparison between agricultural and 
manufacturing workers in graph 2.4 defies claims of steady movements of pay 
ratios in either direction. In contrast to Williamson’s unskilled series, the series 
for agricultural wages starts at the same level as the series for manufacturing 
workers, and instead of falling further behind at the beginning of the 1870s, it 
shot up as a result of the agricultural boom in the mid 1870s (Jörberg 1972b). It 
furthermore lags behind in the agrarian crises in the latter half of the 1880s. 
Apart from these deviations, however, the series for agricultural wages sticks 
quite closely to the series for manufacturing. Thus, for assessing the long-term 
movement of the Swedish real wages from the second half of the nineteenth 
century until the First World War, it should be unimportant whether the wage 
series consists of skilled or unskilled workers, but this conclusion rests on scanty 
evidence. 
                                                 
 
26  Swedish pay ratio=57.34+0.115*TIME (t-ratio: 0.832). 
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GRAPH 2.4. Real wage series for agricultural and manufacturing workers in 
Sweden, 1860–1913 (1900=100) 
Sources: The wage series for manufacturing workers represents a modified series based on the 
industry-specific wage series in Bagge et al. (1933), set out in Appendix 2.1. The wage series 
for agriculture from Jörberg (1972a pp. 713–4). Both series deflated by a cost-of-living index 
from Myrdal (1933 table A column 17, budget b). 
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Admittedly, Swedish mass migration, by diminishing the supply of unskilled 
workers, may have served to contract skilled to unskilled pay ratios. Widening 
pay ratios are however an equally persuasive hypothesis as the migration era 
coincides with the end of around 150 years of very rapid land reclamation in the 
country side, which abruptly diminished working opportunities for landless rural 
workers, thus augmenting the labour supply. The issue of pay ratio movements 
in one direction or another is after all empirical, and certain answers must 
therefore await future research. Until then the safest option at hand is to stick to 
the series for manufacturing wages as a whole. Most of the workers underlying 
the series were unskilled manual workers living in urban areas anyway. Two-
thirds of the male blue-collar workers in the US manufacturing industry were 
either operatives or labourers, whereas only one-third was craftsmen, foremen, 
or other more skilled workers (Rosenbloom 1996). 
2.3.2. American evidence 
The slow-growing real wage series for unskilled American workers is the 
cornerstone of the belief that wages in the Old World converged rapidly towards 
the New World in the latter half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Otherwise, the grand story of factor price convergence would 
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GRAPH 2.5. Real wage series for unskilled and manufacturing workers in the 
US, 1860–1913 (1860=100) 
Sources: The series for real wages for unskilled workers from Williamson (1995b table A1.1). 
Nominal wages for manufacturing workers for 1860–1890 from Long (1960 table A-11) and 
for 1890–1913 from Rees (1961 table 1). Both series deflated by a cost-of-living index from 
David and Solar (1977 table 1). 
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not work. Graph 2.5 plots Williamson’s unskilled series alongside a series which 
represents manufacturing as a whole. This latter series is a spliced index of 
Clarence D Long’s wage series for 1860–1890 and Albert Rees’ wage series for 
1890–1914, deflated by a cost-of-living index from David and Solar (1977).27 
The comparison of these two wage series reveals that a large gap between the 
two appears gradually after the end of the 1880s. Between 1890/94 and 1910/14 
Williamson’s series for unskilled grew 0.79 per cent annually while Rees’ series 
grew 1.45 per cent annually. It is therefore worth looking a bit closer at the 
origin of Williamson’s unskilled series. The references are twofold: Williamson 
(1975) himself furnishes wage data for the years between 1860 and 1889 and 
David and Solar (1977) for the ensuing years until 1914.28 Let us focus on the 
latter sub-period. David and Solar based their series on compilations by Whitney 
Coombs (1926), who in his turn used the Nineteenth Annual Report of the  
Commissioner of Labor for the years up to 1907, and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics from 1907 onwards. Coombs series is based on full-time weekly 
earnings of the lowest paid occupations reported for each industry, thus 
excluding most common labourers. Carter and Sutch (1998) label his series 
‘lower-skilled labour’. That may explain why the series makes appreciably less 
progress after 1907. The slow growth of wages for American unskilled workers 
goes a long way to explaining how it all of a sudden became possible to tell a 
story of factor price convergence while previously GDP/capita measures had 
failed to capture any narrowing income gaps between the Old and New World. 
If true, the wage series in graph 2.5 conveys a measure of rising American 
inequality. Can other evidence buttress the slow growing American wage series 
for unskilled workers? And have pay ratios between skilled and unskilled 
workers been at stake in the literature on American late nineteenth century 
inequality movements? Habakkuk, in his seminal study in 1962, believed that 
the mass of unskilled immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe entering the 
US at the end of the nineteenth century was large enough to leave a deep 
impression in the pay ratio record, expanding the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers. He did however not present any evidence for it. Williamson 
and Lindert (1980), in tracing the long term Kuznets U-curve, focused more on 
                                                 
 
27  Different ways of estimating average hourly earnings make the two American indices less 
suitable for studying cyclical behaviour. Long’s series is based on average hourly earnings 
derived from daily wages, whereas Rees derived his average hourly earnings from annual 
earnings. See Margo (2007) for a brief introduction to the US wage sources referred to by 
Long, Douglas and Rees. 
28  The sources underlying Williamson’s series for wages for American unskilled workers are as 
follows: 1861-1869: Abbot (1905), table X, p. 363, which in turn was based on data from the 
Aldrich report (1870-1890): Long (1960), table A-4, pp. 139-40, laborers in eastern cities, 
based on Bulletin 18, 1890-1913: Coombs (1926), table 5, col I, which in turn was based on 
the Nineteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labour published in 1905 and for 1890-
1907 wage quotations compiled by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
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domestic explanations, in particular technological imbalances and different 
sectoral growth rates of total factor productivity.29 They saw an upturn in skilled-
unskilled pay ratios in the decades preceding the Civil War and another starting 
in the mid-1890s. Their claim that antebellum America experienced a surge in 
inequality sparked some debate (Grosse 1982; Margo and Villaflor 1987), but to 
my knowledge not much ink has been spilled on their evidence of the next surge 
in inequality which took place in the mid-1890s.30 Graph 2.6 shows their skilled-
unskilled pay ratios in the US between 1860 and 1913. Unskilled workers lost 
ground steadily from the mid-1890s until World War I, which provides some 
support for Williamson’s use of a wage series for unskilled workers which after 
the end of the 1890s lags behind wages for workers in general.31 It is not 
independent evidence though; the pay ratios are in fact computed by the same 
unskilled wage series as the one appearing in graph 2.5.  
Rising American inequality fits squarely with the historical narrative. A 
recurrent theme in the economic history literature is the gradual turn-around in 
immigration policy, from unrestrictive towards more restrictive and eventually 
prohibitive laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One of the 
explanations behind the evolution of immigration policy is the threat a soaring 
number of immigrants from the less developed parts of Southern and Eastern 
Europe posed against American born unskilled workers. When the supply of 
unskilled increased their relative bargaining position may have worsen, retarding 
the growth of their wages. There is thus no reason to expect a priori that 
Williamson’s unskilled American wage series is based on a faulty foundation. 
The reliability of the series depends on how representative Coombs’ sample of 
lower unskilled workers is. Carter and Sutch (1998 p. 336) ‘have serious 
reservations about Coombs’ data, which are a pastiche of observations drawn 
from a variety of sources’. They hint, but actually do not prove, that the series 
misrepresents the movement of unskilled real wages. In contrast to Williamson’s 
British and Swedish unskilled wage series, the American includes at least a 
variety of occupations which makes it more trustworthy evidence. 
                                                 
 
29  One of the explanations behind the inverted U-curve, inspired by Kuznets (1955), is that rapid 
industrialisation brings about increased demand for skills, which in turn affects the skill 
premium. Skilled labour is a complement to capital, and falling prices of capital lead therefore 
to increased demand for skill. The inelastic supply of skill leads to changes in the structure of 
pay; the skilled-unskilled wage gap expands and inequality follows in its wake. The skilled-
unskilled pay ratio declines in due course of time when the supply of skills is more in harmony 
with demand and so inequality reverts to its initial position (Kaelbe 1991). 
30  Lindert (2000) in his search for the turning points in increasing American inequality did not 
lay any emphasis on the evidence of expanding skilled-unskilled pay ratio in the 1890s. One 
local study which belies Williamson and Lindert’s pay ratio evidence is Shergold (1977). He 
showed that the skilled-unskilled ratio actually decreased. 
31  US pay ratio=-512.61+0.738*TIME (t-ratio: 7.884)  
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2.3.3. British evidence 
Williamson’s unskilled series for the UK consists of a sample of bricklayer’s 
labourers’ daily wages. In contrast to the American series of unskilled wages, it 
is a very narrow definition of a measure intended to measure the rewards to raw, 
unskilled labour in general. The sample was originally collected by the Board of 
Trade (1908) and remained unpublished until it was rediscovered by Boyer et al. 
(1993). To construct a manufacturing series for comparison with Williamson’s 
unskilled series we can turn to Feinstein’s painstaking investigation into the 
movement of average daily earnings in the UK. Still, his most encompassing 
index of manufacturing covers only the years between 1880 and 1913 (Feinstein 
1990), while elsewhere he has presented a more long-term series based on 
manual workers from five broad sectors: agriculture, building, coal mining, 
cotton textiles, and engineering (including shipbuilding and vehicles) (Feinstein 
1995). To render that series a better representation of manufacturing, agriculture 
and building were excluded and the remaining components were weighted by 
their shares of employment in 1881 (Feinstein 1990). The two British series have 
then been spliced in order to cover the whole period. Graph 2.7 indicates that the 
choice of wage series will influence our view of movement of the UK/Sweden 
wage ratio, but to a lesser extent than in the US/Sweden comparison. The two 
series move in tandem until at least the turn of the century after which the wage 
series for unskilled workers started lagging behind. In the British case inequality 
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GRAPH 2.6. Skilled/unskilled wage ratios in the US, 1861–1912 
Note: Three years moving average. 
Sources: Williamson and Lindert (1980 p. 307). 
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does not seem to play an equally important part in the story, surprising though it 
seems in light of the fierce debate about pay-ratios and other inequality measures 
in the wider historiography of British economic growth and living standards in 
the nineteenth century. Williamson’s study from 1985, in which the contour of 
an inverted U-curve as measured in the movement of pay ratios appeared, 
provoked critical reactions. It challenged long-held views on the restrained 
movement of skill differentials (Phelps Brown 1977; Soltow 1968). Responses 
came from Jackson (1987) and Feinstein (1988) who pointed to the lack of 
robustness as incomes for lawyers and doctors account for nearly all the 
inequality, let alone the fact that those incomes were mismeasured. Crafts (1989) 
summarised the British debate by concluding that the data set has to be 
augmented to make it possible for any future claim of pay ratio movements to 
rest on a firmer evidential basis. 
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GRAPH 2.7. Real wage series for unskilled and manufacturing workers in the 
UK, 1860–1913 (1860=100) 
Sources: The real wages series for unskilled workers from Williamson (1995b table A1.1). 
Nominal wages for manufacturing (coal mining, cotton textiles and engineering) for 1860–
1880 from Feinstein (1995 table A.23) and for 1880–1913 from Feinstein (1990 table 4). Both 
series deflated by a cost-of-living index from Feinstein (1995 table A.24). 
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2.4. New real wage comparisons 
2.4.1. US/Sweden 
Time series for real wages between 1860 and 1913, adjusted to the benchmarks, 
give opportunity to assess relative real wage movements over time. The 
selection of workers underlying the real wage series matters when assessing the 
movement of the US/Sweden real wage ratio. Graph 2.8 compares Williamson’s 
US/Sweden ratio (Williamson) with a modified ratio in which the Swedish series 
instead represents manufacturing as a whole (modified). It may at first glance 
seem a modest difference between the two – overall, they move pari passu 
offering no reason to alter or modify Williamson’s contention – but one feature 
merits special treatment. In the modified series the startling contraction in the 
US/Swedish real wage ratio in the 1870s has slipped away. If we take the first 
reference point in 1870 and the last year of the series, 1914, as the second, 
Williamson’s index drops 253 percentage points, from 410 to 157, while the 
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GRAPH 2.8. Different series for US/Sweden real-wage ratios, 1860–1913 
Note: The series titled Williamson is based on Williamson’s comparable real wage series, the 
American series divided by the Swedish. The series called modified has a different Swedish 
series but adjusted to the same benchmark in 1909 as the series called Williamson. The series 
called new has, apart from a new Swedish series, a new American series. In 1909, the new 
series is furthermore linked to a new real wage benchmark of 136 set out in table 2.4.  
Sources: Wages: The series titled Williamson from Williamson (1995b table A2.1); the 
Swedish series in modified and new is a modified series for manufacturing workers based on 
the industry-specific wage series from Bagge et al. (1933) and set out in Appendix 2.1; and the 
American series in modified from Long (1960 table A-11) and Rees (1961 table 1). Cost of 
living: the US, (David and Solar 1977); Sweden, Myrdal (1933 table A column 17, budget b). 
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modified series declines more moderately, from 236 to 202, or 34 percentage 
points.32 Almost all of the alleged magnitude of the US/Sweden wage 
contraction is now erased. Furthermore, I link the Long-Rees series for 
manufacturing to the new US/Sweden benchmark of 136, the series labelled 
new.33 Graph 2.8 depicts what turns out to be a series for wage ratios without 
trend altogether; in the course of fifty-four years the Swedish catch-up with the 
US wage level is non-existent. Looking at the global labour market from this 
new angle, furnished with more encompassing wage series, the claims made by 
Williamson and his collaborators of a ‘collapse’ of the New-Old World real 
wage ratio seem a bit doubtful. 
2.4.2. UK/Sweden 
The UK/Sweden comparison whose constituent components are highlighted in 
graph 2.9 shows some similarities with the US/Sweden comparison but overall 
downplays the role of different wage measures. Williamson’s series 
(Williamson) of UK/Sweden ratios indicates that at the beginning of the 1870s 
the UK wage level was around twice the Swedish. The series has a volatile 
nature until the mid-1880s, which is a pattern we remember well from the 
US/Sweden comparison. While Williamson’s British series represents 
bricklayer’s labourers, the Swedish series represents iron workers (pre-1888). 
When modifying the Swedish series by substituting manufacturing for unskilled 
wages the surging pre-1885 wage gaps disappear; instead, the modified 
comparison sticks more closely to a British lead of around 50 per cent until the 
last decade of the century. In the modified comparison Williamson’s British 
series of daily earnings of bricklayers has furthermore been adjusted to take 
account of changing working hours to make it a better counterpart to the 
Swedish series of hourly earnings in manufacturing.34 The start of the 1890s 
marks the beginning of a trend towards unity, which brought about convergence, 
and finally reversed roles, on the eve of World War I. The final step implies a 
comparison of manufacturing wages on both sides. To make Feinstein’s more 
encompassing measure of weekly earnings strictly comparable to the Swedish 
hourly it incorporates changing working hours. No markedly different picture 
                                                 
 
32  O’Rourke and Williamson sometimes use a three-year centred moving average but it only 
partly irons out the disparity between the two indices, see for instance O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1997). 
33  The series is linked to the US-Sweden benchmark based on Rees’ estimated US wage level. 
The wage gap would have been a great deal larger if it was linked to the benchmark based on 
Douglas’ estimated American wage level. However, it would not have altered the trend of the 
series. 
34  The source of working hours is Huberman (2004). His earliest benchmark is however from 
1870. Extrapolation backwards, using the estimated trend coefficient between 1870 and 1880, 
extends his series of working hours back to 1860. 
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emerges when comparing the movements of manufacturing wages adjusted to 
the new UK/Sweden benchmark of 118. 
2.5. Conclusions 
Sweden represents the largest country in Scandinavia, a peripheral region that 
appears to have been an overachiever in the late nineteenth century catch up with 
the core. Much of what has been written about ‘spectacular’ factor-price 
equalisation in the first era of globalisation relies on real wage comparisons first 
presented by Jeffrey G. Williamson in his influential article The Evolution of 
Global Labour Markets since 1850: Background Evidence and Hypotheses 
(1995b). This chapter takes a closer look at the way Sweden has been compared 
to the US and the UK, modifies existing evidence and brings forth a new 
comparison. 
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GRAPH 2.9. Different series for the UK/Sweden real-wage ratios, 1860–1913 
Note: The series titled Williamson is based on Williamson’s comparable real wage series, the 
British series divided by the Swedish. The series titled modified has a different Swedish series 
but adjusted to the same benchmark in 1905 as the series titled Williamson. The series titled 
new has, apart from a new Swedish series, a new British series. The new series is furthermore 
linked to a new real wage benchmark of 118 from table 2.3.  
Sources: Wages: The series titled Williamson from Williamson (1995b table A2.1); the 
Swedish series in new and modified is a modified series for manufacturing workers based on 
the industry-specific wage series from Bagge et al. (1933) and set out in Appendix 2.1; and the 
British series in new for 1860–1880 from Feinstein (1995 table A.23) and for 1880–1913 from 
Feinstein (1990 table 4). Cost of living: the UK, Feinstein (1995 table A.24); Sweden, Myrdal 
(1933 table A column 17, budget b). 
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Williamson greatly exaggerated the Swedish wage gap in relation to the US 
by using wages for both skilled and unskilled building workers in a benchmark 
for 1909. American building workers, especially the skilled, received much 
higher pay than their European counterparts at the turn of the century. The pay 
distance narrows, therefore, if we consider instead what most manufacturing 
workers received. The new US/Sweden wage benchmark based on Albert Rees’ 
wage data for manufacturing workers then becomes 136, in contrast to 276, 
which is based on skilled construction workers. The estimated US/Sweden wage 
gap becomes enlarged if instead Paul Douglas’ American wage data are used. 
The Swedish catch up with the US and the UK has been overestimated 
because of reliance on merely a single pre-1887 Swedish wage series for 
unskilled iron workers, which behaved differently from what we know – at least 
with some certainty – about Swedish wage behaviour in general in that it 
progressed at a remarkably swift pace in relation to average manufacturing 
wages. The scanty evidence of any pay ratio movements in Sweden points, 
however, to stability, which indicates that it is unjustifiable to regard unskilled 
wages as outpacing wages for manufacturing wages as a whole. The choice of 
Swedish wage series, whether representing skilled, unskilled or manufacturing 
workers, should be unimportant, provided it includes a representative sample of 
occupations. After substituting a modified Swedish series, based on Bagge et 
al.’s (1933) various wage series for manufacturing workers, for Williamson’s 
Swedish unskilled wage series, the remarkable drops in the 1870’s in the US-
Sweden and UK-Sweden wage ratios disappear. Instead the narrowing of the 
gaps occurred after the turn of the century. In addition to this modification of the 
Swedish wage series, a comparison is also made between the modified Swedish 
series and an American series, based on Clarence D. Long and Albert Rees’ 
wage data, and a British series, based on Charles Feinstein’s wage data, 
capturing the wage experience of a sample of manufacturing workers. That 
further modification makes the series of US/Sweden ratios remain essentially 
flat, whereas it does not affect the UK/Sweden comparison. 
Finally, Swedish workers’ wages caught up with British workers’ around the 
turn of the century, whether we use Williamson’s unskilled or Feinstein’s more 
encompassing wage series. This finding also accords with the evidence of 
comparative labour productivity ratios in manufacturing presented in chapter 4. 
Thus the UK/Sweden comparison is unambiguous. On the other hand, the 
US/Sweden comparison is ambiguous. There are difficulties as far as the 
estimated wage gap in 1909 concerns and Williamson’s American unskilled 
wage series diverge markedly from the series capturing manufacturing at large. 
This brings to the fore large wage dispersions and subsequent measurement 
problem as distinguished American features, making it difficult to establish an 
authoritative picture of wages in the US vs. wages elsewhere. Using again the 
evidence of comparative labour productivity ratios in manufacturing from 
chapter 4, which shows that Sweden reduced the American distance after the 
turn of the century, make us in fact gravitate towards Williamson’s unskilled 
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series as expressing most adequately the wage experiences of manual workers in 
the manufacturing sector. Yet a final affirmation as to the representativeness of 
the different American wage series has to await future research efforts. 
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Appendix 2.1. Real wage series 
TABLE A.2.1 Real wage series for the US, the UK and Sweden, 1860–1913 (1900=100) 
 US  UK  Sweden 
 Unskilled Manufact.  Unskilled Manufact.  Unskilled Manufact. 
1860 68 60  58 56  33 54 
1861 66 58  56 55  40 51 
1862 59 55  57 56  48 53 
1863 53 45  60 58  46 59 
1864 50 41  61 59  42 60 
1865 53 43  60 62  44 64 
1866 56 45  62 61  35 59 
1867 60 50  60 56  36 54 
1868 62 52  63 59  45 55 
1869 69 55  69 64  51 61 
1870 74 58  69 65  34 59 
1871 75 63  67 65  41 58 
1872 75 63  65 65  45 63 
1873 76 66  65 67  43 64 
1874 79 66  70 71  51 72 
1875 81 67  73 72  50 66 
1876 82 67  74 72  46 65 
1877 72 66  75 74  52 68 
1878 72 67  78 73  59 68 
1879 72 66  82 73  54 63 
1880 71 67  79 73  54 63 
1881 75 69  78 74  49 64 
1882 82 71  79 76  56 68 
1883 84 74  78 76  59 69 
1884 87 77  81 78  62 72 
1885 87 77  84 80  66 76 
1886 89 80  85 80  69 78 
1887 88 82  87 83  71 81 
1888 88 77  88 85  68 80 
1889 90 86  87 87  68 79 
1890 91 88  87 96  71 81 
1891 91 88  90 95  71 79 
1892 91 89  91 95  76 83 
1893 92 94  96 96  81 87 
1894 92 90  98 99  86 92 
1895 96 91  100 102  88 92 
1896 95 95  100 103  93 94 
1897 96 94  99 103  96 96 
1898 97 92  102 102  97 97 
1899 99 98  104 105  97 97 
1900 100 100  100 100  100 100 
1901 102 104  100 100  106 103 
1902 104 107  100 100  105 104 
1903 105 107  99 99  105 103 
1904 105 106  100 100  109 107 
1905 107 109  99 100  106 109 
1906 110 114  100 102  107 112 
1907 110 113  97 102  109 106 
1908 107 111  96 100  115 113 
1909 110 114  96 100  117 117 
1910 109 116  94 99  122 125 
1911 106 119  93 101  125 129 
1912 105 118  92 101  120 125 
1913 109 124  99 103  119 126 
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Note: The American and Swedish unskilled real wage series come from Williamson (1995 table 
A1.1) while the British unskilled real wage series from the same source is adjusted for working 
hours and deflated with a different price series from Feinstein (1995 table A.24). The Swedish real 
wage series for manufacturing in 1860–1868 and 1912–1913 is based on Bagge et al.’s (1933 table 
26) original series for manufacturing workers as a whole and in 1868–1912 the modified version 
(Laspeyres, base year 1868) of their series (see Appendix 2.2). For sources of the other series, see 
graphs 2.8 and 2.9.  
Appendix 2.2. New wage series for Swedish 
manufacturing 
Since official wage statistics for manufacturing workers did not appear before 
World War I, our wage evidence comes from Bagge et al.’s (1933) detailed 
investigation based on archival sources. The usual reference point to the 
movement of pre-World War I Swedish wages is their index of average wages in 
manufacturing based on averages for iron and steel, mining, metal 
manufacturing and engineering, sawmills, wood-pulp mills, paper mills, food 
products, textile industry and leather, rubber goods and chemical industries 
(Bagge et al. 1933 pp. 43–4). The authors do not give any precise information on 
the assigned weights but list the factors they consider most important in 
assigning to each industry an appropriate weight. Those factors are, for instance, 
the quality of the wage material, the size of the firm from which the pay record 
was taken and the number of workers in that industry. Quality seems to have 
mattered most (pp. 38–9): ‘The greatest attention, then, has been paid to the 
quality of the series, though, to some extent the relative size of the occupations 
and concerns have also been considered’. The lack of detailed insights into the 
process of aggregation frustrates any attempt to replicate their average series of 
manufacturing. This is unfortunate inasmuch as Schön’s (1988) revisions of 
output, within the context of Swedish historical national accounts, and the 
corresponding adjustments of the number of workers by me for the period 1868–
1912 (chapter 5), justify a closer look at what a different weighting scheme, 
based on the wage bill, may bring about. In the following attempt to assign to 
each series a new weight, based on the new information on output and 
employment for 1868–1912, the quality factor attributable to each series is left 
out of consideration. Instead, the recorded growth rates of wages implied by 
each of the series are taken at face value.  
The starting point is the wage material for different industries, or groups of 
industries, which underlie the computation of Bagge et al.’s series of average 
wages. At times, these series have been complemented with the wage material 
presented in the monographs section to create as many industry-specific wage 
series as their investigation permits. Furthermore, to avoid the potential 
influence of reductions in working hours on the movement of wages, hourly 
earnings are the preferred wage measure. When hourly wages are not available 
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daily wages are the second best option, and annual wages a last resort. When an 
industry-specific series of wages is not at hand I use the wage series of the most 
closely related industry, or the series representing the group of industries to 
which that industry belongs.  
Two factors put the construction of wage relatives in favour of the 
compilation of actual wage levels: First, instead of establishing the average wage 
level in a particular firm or industry, Bagge et al. track the wage record for a 
sample of representative workers. They may, therefore, have been more 
successful in their attempt to picture the movement of wages than establishing 
actual levels. Second, there is an unfortunate mixture of hourly, daily and annual 
wages which makes it difficult to establish a representative level of any kind. 
Nonetheless, the actual wage levels have a bearing on the weights used to 
combine the different wage relatives into an aggregate series for manufacturing. 
The starting point is therefore to establish the wage levels for a reference year, in 
this case 1912. The wage level is derived from the public investigation of cost 
shares which gives the share of wages in gross output, equivalent to the wage 
bill (SOU 1923). Dividing the wage bill by the number of workers yields the 
average annual wage for each industry. Once we have pinned down the annual 
industry-specific wage levels for 1912, we can proceed by scaling the wage 
relatives and then weighting the resulting series of annual wages by number of 
workers as in formula (A.2.1), where W  and N  are average wages and number 
of employed in year t  and industry i , respectively. 
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The series so constructed pave the way for further developments into series 
that satisfy the requirements of different forms of index numbers. In the 
following formula (A.2.2) the series has been transformed into a Laspeyres 
index number where the wage relatives are weighted by the wage bill in the base 
year b . It shows how wages would have progressed had the sectoral structure 
become set in a fixed mould.  
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   (A.2.2) 
The normal convention is to measure the intra-sectoral wage movement by 
choosing an early base year, but, as table A.2.2 shows, the difference between 
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early and late base years is negligible. Annual weights also allows the 
computation of a chained Fisher index which records a somewhat slower 
growth, though again the difference between it and fixed early or late base year 
is quite insignificant. It bears noting that Bagge et al.’s wage series of average 
hourly earnings for manufacturing grew considerably faster than my new series, 
no matter which of the index formula are in use. The gap appears at the end of 
the 1870s, is widened up to the turn of the century, and maintained until 1913. 
This is an expected result considering the larger weight given to the wage series 
for sawmill workers, which grew appreciably slower than the average. The rapid 
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GRAPH A.2.1. Hourly wages for male manufacturing workers, 1868–1912 
(1868=100) 
Note: the series titled new contains sawmill workers’ wages and computed as a Laspeyres index 
with 1868 as base year. 
Sources: The series titled Bagge et al.: Bagge et al. (1933 table 26); the series titled new is set 
out in Appendix 2.1. 
TABLE A.2.2. Average percentage growth rates of nominal wages in the 
manufacturing industry, 1868–1912 
 With sawmills Without sawmills 
Laspeyres, base year=1868 1.83 2.17 
Laspeyres, base year=1912 1.84 2.18 
Chained Fisher 1.77 2.25 
Bagge et al., hourly 2.19  
Bagge et al., annual  1.91  
Note: Annual percentage rate of change has been computed by running a regression of the log 
of nominal wages on time.  
Sources: Bagge et al.’s hourly and annual: Bagge et al. (1933 table 26); the other series: see 
Appendix 2.3. 
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expansion in the sawmill industry was brought to a halt in 1874, and the drop 
from the peak in 1874 to the trough in 1891 cut the wage level by half. Between 
1870 and 1912 the series grew on average 0.37 percent annually, which was an 
80 percent slower progress than for manufacturing as a whole. Since Schön 
adjusted the level of output for sawmills upwards, and chapter 5 attempted to 
make the number of workers correspond with this higher level, the wage bill, 
and thereby the weight assigned to the wage series have inevitably been 
augmented significantly. The results in table A.2.2 show the visual impact that 
graph A.2.1 assesses and confirms that the new weighting scheme applied here 
changes the colours of the Swedish wage picture. It now looks paler. The 
difference between the old and the new series is large enough to warrant more 
attention than there is scope for in this minor investigation. It may have been that 
Bagge et al. did not assign the series of wages for sawmill workers the large 
weight it has been assigned here for reasons they did not communicate to their 
readers. Perhaps they deemed bizarre the behaviour of the wage series of 
sawmill workers and therefore degraded the quality and the importance of it. 
What speaks in favour of the reliability of the series is that there is corroborative 
evidence of the sluggish growth rate of wages for sawmill workers relative to the 
average of manufacturing (Cornell 1982). As long as no further evidence defies 
its usefulness the average should include sawmill workers’ wages, weighted with 
due respect to its great importance in the Swedish economy. 
 
Appendix 2.3. Data sources for the new Swedish 
wage series for manufacturing 
This classification of industries and their corresponding wage data is the same as 
in Appendix 5.3 which means that sources of gross output and the number of 
workers used to derive the wage bill in 1912 appear there. Information on the 
share of wages in gross output comes from the public investigation on cost 
shares (SOU 1923) which also is presented in Lindahl et al. (1937).  
1. Iron, metal and engineering 
Ironware and engineering 
Metal 
Shipyards 
Electro technical  
Source: Series of hourly earnings for male workers at metal manufacturing and 
engineering works (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 115, table 10).  
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Iron ore 
Source: Series of average annual earnings for male workers at iron-ore mines in 
central Sweden (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 104, table 8). 
 
Iron and steelworks 
Source: Series of average hourly earnings for male workers at iron works (Bagge 
et al. 1933 pp. 74–5, table 6).  
2. Stone, clay and glass 
Glass 
Source: Arithmetic mean of the following series: daily earnings of glass blowers, 
stem makers, blowers, glass blowers’ mates, various craftsmen and unskilled 
workers at Kosta Glassworks and daily earnings of glass blowers, glass polishers 
and glass packers at Eda Glassworks (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 430, 434, tables 98–
9). 
 
Chinaware and tile 
Source: Arithmetic mean of daily earnings of potters, oven men and outdoor 
workers at Gustavsberg China factory (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 425, table 96). 
 
Quarrying and refined stone products 
Source: Arithmetic mean of the series of daily earnings of brick makers at 
Höganäs-Billesholm and the series of hourly earnings of workers at Annetorp 
Limestone Quarries and Limhamn and Lomma Cement and Brick works (Bagge 
et al. pp. 408, 417, tables 87, 91).  
 
Cement 
Bricks 
Source: Arithmetic means of the following series: daily earnings of brickmakers 
at Höganäs-Billesholm and hourly earnings of workers at Annetorp Limestone 
Quarries and Limhamn and Lomma Cement and Brickworks (Bagge et al. pp. 
408, 417, table 87 and 91).  
 
Coal 
Source: Series of daily earnings of hewers at Höganäs-Billesholm (Bagge 1933 
p. 408, table 87). 
3. Wood 
Sawmills and planing mills 
Source: Arithmetic mean of the series of hourly earnings of sawers and plank 
pilers in the sawmill industry (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 143, table 12). 
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Refined wood products 
Source: Since the wage series of sawmills and planing mills exhibit a very 
sluggish growth before the 1890s the aggregate series of manufacturing is used. 
4. Paper 
Paper pulp 
Source: Series of average hourly earnings of all workers in the wood pulp 
industry (Bagge (1933 p. 172, table 15). 
 
Paper 
Book printing 
Source: Series of hourly earnings for skilled paper mill workers (Bagge et al. 
1933 p. 187, table 16).  
5. Food 
Flour mills 
Source: 1868–1986: weighted index (weights in parentheses) of earnings of male 
(0.9) and female (0.1) workers in the food industry (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 196, 
table 18); 1886–1912: arithmetic mean of the series of hourly earnings for mill 
hands and store men at Helsingborg Grinding Mills (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 522, 
table 125). 
 
Pork butcheries 
Margarine 
Tobacco 
Chocolate and candy 
Bakery 
Dairy 
Miscellaneous food industry 
Source: Weighted index (weights in parentheses) of earnings of male (0.9) and 
female (0.1) workers in the Food industry (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 196, table 18).  
 
Sugar 
Source: Weighted index (weights in parentheses) of the series of hourly earnings 
of male (0.9) and female workers (0.1) in combined sugar factories. Among 
male workers skilled (0.2) and unskilled (0.8) (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 208, table 
19). 
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Breweries 
Spirit 
Source: 1868–1896: Series of annual earnings of brewery workers at Pripps 
Brewery, female (0.2) and male (0.8); 1896–1912: hourly earnings of male 
brewery workers at Hamburger brewery (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 528, table 127). 
6. Textile  
Textile 
Clothing 
Source: Weighted index (weights in parentheses) of average hourly earnings of 
male (0.4) and female (0.6) workers in the textile industry (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 
220, table 20). 
7. Leather, hair and rubber 
Tannery 
Products of leather and fur 
Shoes 
Source: 1882–1897: annual earnings of workers at Lilljedahl leather factory, 
Sölvesborg, and annual earnings of skilled workers at L. A. Matton leather 
factory, Gävle (Bagge et al. 1933 pp. 554, 556, tables 141–2); 1898–1912: 
hourly earnings of journey men and unskilled workers at Ehrnberg Leather 
factory, Simrishamn (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 552, table 140). 
 
Rubber 
Source: Hourly earnings of male (0.8) and female (0.2) workers in the galosh 
making department at Hälsingborg rubber factory (Bagge et al. 1933 p. 557, 
table 143). 
8. Chemicals 
Paint 
Soap and detergent 
Oil  
Matches 
Explosives 
Charcoal  
Chemicals and fertilizers 
Source: 1868–1870: Series of manufacturing as a whole; 1870–1912: arithmetic 
mean of the series of average annual earnings of male (0.75) and female (0.25) 
workers at Zadig Soap factory, Malmö; daily earnings of Nitroglycerine Factory, 
Stockhom; hourly wage of various workers at Stockholm superphosphate 
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factory, Gäddviken; hourly earnings of male and female workers at Jönköping 
Match factory; and hourly earnings of skilled workers (0,75) and female candle 
moulders (0,25) at Liljeholmen Stearine factory (Bagge et al. 1933 pp. 561, 563, 
568–9, 571, tables 145–6, 149–51). 
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Chapter 3 
The Swedish Wage-Rental Ratio and 
its Determinants, 1877–1926 
With Jan Bohlin 
Australian Economic History Review 47, pp. 49–72, March 2007 
3.1. Introduction 
Trends in factor prices have recently figured prominently in the literature on 
globalisation in the late nineteenth century Atlantic economy. An important 
observation in this literature is the narrowing income gap between the Old and 
the New World in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The guiding principle 
behind the division into the Old and New World was relative factor 
endowments. The New World had plenty of land but scarcity of labour, while 
the Old World had plenty of labour but scarcity of land. The well-known 
globalisation story tells us that declining transport costs in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century made possible huge exports of agricultural products from the 
New to the Old World, which led to changed relative factor returns on land and 
labour. For landowners in the Old World, the inflow of cheap grains put 
downward pressures on their incomes, while exports of grain on a massive scale 
favoured the income growth for landowners in the New World. 
In a seminal article by O’Rourke et al. (1996), empirical trends in relative 
factor prices were represented by trends in wage-rental ratios for a number of 
countries. Their evidence showed that wage-rental ratios fell abruptly in the New 
World before World War I. The opposite happened in the Old World, where 
wage-rental ratios rose. The Old World sample was further divided so that 
countries entered into either a protectionist or a free-trade group, the idea being 
that some Old World countries muted the forces of globalisation by erecting 
tariffs on imports of grain. In protectionist countries wage-rental ratios should 
therefore have displayed a slower increase than in free-trade countries. Sweden 
was classified as an Old World free-trade country, whose wage-rental ratio 
exhibited a markedly upward trend, as did wage-rental ratios in the other Old 
World free-trade countries. 
The classification of Sweden as a free-trade country defies what we know 
about Swedish trade policy (Bohlin 2005). For example, from 1888 Swedish 
grain tariffs were similar to those in Germany and France, both of which 
O’Rourke et al. (1996 p. 54) classified as protectionist countries. So why did 
evidence show that the Swedish wage-rental ratio behaved in a way more similar 
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to free-trade countries than protectionist ones? This chapter intends to resolve 
this seeming contradiction with new evidence of Swedish land prices that 
indicate land rentals. The new series of land prices covers the years from 1877 to 
1926, which captures the impact of late nineteenth century globalisation, the 
advent of Swedish industrialisation and rapid economic growth and the dramatic 
distributional changes associated with World War I. It omits though the impact 
of the new era in Swedish agricultural policy, involving trade regulations and 
subsidisation, which commenced in 1933. 
We begin the chapter discussing the new series of land prices and offer our 
criticism of the series used by O’Rourke et al. (1996). To create a new picture of 
the Swedish wage-rental ratio also requires representative series of wages for 
either agricultural or industrial workers. We discuss the available wage series 
and the choice of an agricultural or industrial wage series as a numerator in the 
wage-rental ratio. Until World War I agricultural and industrial wages increased 
at about the same rate. In the aftermath of the war, however, agricultural and 
industrial wages set out on different courses in the 1920s; for this period, the 
wage-rental ratio increases more if we use industrial wages in the numerator. 
When we use our new series of land prices, the new Swedish wage-rental ratio 
displays a slower increase than the wage-rental ratio reported in O’Rourke et al. 
(1996), whether computed by an agricultural or industrial wage series in the 
numerator. The Swedish wage-rental ratio evolves similarly to that of other Old 
World protectionist countries’, which is more in harmony with the Swedish 
protectionist turn in 1888. 
Using economic theory and stylised facts about long-term economic develop-
ment we argue that the wage-rental ratio tends to increase in developing econo-
mies such as Sweden from the end of the nineteenth century. The key to 
understanding short-term fluctuations in the wage-rental ratio lies in the 
movements of land prices. We therefore turn to a discussion about the 
determinants of land prices and specifically explore the effects of changes in 
agricultural productivity and commodity prices on the evolution of land prices. 
The terms of trade developed favourably for the agricultural sector in the 
decades before World War I. We ask to what extent the price increase for 
agricultural products were caused by tariffs or a change in the product mix from 
grain to animal products. 
3.2. Documentation of new land prices 
There are two sources for the evolution of Swedish land prices. Both were pre-
sented in Åmark’s (1923) monograph commissioned by the public investigation 
committee devoted to exploring the effects of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century protectionism. The first source is a series of Crown land leases per 
hectare between 1861 and 1913 (Åmark 1923 p. 27, table 8). Lindahl et al. 
(1937 p. 393, table 126) extended the series to 1930 and capitalised it to land 
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prices by applying an interest rate of five per cent. O’Rourke et al. (1996) used 
that series to compute their Swedish wage-rental ratio. The other source is a 
series of private land sales between 1876/1878 and 1918/1820. As far as we 
know this series has been ignored. Land sales data for private land appeared in 
yet another public investigation in 1930 that allow us to extend the series of 
private farm sales to 1926 (Höijer 1930 p. 121). Accordingly, we have 
information for both Crown land leases and private land prices from 1877 to 
1926 displayed in graph 3.1. There are two differences that warrant our 
attention: first, Crown land leases fell more abruptly during the agrarian crises in 
the 1880s; and second, private land prices grew more briskly during World War 
I. As the two series display markedly different behaviour, it is necessary to 
determine which is better to compute the Swedish wage-rental ratio. This 
requires a minor digression on the judicial status of land. 
Three types of landownership existed in Sweden at the end of the nineteenth 
century that had their origins in the Middle Ages. Private land was owned by 
freeholders who paid taxes to the Crown (skattejord). Crown land was leased by 
tenants who paid land dues to the Crown as rent (kronojord). Tax exempted land 
was owned by rich peasants and noblemen and was cultivated by tenants who 
paid rents to the owner (frälsejord). Around 1700, these categories of land made 
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GRAPH 3.1. Crown land leases and private land prices per hectare, 1877–
1926 (1913=100) 
Note: In 1877–1919, the series of private land prices are based on averages for 3 years. Linear 
interpolations fill the remaining gaps. Thus, the first year is actually the average of 1876–1878. 
Sources: Crown land leases: Lindahl et al. (1937, p. 393, table 126). Private land prices: In 
1877–1919, a weighted measure based on series from Åmark (1923 pp. 78–89). In 1919–1926, 
Höijer (1930 p. 121). 
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up more or less equal shares of the total arable area. However, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the proportions of each category of land had changed con-
siderably. In 1878, 60 per cent of the land was owned by freeholders, while the 
share of Crown land was merely eight per cent (Gadd 2005). Here is the first 
clue as to why the series representing the leases of Crown land in this period is 
unrepresentative for the evolution of land prices in Sweden. 
There are at least two arguments against using the series of Crown land 
leases as indicative of the evolution of sales values in the private land market. 
First, the farms leased on Crown land were generally very large. While most 
private farms were 5–10 ha in Åmark’s sample, the average Crown land unit was 
larger than 50 ha and if we include forest land they were larger than 90 ha. 
Second, as the terms of the leases were long (20 years) any potential user of land 
had to weight carefully the likelihood of change in legislation that might affect 
their rights to dispose of the land they leased. The most important change in 
legislation that affected the value of the leases came in 1882, curtailing the right 
of the Crown land tenants to exploit forest land, and only allowing tenants to 
collect household firewood. That permission was further restricted in the 1890s 
(Åmark 1923 pp. 24–6). Åmark tried to remove the influence of the changed 
legislation by only using arable land and meadows reduced to arable when 
calculating Crown land leases per hectare. He nevertheless acknowledged that 
the much more precipitous decline of Crown land leases in the 1880s, compared 
with sales values of private land, reflected the changed forest legislation. 
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GRAPH 3.2. Private land prices by size classes, 1877–1919 (1913=100) 
Note: Based on averages for 3 years. Linear interpolations fill the remaining gaps. Thus, the 
first year is actually the average of 1876–1878. 
Sources: Åmark (1923 pp. 80–9). 
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As Crown land leases give a distorted picture of the evolution of sales values 
in the overall land market, we turn now to Åmark’s investigation of private sales 
values. Åmark’s series of private sales values was constructed from a sample of 
4,854 sales transactions. He presented the series in three year averages stretching 
from 1876/1878 to 1918/1820 for counties in central and southern Sweden.35 The 
investigation further excluded farmlands smaller than 5 ha, and farms with for-
estland and pasture that were more than three times the size of the crop land. The 
number of purchases varied greatly by the size of the arable land. Purchases of 
farm properties with more than 100 ha of crop land do not figure prominently in 
the sample; in some locations and years, there were only a few purchases of 
properties of that size. 
In graph 3.2 we present four separate series of farm prices by size class. The 
small and medium-sized farms had a more favourable development of sales 
values than the large and very large farmlands. Small farms relied heavily on 
family labour. The evolution of sales values on farms above 50 ha that relied on 
hired labour should be more indicative of the evolution of land rentals. If we 
disregard the series of farms above 100 ha, all series of land prices nevertheless 
show the same general contour of development. 
We have scanty information about the way land prices have been collected 
for the years after 1919. Höijer simply states that the sales values were collected 
in a way that would make them comparable to Åmark’s investigation (Höijer 
1930 p. 121). 
3.3. Agricultural and industrial wages 
3.3.1. Agricultural workers 
Agricultural wage earners did not represent a homogenous group of rural work-
ers. At least three broad categories of workers can be distinguished. The largest 
were dayworkers who comprised either landless people or owners of a parcel of 
land insufficient to provide them with incomes above subsistence. They worked 
for peasants or nobles and comprised a growing proportion of the rural working 
class, amounting to 46 per cent in 1870–1880 and 50 per cent in 1920–1930. As 
dayworkers were largely paid in cash, assessments of wage increases for agricul-
tural workers often refer to this specific category of worker. Dayworkers had the 
freedom to work wherever they found appropriate employment, in contrast to 
farm servants, whose freedom was constrained by the Domestic Servants Act. 
Domestic farm servants were paid an annual or monthly cash wage with free 
board and lodging. Lack of freedom also characterised the third class of workers, 
                                                 
 
35  The investigation included the counties of Östergötland, Halland and Skaraborg. 
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the so-called statare, who worked for nobles on large estates. They were paid a 
fixed annual cash wage with free housing and benefits in kind (stat) (table 3.1). 
Our knowledge of wages for agricultural workers comes from compilations 
in the Bagge et al. (1935), based on market price scales (markegångstaxa) for 
pre-1913 years and the wage material of the Social Board thereafter.36 The most 
homogenous wage series represents day-rates for dayworkers, which O’Rourke 
et al. (1996) used to compute the Swedish wage-rental ratio. However, we need 
to adjust the wage series to take account of the gradual shortening of the 
working day during summer, the winter hours remaining stable before 1930, 
governed by available daylight. In all likelihood no substantial change in 
working hours took place before the 1870s and the average work day was 14 
hours, including breaks. As the 1920s drew to a close, the norm approached 10 
hours a day during summer time. If we assume working hours during winter, 
roughly half of the year, were unchanged the reduction in the annual average 
work day was 2 hours per day over 60 years. This adjustment results in a wage 
series for agricultural workers that increase somewhat faster than the series used 
by O’Rourke et al. (1996). Later in this chapter we will use our modified series 
of daily wages as a numerator when computing the new Swedish wage-rental 
ratio. 
These adjusted day-rates cannot simply be grossed up to annual incomes as 
many dayworkers had a small piece of land for horticulture and small-scale 
farming, and in the off-season many of them were principally employed in lum-
bering. This makes it difficult to compare dayworkers’ day-rates to annual 
wages for farm-servants and statare. Jungenfelt (1959 p. 104), in his pioneering 
study of the share of wages in national income, tried nevertheless to construct a 
general series of annual wages for agriculture. We will contrast below his annual 
series with the annual wage series for manufacturing workers when computing 
the ratio of agricultural to manufacturing wages. 
                                                 
 
36  The referred series in Bagge et al. (1935) appears on p. 113, table 169 and p. 152, table 180. 
An identical series of wages for dayworkers also appears in Jörberg (1972a pp. 710–4). There 
is also a wage series for dayworkers in the official statistics, see Lundh (2008). 
TABLE 3.1. Distribution of agricultural workers in Sweden, 1870/1880 and 
1920/1930 (%) 
 Farm servants Dayworkers Statare 
1870/1880 49 46 5 
1920/1930 39 50 11 
Source: Jungenfelt (1959 pp. 106–8). 
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3.3.2. Manufacturing workers 
Information on wages of manufacturing workers did not find its way into official 
statistics until 1913 when the Social Board began its annual report. Industrial 
wage data before 1913 are scant and we have once again resorted to the wage 
series that appeared in Bagge et al. (1933). These wage data were collected from 
firms whose wage records had survived. From each firm’s wage record, a wage 
series for a small number of workers from representative occupations were col-
lected to compile occupational averages. In all likelihood, this method probably 
tracks changes of wages from one year to another better than it pins down actual 
levels. Many of the aggregate, the regional and the occupational wage series in 
Bagge et al. (1933) have been subjected to scrutiny by Swedish economic 
historians.37 Some have objected that the omission of temporary workers renders 
the wage series in Bagge et al. (1933) questionable, but no attempts have so far 
been made to construct a new national series of wages pre-1913 (Gustafsson 
1996). Two series for industrial workers are presented in Bagge et al. (1933 p. 
260–1, table 26), the first of which represents hourly wages, which is the 
preferred measure, and the other series represents annual wages. After 1913, the 
Social Board collected wage data and Bagge et al. (1933) used this source to 
construct a wage series that could be linked to their pre-1913 series. 
International wage comparisons frequently rely on samples of so called 
‘urban unskilled’ wages and commonly the wages of construction workers. For 
Sweden, though, wage data for unskilled construction workers are comparatively 
scarce before 1913.38 Furthermore, few wage series of unskilled workers in 
manufacturing exist for the latter part of the nineteenth century, which means 
that it is difficult to tell with certainty whether the skilled-unskilled pay ratio 
exhibited any upward or downward trend.39 The Swedish wage series in 
Williamson’s (1995b) widely cited article probably overestimate the growth of 
real wages, being based on only four series of unskilled occupations whose 
wages grew faster than those for manufacturing workers in general (see chapter 
2). We think it safer to stick to the series from Bagge et al. (1933) for 
manufacturing workers as a whole, which better captures our state of knowledge 
of wage behaviour in manufacturing. This is a more a representative measure of 
the development of wages in sectors other than agriculture. 
                                                 
 
37  Gustafsson (1965), Berglund (1982), Cornell (1982), Johansson (1988). 
38  As construction workers were largely paid by piece rates, preserved records of hourly wages 
were more difficult to come by and thereby excluded from the investigation by Bagge et al. 
(1933 p. 8). 
39  Chapter 2 shows that the few existing wage series of skilled and unskilled workers indicate a 
stable skilled-unskilled pay ratio. 
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3.3.3. Ratio of agricultural to manufacturing wages 
Because the wage-rental ratio can be computed using either agricultural or 
manufacturing wages as a numerator, the relative movement of wages in the two 
sectors matters for our interpretation of the wage-rental ratio. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the ratio of wages for agricultural to industrial workers and the 
trend are important components in the transition from agriculture to industry. 
The ratio represents the opportunity cost for rural workers of staying in agricul-
ture or the cost of migration to find unskilled manufacturing jobs. The ratio of 
unskilled manufacturing to agricultural hourly wages fluctuated between 2 and 
2.5 until the 1890s, narrowed slowly until shortly after World War I, after which 
the ratio enlarged substantially.40 After being quite tightly coupled together, the 
hourly wages in industry and agriculture diverged sharply after World War I. 
The nominal wage gap between agricultural and urban workers does not trans-
late to a commensurate real income gap, however, because rural dwellers had 
access to cheaper food and housing. Over time industrialisation and urbanisation 
                                                 
 
40  On the basis of the few skilled and unskilled wage series in Bagge et al.(1933, 1935), the 
unskilled-skilled pay ratio in industry was found to have been on average around 84 between 
1860 and 1912. 
100
150
200
250
300
350
1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925.
Hourly wages
Annual wages
 
GRAPH 3.3. Ratio of manufacturing to agricultural wages, 1877–1926 
Note: The wage gap was estimated for a benchmark in 1877. 
Sources: Manufacturing: Bagge et al. (1933 pp. 260–1, table 26). Agriculture: hourly wages 
Bagge et al. (1935, p. 113, table 169, and p. 152, table 180); annual wages Jungenfelt, (1959 p. 
106–7). 
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drove a wedge between farm-gate and retail prices as processing and marketing 
made food in urban areas more expensive than agricultural products in rural 
areas. That promoted a contraction of the real wage gap. Furthermore, the annual 
wage gap was smaller because of longer working days in agriculture, and it did 
not swell after the war because of heavy reductions in working hours in 
industry41 (graph 3.3). 
3.4. Theory: What determines land rentals? 
The wage-rental ratio shows the evolution of the relative reward accruing to 
labour and landownership. A capitalist tenant expects the same rate of return on 
his investment as he might expect in any other sector. The rent that he would be 
prepared to pay to a landowner is therefore dependent on the yield of the rented 
land. The larger the difference between the yield per land unit and the required 
rate of return, the more he is willing to pay in rental. Theoretically, as for any 
asset, the price of a piece of land is nothing but the future stream of income from 
owning it discounted to present value by applying a suitable rate of interest. 
Accordingly, land prices serve well as an indicator of land rentals. Experience 
from asset markets shows that expectations of future incomes are heavily influ-
enced by recent experiences. Therefore, if income from owning land is on the 
rise, land prices will rise too. If buyers of land expect land prices to increase in 
the future, land prices may run ahead of rents for speculative reasons, but in the 
long run they would follow each other closely. To understand the evolution of 
land prices we therefore have to understand the variables that determine the 
income of landowners. An important determinant of farmer’s revenues is the 
prices of agricultural goods. The revenue of the farmer, though, is not only 
determined by the prices he receives but also by how much he sells. In other 
words, if he can raise the monetary value of his output by reallocating his 
product mix in the direction of more income elastic goods, and if he can raise 
productivity, his revenues will rise. 
Landowners’ income is determined both by revenues and costs. The most 
important costs to consider are wages for agricultural workers and purchased 
inputs. However, the effect of agricultural wages on land prices is not so clear-
cut. On the one hand, a rise in agricultural wages would increase the cost of 
hiring labourers. This would affect adversely the income of large landowners, 
who rely heavily on hired labour. On the other hand, as a majority of farms were 
small family farms, who only sparingly hired labour, it did not matter whether 
income was derived from imputed payments to their own labour or from rewards 
                                                 
 
41  Bagge et al. (1933 p. 253) report that marked reductions in working hours occurred in 1918-
1920. In 1920, hours of work were restricted to 48 hours per week in the manufacturing, 
commerce and transport sectors. 
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to their landownership. Most important for family farms was their total income. 
Therefore, if agricultural wages increased they might have been inclined to 
accept a lower rate of return on their farm capital than large landowners and be 
willing to bid up land prices. 
Purchased inputs were another cost item for farms, although they were less 
important than wages because they only constituted 15 per cent of final sales 
value. Most of the inputs came from the industrial sector and an increase in 
industrial prices would increase costs per unit of output for the farmers. 
From the above deliberations we may conclude that in order to explore the 
evolution of farm prices we should look at the evolution of agricultural and 
industrial prices, agricultural wages, and agricultural productivity. We have 
already dealt with wages. In the following two sections we take a closer look at 
commodity prices and agrarian productivity. 
3.5. Commodity prices 
3.5.1. Agricultural prices 
The influx of New World grain into Western Europe after the US civil war put 
downward pressure on agrarian commodity prices. In Sweden, as in many coun-
tries in Europe, landowners successfully campaigned for grain tariffs. From 
1888 onwards, the prices of crop products developed more favourably for 
Swedish farmers than world market prices for grain. The index of agricultural 
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GRAPH 3.4. Ratio of animal to crop product prices, 1877–1926 (1913=100) 
Source: Unpublished series by Lennart Schön, provided by the author on request. 
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prices includes animal products whose prices developed more favourably than 
grain prices from the mid-1880s, as graph 3.4 shows.42 In this period Swedish 
farmers expanded production of animal products while the output of crop 
products stagnated; between 1870 and 1913 the volume of animal produce grew 
by 2.3 per cent per year, while crop produce declined 0.2 per cent per year 
(Schön 1995). The overall index of agricultural prices thus captures the effects 
of the transition from cropping to animal products. As we argue below, the 
change in the output mix of the agricultural sector from crop to animal produce 
was more important for the favourable price trend than the grain tariffs. The 
more favourable price trend for animal products was intensified during World 
War I when agrarian prices soared. 
3.5.2. Industrial prices 
Creating an index of prices for all manufactured goods is a challenge. Works 
within the field of Swedish Historical National Accounts (SHNA) provide many 
price series for manufactured goods, especially after 1885 (Ljungberg 1990; 
Schön 1988). Edvinsson (2005), in his contribution to SHNA, argues that when 
possible we should use chained Paasche and Laspeyres indices combined into a 
                                                 
 
42  The separate series of animal and crop products do not appear in Schön (1995). Instead the 
separate series were provided by the author on request. 
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GRAPH 3.5. Ratio of agricultural to industrial prices, 1877–1926 (1913=100) 
Sources: Agricultural prices: Schön (1995 tables J1 and J6). Industrial prices: in 1877–1912, 
chapter 5; in 1912–1926, Edvinsson (2005 http://www.historia.se). 
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Fisher index.43 Thanks to the Swedish Industrial Statistics, annual current values 
are readily available for most manufactured goods, which would allow solution 
to the index-number problem. One of the authors has carried this approach still 
further for manufactured goods by including more price series, but only in a 
series that stretches until 1912 (chapter 5). The rest of the period is covered by 
Edvinsson’s series.44 Prices fell from a peak in 1874 to a trough in 1887, and 
recovered slowly until 1915. The impression one gets of these pre-war decades 
is nevertheless one of price stability for industrial goods. The high rate of 
inflation during World War I brought a dramatic increase in prices of 
manufactured goods; the index rose from 100 in 1915 to 334 in 1920. Prices then 
dropped to more moderate levels. 
3.5.3. Agricultural terms of trade 
In Sweden the two decades before World War I were in Federico’s (2005) words 
a ‘veritable golden age’ for farmers. The terms of trade for Swedish farmers (the 
ratio of agricultural prices to industrial prices) improved by 75 per cent between 
                                                 
 
43  Previous authors contributing to SHNA have used so-called deflation periods, that is, fixed 
weights for periods of 20–25 years. The present authors agree with Edvinsson that as long as 
there are annual current production values at hand chained Laspeyres and Paasche indices 
combined into a Fisher index provide the ideal solution to the index number problem. 
44  Edvinsson’s series are published on http://www.historia.se 
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GRAPH 3.6. Prices of agrarian products and land prices, 1877–1926 
(1913=100) 
Source: See graph 3.1 and 3.5. 
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1897 and 1915, which was driven by price increases for agricultural goods, 
especially animal products, while manufactured goods prices remained fairly 
stable. If we look only at animal products, the terms of trade improved by 85 per 
cent, while for crop products the terms of trade improvement were 48 per cent. 
World War I and its aftermath brought extreme conditions in commodity 
markets. At the initial stages of high inflation agricultural prices increased faster 
than industrial prices, but they also fell deeper in the deflation that set in once 
the war had ended and which adjusted the terms of trade downwards to its pre-
war levels (graph 3.5). 
Graph 3.6 demonstrates that land prices followed agricultural prices closely. 
However, the swings in land prices were not as pronounced as those in 
agricultural prices. When agricultural prices declined precipitously in the 1880s 
and in the deflation after World War I, land prices did not follow suit, and when 
agricultural prices rose during the war land prices did not rise to the same extent. 
3.6. Productivity in agriculture 
Estimates of the evolution of labour productivity in agriculture can be calculated 
from the available time series data for value added and employment.45 However, 
the employment data from the population censuses held every tenth year are of 
dubious quality. Population census enumerated people according to occupation, 
but it is well known that many of those classified as employed in agriculture 
performed other tasks such as rural handicrafts at least part of the year. Employ-
ment varied seasonally in agriculture. We simply do not know the exact number 
of full-time-employed agricultural labourers. Underemployment in the country-
side was prevalent, although it declined as industrialisation and urbanisation 
proceeded. The accuracy of official employment statistics improved gradually, 
which means we would overstate the growth of labour productivity in agriculture 
when using employment data derived from the population censuses. 
Therefore, to obtain an estimate of the growth of productivity in the agricul-
tural sector we employ another method based on price data. Other authors have 
used the method for studying the evolution of total factor productivity in 
agriculture (Hoffman 1991). An estimate of total factor productivity (TFP) can 
be derived from formula (3.1), 
= +Yp Y wL rK   (3.1) 
                                                 
 
45  Value added for agriculture in Schön (1995) and employment in Jungenfelt (1966). For 
employment, see also Edvinsson (2005). 
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where Yp  = price index of value added, Y = volume of value added, w  = 
wage rate, L  = number of labour units, r  = rate of return on capital invested in 
farms, K  = volume index of farm capital (land, buildings, equipment etc.). 
Formula (3.1) is an accounting identity that says that the value of output can 
be dissolved into payment for the various inputs: wages for employed workers 
and rentals per hectare for owners of farmlands. 
After logarithmic differentiation of formula (3.1) and rearranging, we obtain 
the formula (3.2): 
α β α β− − = + −     Y
Y
pY L K w r
Y L K w r p
  (3.2) 
where α  and β  are cost shares and the dots stand for time derivatives. 
The left-hand side of formula (3.2) is nothing but the growth in TFP as it is 
defined in the literature. Accordingly, TFP can also be measured by means of 
price data. Viewed from the side of prices, TFP is the difference between the 
weighted growth of input prices and the growth of the output price. Productivity 
growth manifests itself in increased buying power of factor incomes over final 
goods. As several authors have pointed out this is of considerable interest for 
economic historians, because we often have much better price data than data on 
physical volumes of inputs and outputs. 
To estimate the expression on the right-hand side of formula (3.2) we need 
data on factor shares. One of the authors has estimated the wage share in 
agriculture as 60 per cent in 1913 (Bohlin 2006). According to Jungenfelt (1966 
pp. 248–9, table 9), the wage share in the agricultural sector (including forestries 
and fisheries) was 49 per cent in 1913 and 70 per cent in 1876/1877. According 
to Åmark (1923), the share of wage costs of total costs in agriculture was ‘at 
least 52 per cent’. We conclude that it seems reasonable to assume a wage share 
of 60 per cent for the period 1877–1913. We also need a series of prices for 
agricultural goods, agricultural wages and land rentals. The first two are readily 
available. We use our new series of sales values for private land as an indicator 
of land rentals. As the discussion in a previous section of this chapter has 
revealed, the evolution of land prices varied depending on the size class of 
farms. A calculation of TFP according to formula (3.2) should be most 
appropriate for large farms that relied on hired labour. In table 3.2 we present 
our estimates of TFP growth in Swedish agriculture (column 5 from the left in 
TABLE 3.2. Growth in total factor productivity and labour productivity in 
Swedish agriculture, 1876/1878–1912/1914 (% p.a.) 
Hectare size of farm unit  
5–10 10–50 50–100 >100  
Weighted 
average 
Labour 
productivity 
1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2  1.3 1.4 
Sources: Schön (1995 table J19); Åmark (1923); Edvinsson (2005 http://www.historia.se). 
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table 3.2) and we also present separate calculations for four different size 
classes. 
The productivity data presented in table 3.2 indicate that TFP grew by sightly 
more than one per cent per year between the late-1870s and World War I. The 
growth figures for TFP on small farms seem suspiciously high. The average size 
of farms in the size class 5–10 ha was 7 ha, while it was 20 ha in the size class 
10–50 ha. Farms of these sizes relied heavily on family labour, especially the 
smallest. The calculation of TFP from price data presupposes that all labour 
units are paid at the going market rate. It may have been the case that wages for 
family members at family farms did not increase at the same rate as those for 
hired labourers. Owners of family farms were concerned about their total income 
and did not bother about the extent to which it derived from imputed wages or 
land rents. In that respect productivity growth might be overestimated for small 
farms by the right-hand side of formula (3.2). We also have little confidence in 
the productivity figures for farms in the size class larger than 100 ha because the 
land price data for these farms are based on a small sample of sales. The TFP 
figures for farms in the size class 50–100 ha seem more reasonable. Comparison 
of our estimate for the TFP growth rate and the growth in labour productivity – 
1.4 per cent between 1876/1878 and 1912/1914 – indicates our TFP measure is 
reasonable. As we have noted, land rentals may overstate land prices if buyers 
speculated in further land price increases. It is therefore of some comfort that our 
calculated TFP growth rate does not differ too much from other estimates based 
on alternative methods. For example, van Zanden (1991) gauges that the yearly 
increase in ‘total productivity’ in Swedish agriculture between 1870 and 1910 
was 1.03 per cent. 
3.6.1. Commodity prices, wage costs, productivity, and land rentals 
We have assembled evidence on the evolution of commodity prices, wage costs, 
and agricultural productivity. Together they determined farmers’ income. To the 
extent that prices in the land market reflected income growth, they also deter-
mined land prices. An example may illustrate the mechanisms at work. Let us 
assume a farm whose sale value in 1876–1878 was 100, 60 of which went to the 
wages of agricultural labourers. Between 1876/1878 and 1912/1914 agricultural 
commodity prices increased 0.4 per cent per year while agricultural productivity 
increased 1.3 per cent. With given factor inputs the farm’s revenue would have 
increased to 183.8 in 1912/1914. At the same time wages increased by two per 
cent per year. On our farm they would have increased to 122.4 in 1912/1914, 
leaving 61.4 to the owner of the farm. Thus, his income would have grown from 
40 to 61.4 or 1.2 per year between 1876/1878 and 1912/1914, which is also 
approximately the rate at which land prices grew in the period. Our example is 
of course only another way to illustrate that a productivity increase slightly over 
one per cent per year was required to motivate the increased land prices in this 
period. 
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3.7. Evidence and interpretation of the wage-rental ratio 
Our new series of land prices show a more rapid increase than previous series, 
which flattens the steep upturns in the Swedish wage-rental ratio that O’Rourke 
et al. (1996) found. In graph 3.7 we show their Swedish series alongside our new 
wage-rental series, one with manufacturing and the other with agricultural wages 
in the numerator.46 All series show that wages increased faster than land prices, 
but there are notable differences. Our series of wage-rental ratios did not 
increase nearly as much between 1877 and 1900 and during World War I as the 
O’Rourke, et al.’s (1996) series. The previous section on land prices identified 
that they had underestimated the growth of land prices by using the series of 
                                                 
 
46  O’Rourke et al. (1996) showed the evolution of the Swedish wage-rental ratio in 1870-1914. 
We have extended to 1926 their series of the Swedish wage-rental ratio that was based on 
Crown land leases and agricultural wages unadjusted for working hours. A similar extended 
Swedish series appeared in Williamson (2002 p. 54, table 4). 
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GRAPH 3.7. Different measures of Swedish wage-rental ratios, 1877–1926 
(1913=100) 
Note: O’Rourke et al.’s (1996) ratio is computed by dividing agricultural wages by Crown 
land leases. Our new wage-rental ratios are computed by dividing either agricultural wages, 
adjusted for working hours, or manufacturing wages, by private land prices. 
Sources: See graph 3.1 and 3.3. 
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Crown land leases, thereby exaggerating the increase in the wage-rental ratio. 
This accounts for most of the difference between the competing estimates.47 
The explanation of the wage-rental ratio turns on the rate at which 
commodity and factor prices rise and fall. The new series reveals that wages 
grew somewhat faster than land prices until around 1900. Then the ratio levelled 
off, and wages and land prices grew in tandem until World War I. In the 
inflationary conditions during the war, wages increased more than land prices. 
The interpretation of the wage-rental ratio as a measure of income distribution 
requires caution. During inflationary conditions land prices may not be a 
representative indicator of the income of farmers and landowners. If market 
participants do not expect the surge in commodity prices to last, land prices will 
not increase at the same pace as farmers’ incomes, implying that the wage-rental 
ratio fails to represent accurately distributive shares. That was the case during 
World War I. According to the wage-rental ratio the lot of workers improved 
compared with landowners when in fact the opposite happened, as real wages 
declined because of rapid price increases of agricultural products. Land prices 
                                                 
 
47  A minor part of that difference is offset by our use of a series of wages for agricultural workers 
that grow somewhat faster, because it has been adjusted to take account for reductions in 
working hours. 
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GRAPH 3.8. Ratio of industrial product wages to labour productivity in 
Swedish manufacturing, 1877–1926 (1913=100) 
Sources: Value added from Schön (1995 pp. 308–9, table I14). Employment: chapter 5; 
Edvinsson (2005 http://www.historia.se). Wages: Bagge et al. (1933 pp. 260–1, table 26). 
Deflator: see graph 3.5. 
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did not increase by nearly as much as agricultural commodity prices apparently 
because buyers of land did not expect the inflationary conditions to last. 
Furthermore, our judgement of the wage–rental ratio depends on the wage 
series in use. Before World War I, agricultural and industrial wages tended to 
grow in parallel, but after World War I industrial wages surged ahead. Between 
1877 and 1926 the wage–rental ratio increases by 175 per cent if we use the 
series of industrial wages and by 55 per cent if we use the agricultural wage 
series. The bifurcation of the path of hourly wages in agriculture and 
manufacturing after World War I marks a striking redistribution between labour 
and capital in manufacturing: during 1918–1920, hourly wages rose quickly in 
the manufacturing industry together with big reductions in working hours. In the 
ensuing deflation in the 1920s industrial wages did not fall by nearly as much as 
industrial commodity prices. Graph 3.8 shows that the increase in labour 
productivity was not high enough to compensate the owners of industrial firms 
for the reduction in working hours and the increase in product wages. The share 
of wages in value added expanded, which mirrors a shift in the distribution of 
power between social classes in favour of workers. It is no coincidence that 
workers managed to encroach on capital’s share of value added after the end of 
World War I, as it coincided with the introduction of universal suffrage in 
Sweden and the revolutionary tide in many European countries.48 
No similar distributional shift in favour of labour took place in agriculture. 
The terms of trade turned against agriculture in the 1920s, which made it 
difficult or impossible for landowners to grant agricultural workers wages large 
enough to maintain the relative wage gap with manufacturing. Mass 
unemployment and the absence of unionisation weakened the bargaining powers 
of agricultural workers vis-à-vis landowners. Even though wages sank more in 
absolute terms in the manufacturing sector during the deflation of 1920s, the 
percentage rate of decline in wages was larger for agricultural workers. It was 
almost as large as that for agricultural products. Hence, product wages increased 
only slightly in agriculture. 
3.8. The Swedish wage-rental ratio in international 
perspective 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century mass migration, trade and capital 
flows – which deserve the prefix global – brought forth a factor-price 
equalisation between the labour scarce but land abundant New World, and the 
labour abundant but land scarce Old World. Despite our revision of the Swedish 
                                                 
 
48  Greasley and Madsen (2007) found a similar dislocation of incomes in favour of labour in 
Denmark in the aftermath of World War I. They attributed most of that shift to a rise in 
labour’s bargaining power associated with trade union militancy. 
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wage-rental ratio, it still displays the main characteristics of an Old World 
country. Between 1875/1879 and 1910/1914 wage-rental ratios increased in the 
Old World and decreased in the New World, as graph 3.9 reveals. These 
historical trends should come as no surprise. In newly settled areas, such as the 
USA and Australia, ‘virgin land’ expropriated from the indigenous population 
was transformed into private holdings by a soaring number of immigrants and 
assigned a price. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, land was 
practically free or could be purchased at very low prices. Eventually the frontier 
was closed and the land-to-labour ratio decreased. At the same time the transport 
revolution opened up the world to exports of agrarian products from the newly 
settled territories. Hence, the price of land rose rapidly from very low levels.49 
In the Old World the influx of cheap grain brought about a fall in income for 
landowners, which provoked political reactions. Landowners rallied for protec-
                                                 
 
49  It may be of some interest to compare farmland prices in the USA and Sweden. Using official 
exchange rates, in 1870 farmland prices on plain-lands in Southern and Central Sweden (in the 
counties of Östergötland and Skaraborg) were more than five-times higher than in the US. Still 
in 1910, they were more than two-times higher (Åmark 1923 p. 789, table A; Lindert 1988 pp. 
49–51, table 1). 
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GRAPH 3.9. Wage-rental ratios in the Old and the New World, 1875/1979–
1925/1929 (1910/1914=100) 
Note: Old World countries: Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and Spain. New 
World countries: Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA. 
Sources: New and Old World countries: Williamson (2002 pp. 73–4, tables 2 and 3). We have 
included in the New World sample data for New Zealand from Greasley and Oxley (2005, data 
appendix). Sweden: our new wage-rental ratio with industrial wages in the numerator. 
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tionist interventions in order to stem the flow of cheap grain from the New 
World. Tariffs were raised in a number of countries, notably France and 
Germany, while others like Britain, Ireland, and Denmark, adhered to free trade. 
O’Rourke et al. (1996), in their article on factor price convergence, labelled free 
trade or protectionist the countries in their Old World sample and found that 
wage-rental ratios increased faster in free-trade countries than in protectionist 
countries, indicating that tariffs mitigated the negative influences of cheap grain 
on land prices. Sweden was labelled a free-trade country despite evidence it had 
a high rate of protection (O’Rourke et al. 1996 p. 504). Their argument rested on 
Sweden adopting a protectionist stance relatively late. We cannot agree with that 
argument: the free-trade era in Sweden ended in 1888, only three years after 
most of the other Old World countries erected their tariffs (O’Rourke and 
Williamson 1999 ch. 6). If protectionism mattered in these countries, it mattered 
in Sweden too. 
The first steps towards a protectionist trade regime in Sweden were taken in 
1888 when custom duties were reinstalled on agrarian and food products, and 
above all on bread grain and flour. Tariffs came to range over a wide array of 
agricultural, food and industrial products, while raw materials were generally 
free from protection. For most years after 1888, the rate of nominal protection 
for bread grain varied between 20 and 40 per cent (Bohlin 2005). It permitted 
Swedish farmers higher incomes than would otherwise have prevailed in a free-
trade world. Animal products received some protection as well, but this was of 
little consequence because the most important animal product, milk, was 
unprotected.50 The turnaround in trade policy probably slowed the transition 
from crop to animal production in Swedish agriculture, but it did not change its 
general direction. 
If Sweden is to be classified as a protectionist country, why did its wage-
rental ratio behave similarly to the free-world countries, as O’Rourke et al. 
(1996) show? The answer is that it did not, based on our new series for land 
prices. Graph 3.10 reveals that the pattern of the wage-rental ratio resembles the 
protectionist France, Germany, and Spain. However, the link between the evolu-
tion of the wage-rental ratio and protectionism is questionable in the case of 
Sweden. Tariffs on bread grain raised the domestic prices of bread grain above 
the world market level but tariffs did not affect prices of the principal animal 
products significantly, most of which were non-tradable. Prices of animal 
products developed more favourably and demand for them was more income 
                                                 
 
50  Fresh milk enjoyed a high natural protection anyway because it was not transportable over 
long distances, but milk was primarily used for making butter. Therefore, because butter 
enjoyed tariff protection, it may be argued that milk was indirectly protected. However, butter 
was an important export product at the time and Swedish butter prices followed closely the 
world market price for butter as argued by Jorberg (1972b p. 211). The butter tariff was largely 
inconsequential. 
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elastic. A transition towards more animal products would have boosted land 
prices in a free-trade world too. 
Some simple calculations may illustrate the relative importance of price 
movements and volume changes for the growth of nominal income in 
agriculture. The rate of growth of output in current prices is the sum of the 
growth rates of volumes and prices. Table 3.3 shows that total agricultural 
output grew by two per cent per annum in current values between 1876/1878 and 
1912/1914, 30 per cent of which came from price increases and 70 per cent from 
volume growth. At the same time, farmers changed their product mix towards 
more animal produce. In 1876/1878 about 50 per cent of the output comprised 
crop products, in 1912/1914 crop products had contracted to 25 per cent. For 
animal products, the proportion of current value growth accounted for by 
volume changes was 72 per cent, while it was slightly less for crop products. A 
crude counter-factual calculation may shed some light on the importance of 
grain tariffs for nominal income growth in crop products. If we assume that 
prices of crop products had been 25 per cent lower in 1912/1914 without tariff 
protection than they actually were, nominal output growth in agriculture would 
have been reduced by roughly 0.25 per cent per annum, assuming unchanged 
product mix. In other words, the agricultural growth rate would have been 
reduced by one-eighth. We conclude that the most important factor behind 
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GRAPH 3.10. Wage-rental ratios in protectionist and free-trade countries in the 
Old World, 1875/1879–1910/1914 (1875/1979=100) 
Note: Protectionist countries: France, Germany, and Spain. Free-trade countries: Britain, 
Ireland, and Denmark. 
Sources: Protectionist and free-trade countries: Williamson (2002 pp. 73–4, tables 2 and 3). 
Sweden: our new wage-rental ratio with industrial wages in the numerator. 
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nominal income growth in agriculture after the protectionist turn in trade policy 
in 1888 was volume increases and, to a minor extent, price increases in animal 
products. 
To sum up, industrialisation from the 1890s set Sweden on a rapid and sus-
tainable growth track, which spurred demand for more income elastic products. 
Wages for industrial workers accompanied productivity advances in industry and 
wages for agricultural workers followed suit. Owners of large farms could bear 
the burden of rapid wages by increasing productivity and switching to animal 
products. For smaller farmers, commonly more committed to animal production, 
rapid wage increases did not affect their profitability greatly as they did not rely 
extensively on hired labour. 
3.9. Conclusions 
This chapter joins the stream of recent attempts to increase our knowledge of 
movements in relative factor prices, with a focus on the Swedish wage-rental 
ratio between 1876 and 1926, and in light of the wider historiography of global-
isation and factor price convergence. We document a new series of private land 
prices in 1877–1926. The new series, in contrast to the series based on Crown 
land leases, fell by a smaller magnitude during the agrarian crises in the 1880s 
and increased faster after the turn of the century. A consequence of adopting the 
new series of land prices is a new picture of the wage-rental ratio, a measure 
supposedly indicating trends in income distribution. In contrast to earlier evi-
dence, showing that the Swedish wage-rental ratio increased rapidly from 1870 
to 1914, our new wage-rental ratio shows a slower increase. This is interesting as 
industrialisation, which set in motion powerful forces of accumulation, tends to 
put the wage-rental ratio on an upward track. Sweden enjoyed rapid and sus-
tainable economic growth from the 1870s onwards, which means that a priori 
we should expect the wage-rental ratio to increase. We show a more gradual 
increase in the wage-rental ratio than previously thought, which highlights the 
very good conditions that existed for agriculture. Rapid productivity advances in 
agriculture and favourable prices, especially for animal products, boosted land 
prices. 
TABLE 3.3. Growth in current values of output in agriculture (% p.a.), 
decomposed into volume changes and price changes, 1876/1878–1912/1914 
 Growth Percentage share accounted for by 
  Price changes Volume changes 
Agriculture 2.1 30 70 
Animal products 3.2 28 72 
Crop products 0.1 34 66 
Source: Unpublished data of crop and animal output in fixed and current prices, provided by 
Lennart Schön. 
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Historical trends in wage-rental ratios have figured hugely in discussions of 
globalisation and its impact on relative factor-price movements in the land-
scarce but labour-abundant Old World, and the land-abundant but labour-scarce 
New World in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding our 
revision of the wage-rental ratio, the Old World label still comfortably fits 
Sweden; the wage-rental ratio increased in Sweden and other Old World 
countries and decreased in the New World. The revised Swedish wage-rental 
ratio, in contrast to the previous, behaves more like wage-rental ratios in the 
protectionist countries than in the free-trade countries in the Old World. That 
view is consistent with the Swedish protectionist turn in 1888. However, while 
farmers gained from grain tariffs, their income growth had more to do with a 
change in their product mix from crop to animal products. Real output increases 
and favourable nominal price movements of animal products served to raise land 
prices far more than tariffs on bread grain. 
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Appendix 3.1 
TABLE A.3.1 Land values for private land and Crown land, 1877–1926 
(1913=100) 
 private land Crown land 
 Size class, hectares   
 5–10  10–50  50–100  100– average  
1877 71 67 73 87 75 125 
1878 69 66 71 86 73 113 
1879 67 64 69 84 72 99 
1880 65 63 67 83 70 97 
1881 66 64 66 83 70 100 
1882 67 64 65 83 70 97 
1883 69 65 65 83 70 94 
1884 67 65 62 82 69 90 
1885 66 64 59 82 67 86 
1886 65 64 56 81 66 82 
1887 62 62 57 79 65 79 
1888 58 60 58 77 64 81 
1889 55 58 59 74 63 80 
1890 59 58 58 77 63 76 
1891 63 57 58 79 63 76 
1892 67 56 58 81 63 82 
1893 66 58 59 86 64 94 
1894 65 59 59 90 66 84 
1895 64 60 60 96 67 83 
1896 63 63 59 91 67 77 
1897 62 65 57 87 67 76 
1898 60 68 56 84 67 74 
1899 62 69 59 83 68 78 
1900 64 70 62 83 70 76 
1901 66 70 64 82 72 78 
1902 72 72 70 84 75 75 
1903 78 74 75 86 78 90 
1904 84 76 81 88 82 95 
1905 87 78 81 90 83 96 
1906 90 79 80 91 84 99 
1907 93 81 79 93 85 93 
1908 93 83 81 94 86 91 
1909 94 84 83 95 88 89 
1910 94 86 84 96 89 92 
1911 96 90 89 97 93 96 
1912 98 95 94 99 96 101 
1913 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1914 111 111 105 113 110 105 
1915 124 122 111 127 121 109 
1916 138 135 117 144 133 111 
1917 155 150 136 154 150 122 
1918 169 166 158 165 167 127 
1919 193 184 185 176 190 147 
1920     214 148 
1921     178 160 
1922     164 156 
1923     159 146 
1924     162 145 
1925     161 145 
1926     160 158 
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Chapter 4 
Chasing the American and the 
British Productivity Frontiers  
Swedish Comparative Labour Productivity 
in Manufacturing, 1869–1950 
4.1. Introduction 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Sweden embarked on a process of 
intensified industrialisation and sophisticated production of goods in which high 
value added industries increased their shares of output and employment at the 
expense of older and raw material-based industries. It was in many ways the 
birth of the modern Swedish industrial state and the starting-point of an era of 
swift and sustainable economic growth, putting the Swedish GDP per capita on 
an equal footing with most of the European countries in the wake of World War 
II. The quest for explanations of the rapid transition to modernity and the closing 
of the income gap in relation to the leaders has long preoccupied the minds of 
Swedish economic historians. The historiography reveals that the establishment 
of a large number of manufacturing industries in the decades preceding and 
following the turn of the century is a recurrent theme in many accounts.51 This 
preoccupation stems from a perception that modern manufacturing industries 
had dynamic properties which propelled the economy forward and laid the 
foundation for Swedish growth of income over most of the twentieth century.52 
In particular, many accounts lay stress on the broad sweep of firms within the 
mechanical and electro mechanical industry that appeared from the 1890s 
onwards. The view that manufacturing was the engine of growth from at least 
the 1890s is firmly rooted. The introduction, adaptation and diffusion of new 
production techniques are at the forefront in, for instance, Schön (2000b), the 
most recent and arguably also the most influential account of Swedish economic 
                                                 
 
51  Gårdlund (1942 pp. 63–167), Montgomery (1947 pp. 290–314, 333–8), Jörberg (1961), Kuuse 
(1977), Olsson (1993 pp. 61–6), Gustafsson (1997), Schön (2000 pp. 220–46). 
52  This view also finds support in Kaldor’s (1966) third growth law, establishing a strong positive 
relationship between the growth of manufacturing output and the growth of productivity 
outside manufacturing. 
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history. He stresses the importance of the adoption of electricity from around 
1890 onwards, which paved the way for new innovative companies in electricity 
production and distribution, electromechanical engineering, machine industry, 
pulp and paper (Schön 2000a).53 These industries were intensive in their use of 
human capital and highly competitive in world markets – foremost 
representatives of the ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ (Landes 1969). Although 
some Swedish inventors helped to augment the body of ingenious contrivances 
applicable in manufacturing, Sweden gained from embracing the progress in 
science and technology made elsewhere. Swedish entrepreneurs tapped sources 
of knowledge in the forerunners of industrialisation, especially Britain, and 
skilfully adapted them to local conditions.54 This is familiar ground in economic 
history; in an older strand of convergence literature one finds support for the 
view that the application of new production techniques matters for relatively 
backward countries attempting to narrow the gap to the leaders. In keeping with 
the spirit of Gerschenkron (1962) and Abramovitz (1986), it is easier for 
relatively poorer countries, latecomers in terms of industrialisation and 
economic development, to imitate technologies in use in rich countries than it is 
for the leading countries to advance the frontier through innovation. Merely 
being backward carries a potential for higher growth rates. Whether that 
potential will be realised depends on the ‘social capability’ of a country, in 
Abramovitz’ own words. Most observers agree that Sweden met the 
requirements underlying the concept of ‘social capability’; for instance, 
Sandberg (1979) wittingly labelled Sweden ‘the impoverished sophisticate’. 
Nonetheless, a challenge has been thrown down to those endorsing the whole 
idea of the importance of manufacturing and technology transfer for income 
convergence. Responsible for this challenge is Stephen Broadberry, who, in a 
string of important works in the 1990s has documented and explored long-term 
series for US/UK ratios of labour productivity for manufacturing and other 
sectors (Broadberry 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1997). The most noteworthy feature of 
these series is that relative levels of labour productivity remained largely 
unchanged over time in the manufacturing sector. Even if there were deviant 
swings in the ratio, it gravitated towards the two-to-one American lead in its 
long-run evolution. Although the American level of labour productivity in 
manufacturing was already twice as high as that of the British in the 1870s, it did 
not change much throughout the twentieth century. Hence, the manufacturing 
sector is not the place to look at to capture the forces in operation responsible for 
the American catch-up and eventual occupation of the leading position in terms 
of GDP per capita. This belies the crucial role previously attributed to 
technology transfers in manufacturing as being the force driving economy-wide 
                                                 
 
53  On the role of electricity, see also Hjulström (1940), Norgren (1992) and Schön (1990). 
54  Gårdlund (1942 pp. 233–59); Gustafsson (1996); Bruland (1998). 
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convergence forward.55 Instead, Broadberry argues, to understand convergence 
at the whole-economy level, we need to look carefully at structural 
transformations and productivity advances in other sectors. Convergence in GDP 
per capita takes place mostly through re-allocation of resources from low to high 
value added sectors (Broadberry 1993, 1994b). To bolster his argument 
Broadberry (1997) also presented evidence of labour productivity ratios in 
countries other than the US and the UK. Sweden along with Norway, Denmark 
the Netherlands and Germany constitute a sample labelled ‘Northern Europe’. 
These countries’ productivity levels relative to the UK show, firstly, that the 
level of labour productivity did not fall short of the British level at the beginning 
of the twentieth century and, secondly, that the ratios remained fairly constant 
during the twentieth century. The question that begs an answer is thus: did the 
Swedish economic historians get it wrong in assigning to manufacturing 
industries the responsibility for the Swedish catch-up with the core? In addition, 
will a closer look at the Swedish experience confirm Broadberry’s different view 
of convergence or will it rather support an older convergence literature? 
This chapter attempts to respond to these challenging questions by charting 
the long-term movement of comparative labour productivity in manufacturing in 
Sweden relative to the US and the UK. To do so requires the establishment of 
benchmarks for comparative levels of labour productivity. The ‘industry of 
origin’ approach to benchmarks aims to compare levels of output by industry. As 
Broadberry did with his pre-World War II benchmarks, I measure physical 
output per worker, the methodology that is attributed to Lazio Rostas’ (1948).56 
The method renders each country’s level of output comparable. In cases where 
the method is inapplicable, I use net output per worker instead, and the average 
unit value ratio or the official exchange rate converts output in pounds and 
dollars into Swedish kronor. All information on output and employment comes 
from each country’s official statistics, implying that the earliest benchmark of 
1909 coincides broadly with the first British Census of Production in 1907.57 The 
two additional benchmarks refer to 1924 and 1935. Time series for real output 
and employment in 1869–1950 are linked to the benchmarks of 1924 to cover a 
wider stretch of history. These series, along with series of GDP to capita ratios, 
make it possible to study the long-term movement of comparable levels of 
labour productivity in manufacturing in relation to the aggregate. The evidence 
of long-term labour productivity in this chapter shows that the traditional 
                                                 
 
55  Examples of studies which lay emphasis on the spill-over effects from leaders to followers are 
Gomulka 1971, Cornwall 1977, Nelson and Wright 1992. Abramovitz (1986) and Feinstein 
(1991) include the transfer of a range of other capabilities too. 
56  Hjerppe (2001) used Rostas’ method to assess differences in labour productivity among 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark. 
57  In the following, censuses refer to the Swedish Industrial Statistics (Bidrag till Sveriges 
officiella statistik. D. Manufakturer och fabriker and Sveriges officiella statistik. Industri), the 
British Census of Production and the US Census of Manufactures. 
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interpretation reigns supreme; Sweden did enjoy significant convergence gains 
through the outstanding achievements of manufacturing industries. The series of 
GDP to capita ratios show, however, that one also needs to take into account 
structural transformation to paint a more detailed picture of relative 
performance, supporting Broadberry’s alternative vision of convergence. 
4.2. Methodological considerations 
Although an array of factors other than labour productivity affects the amount of 
goods and services available for final consumption, labour productivity is 
arguably the single most important measure of economic performance. 
International comparisons of labour productivity enable us to gain an insight into 
relative incomes and hence standards of living in different countries. The 
methods described below, physical output per worker and net value per worker, 
are usually referred to as the ‘industry of origin’ approach (van Ark 1993). They 
aim to compare output levels by industry, and the long list of productivity 
comparisons across countries based on the industry of origin approach attests to 
their wide applicability.58 It pins down robust comparative levels and many 
comparisons have proved to endure the test of time. Despite a long pedigree, 
these methods also suffer from a number of shortcomings that keep their 
applicability within certain bounds. First, the sample of industries does not 
remain identical in several consecutive benchmarks. As time goes by new 
industries crop up while others cease to exist, and changes of classification 
schemes in each country’s census render earlier comparisons difficult if not 
impossible. Furthermore, a single benchmark of comparative labour productivity 
may be thought of as a snapshot at a certain point in time hence depending to 
some degree on contingencies. A well-known problem is that estimated levels of 
labour productivity are influenced by capacity utilisation. If the benchmark year 
for a particular industry represents a peak in the business cycle in one country 
but a trough in the other, the estimated productivity ratio becomes fallacious. 
Ideally, the choice of benchmark years should reflect considerations of business 
cycles for the most important industries. In reality, censuses only appeared in 
selected years, which limits the number of ideal matches. Inasmuch as the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics appeared annually, I have matched it to either the 
British Census of Manufactures or the US Census of Manufactures, both of 
which appeared more occasionally. For instance, in the first benchmark I 
                                                 
 
58  Apart from the ones referred to in the text a few additional examples suffice: Frankel (1957), 
Jung (2003), Dormois (2004).  
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compare the Swedish output in 1909 with the American output in 1909 and the 
British output in 1907.59 
4.2.1. Physical output per worker 
Lazio Rostas’ (1948) research on the British labour productivity levels in 
relation to American, carried out with scrupulous attention to detail, represents a 
cornerstone in the historiography of productivity benchmarks. He elaborated a 
method based on comparisons of physical output per unit of labour input. The 
use of physical indicators renders comparable each country’s measure of labour 
productivity, e.g. metric tons of cement per worker in the US and Sweden. 
Dividing the one country’s level with the others’ yields a labour productivity 
ratio. The method, straightforward though admittedly somewhat crude, is 
applicable as long as there are fairly homogenous and comparable products at 
hand. In addition, it requires a wealth of information on output in physical 
quantities for separate industries. In the Swedish Industrial Statistics, the extent 
to which physical quantities are reported for separate industries varies from one 
year to another, which imposes a limit as to the number of potential benchmark 
years.60 Furthermore, as the twentieth century progressed, the increasing 
complexity of the structure of goods made Rostas’ method gradually less 
applicable. Constraints imposed by an insufficient breakdown of the industrial 
classification, or just different classification schemes, pose just as serious a 
problem, though. Such is the case as regards matched products given in 
incommensurable physical units, e.g. matches, given in kilos in Sweden but in 
number of units in the UK and the US. For many goods, censuses do not report 
physical quantities. 
The censuses in all three countries are based on two classification schemes: 
by goods and by industry. Physical quantities and corresponding product values 
appear in the former, employment data and output value per industry in the 
latter. The total number of workers employed, as given in the censuses, relates to 
the total value of output for the industry under investigation, whereas we are 
only interested in the number of workers associated with the products under 
investigation. The correction factor is given by the ratio of the value of those 
products included in the comparison to the total value of gross output in the 
industry. This ratio equals the coverage ratio and is used not only in order to 
adjust the number of workers but also to indicate whether the estimate is 
reliable. The assumption underlying this method is that the compared and the 
                                                 
 
59  In the text I refer to the benchmarks of 1909, 1924 and 1935 though the true benchmark years 
are 1907/1909, 1924 and 1935 in the UK/Sweden comparison and 1909, 1924/1925 and 
1937/1935 in the US/Sweden comparison. 
60  The absence of a detailed classification scheme by industry disqualifies, for instance, the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics of 1913, an otherwise suitable benchmark year. 
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excluded products have similar labour input per unit of output. This may be an 
unrealistic assumption since the manufacturing of different goods requires 
different kinds of production techniques and hence different labour input per unit 
of output. Comparing the unit values of the compared and excluded products 
hints at whether or not the assumption holds; if the unit values differ 
substantially, it is fraught with difficulty to match product and employment, and 
thus the number of possible comparisons is circumscribed. Low coverage ratios 
are likely to be the case when an industry produces a main-product but also a 
sizable share of by-products and ancillary products. Quite often, the total value 
of the products under investigation does not account for the major part of the 
total value of output in that industry. In some cases, a substantial part of the total 
quantity produced is not manufactured in the industry under review but as by-
products elsewhere. An example is the total US production of oleomargarine, a 
good share of which is manufactured in the meat packing industry, while the 
estimates refer to the quantity produced in the oleomargarine industry. If labour 
input per unit of output differs between these industries, then the estimates give 
a misleading impression. 
For readers unfamiliar with Rostas’ methodology table 4.1 guides through the 
different steps to establish productivity ratios in the beet sugar industry.61 
Column (1) and (2) give tons of beet sugar and corresponding product values in 
Swedish kronor, pounds and dollars, taken directly from each country’s census. 
Dividing column (2) by column (1) gives unit values in column (3). The next 
column, (4), reports the total production value of the beet sugar industry, and 
                                                 
 
61  Appendix 4.2 contains the same information for all the industries included in the sample. 
TABLE 4.1. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in American, 
British and Swedish beet sugar industry, 1924 and 1925 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Quanty 
‘000 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Unit 
value 
per ton 
Value of 
total output 
‘000 
Coverage 
ratio  
(%)  
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
work. 
US 1925 1,186 124,026 105 132,339 94 8,872 8,315 143 
UK 1924 1,006 44,454 44 53,273 83 11,400 9,513 106 
Sweden 1924         153 121,330 793 122,427 99 2,245 2,225 69 
Note: Value of product and value of total output are expressed in each country’s currency. 
Sources: British Census of Production (1924); US Census of Manufactures (1925); Sveriges 
officially statistik. Industri (1924). 
TABLE 4.2. Comparative labour productivity ratio and unit value ratio in the beet 
sugar industry, 1924 and 1925 
 Benchmark year  Labour productivity ratio Unit value ratio, 
kronor 
US/Sweden 1925/1924  207 7.6 
UK/Sweden 1924  154 17.9 
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dividing column (2) by column (4) gives the coverage ratio. It signals how large 
a share of total output value the product under consideration, in this case beet 
sugar, represents in this industry. The higher the share the more solid the ground 
on which the benchmark rests. The estimated number of workers in column (8) 
is derived by multiplying column (5) and (6) (divided by 100) and, finally, 
dividing physical output by the estimated number of workers gives an estimate 
of tons per worker. Table 4.2 displays the estimated labour productivity ratios 
along with unit value ratios, the latter obtained through dividing the Swedish 
unit value by either the British or the American. In 1924 British labour 
productivity was 54 per cent higher than Swedish while the American advantage 
was 107 per cent. 
Clearly, the method of physical output per head neglects quality differences 
owing to for instance variety, size, shape, durability and style.62 Leunig (2003) 
has demonstrated persuasively the potential pitfalls of adding together quantities 
                                                 
 
62  In Appendix 4.2 I discuss briefly some of the major differences in product quality and 
composition of output. 
TABLE 4.3. Physical output and weighting procedure in the Swedish and  
American paper pulp industry, 1935 and 1937  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pulp variety Quantity,  
Tons 
Share of 
total 
product 
value 
Unit 
value 
Relative 
price 
New 
quantity, 
Swedish 
relative price
New 
quantity,  
US relative 
price 
New 
quantity, 
geometric 
average 
Number 
of 
workers 
  USA 1937 
chanic   1,764,404 0.15 17.2 1.0 1,764,404 176,4404  
Sulphite white 1,486,628 0.40 53.3 3.1 4,606,818 906,3173  
 grey 872,547 0.15 35.2 2.0 1,785,678 283,3674  
Sulphate white 237,158 0.04 35.2 2.0 485,347 1,548,771  
 grey 2,120,742 0.26 24.1 1.4 2,971,505 6,559,980  
Total  6,481,479 1.00    11,613,751 21,770,002 15,900,672 21,805
  Sweden 1935 
Mechanic   1,296,357 0.12 31.1 1.0 1,296,357 1,296,357   
Sulphite white 310,441 0.17 189.6 6.1 1,892,592 962,006  
 grey 1,304,900 0.38 101.0 3.2 4,237,778 2,670,493  
Sulphate white 54,315 0.03 203.1 6.5 354,707 111,156  
 grey 1,088,582 0.30 96.2 3.1 3,367,254 1,525,281  
Total  4,054,595 1.00   11,148,687 6,565,293 8,555,373 20,670
Note: Dividing the unit value of each pulp quality with the unit value of mechanic pulp gives the 
relative prices. New quantity is the product of relative price and quantity.  
Sources: US Census of Manufactures (1937); Sveriges officiella statistik. Industri (1935). 
TABLE 4.4. Comparative US/Sweden labour productivity in the paper pulp 
industry, 1937/1935 (Sweden=100) 
 US/Sweden 
Before conversion 152 
After conversion 176 
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of different kinds of yarn. Coarser yarn is after all heavier than finer, but a robust 
weighting of aggregate output fails to take into account that simple fact, which 
leads Leunig (2003. p. 96) to conclude that Broadberry (1994) had it wrong in 
asserting that the US had a 17 per cent productivity lead in cotton spinning in 
1907. Instead, in a study of Lancashire and New England – the two leading 
textile industries at that time – Leunig, by estimating all types of yarn separately, 
finds that the two areas had similar productivity for low counts, while 
Lancashire was more productive for all counts above 20, the latter of which 
accounted for the lion’s share of the total output. Hence, the UK was the leader 
of textile industry, not the US. It is, however, a moot point as to whether quality 
factors really account for the main part of the variations (Rostas 1948; van Ark 
1993; Magee 1997). Some of the estimated productivity ratios raise our 
suspicions that quality differences play an important part but, as Broadberry 
(1997) argues, it is not reasonable to claim that quality differences are all in the 
same direction. Hypothetically, if American cement is of a higher quality than 
Swedish, the opposite might be said about pulp, reducing the risk of arriving at 
numbers in the aggregate that are significantly biased in one direction or the 
other.  
Simply adding up quantities represents an unnecessarily crude solution if the 
censuses provide detailed information on the composition of goods. To create 
heterogeneous units requires the computation of equivalents, as though all 
countries produced the same commodity. The calculation is done in each 
country’s relative prices and the geometric mean yields the new measure of 
physical quantity. The conversion serves to iron out inconsistencies stemming 
from unequal proportions of output. Table 4.3 elucidates an example of 
conversion in the US/Sweden benchmark of 1937/1935. Column (2) shows the 
proportions in which the US and Sweden produced different kinds of paper pulp, 
all of which had different unit values (column 3). The relative price in column 4 
expresses the price of all kinds of pulp in relation to mechanic pulp. Multiplying 
quantity in column (1) by both countries’ relative prices gives new quantities, 
mechanic pulp equivalents, in column (5) and (6). The geometric mean of 
column (5) and (6) is the new quantity in column (7) which is then used to 
compute each country’s level of labour productivity. Table 4.4 shows how the 
conversion raises the US-Sweden productivity ratio from 152 to 176. As column 
(2) in table 4.3 shows, the US proportion of the relatively more expensive white 
pulp, produced with the sulphite method, is larger than the Swedish proportion. 
It makes conversion boost the American productivity level. Unfortunately, the 
descriptions of the products in the censuses do not always make such meticulous 
investigation straightforward.63 
                                                 
 
63  Apart from paper pulp, the following products were subject to conversion into equivalents: 
bulbs, glass, paper, butter, cotton yarn and wool yarn.  
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4.2.2. Net value per worker 
The alternative to Rostas’ method is a comparison of net output per worker, the 
most common solution for post-1945 benchmarks.64 The definition of net output 
in the US Census of Manufactures and the UK Census of Production is identical: 
‘Net output of an industry is derived by subtracting from the value of gross 
output the aggregate of the cost of materials and fuel used, the amount paid for 
work given out and other payments recorded’.65 Prior to 1952, the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics reported only gross output by industry, although net output 
could be obtained for manufacturing as a whole from 1947 onwards. The dearth 
of information on net output excludes the net value per worker method as a 
primary way to establish productivity benchmarks for the first half of the 
twentieth century. Yet, inasmuch as Rostas’ method fails when no physical 
indicators exist, it is necessary to circumvent the absence of information on net 
output in the Swedish Industrial Statistics. Two public investigations report costs 
shares of materials and fuel for a number of industries in 1913 and 1926 (SOU 
1923; Kommerskollegium 1927).66 These years correspond well to this 
investigation’s benchmarks in 1909 and 1924, but less so to the last benchmark 
in 1935. I have had to assume that the net output shares were the same in 1935 
as in 1924, adding uncertainty to the estimated level of this benchmark. The 
classification of industries in the public investigations and the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics is similar. 
Net output expressed in each country’s currency needs to be translated into a 
single unit of pay. The use of the official exchange rate has repeatedly been 
deemed inappropriate because it reflects only the relative values of traded goods 
(Gilbert and Kravis 1954). Furthermore, short-term capital movements may 
influence the official exchange rate. The solution to the currency converting 
procedure is so-called unit value ratios (Paige and Bombach 1959; Maddison 
and van Ark 1989). Unit value ratios convert net output given in a country’s own 
currency into the currency of the other. Unit values can be obtained from each 
country’s census; dividing the product value by the corresponding quantity gives 
the unit value. Unit values are so-called ex factory gate prices, not prices of 
consumer goods, thereby excluding the potential influence of transport costs and 
distributive margins. Besides, unit values include semi-finished products but 
exclude imported products. The aggregation of different unit value ratios is a 
                                                 
 
64  The methodology of net output per worker was established by Paige and Bombach (1959). 
65  Net output is additive over all industries without any appreciable duplication but it does not 
equal value added, each industry’s contribution to GDP, because it contains for instance 
payments made for repairs, hire of plant, advertising and research work (Historical Statistics of 
the Census of Production 1907 to 1970). 
66  One minus these cost shares multiplied by gross output gives a measure which Lindahl et al. 
(1937 Appendix D table 107) called net value. It should be comparable to net output as defined 
in the British Census of Production and the US Census of Manufactures. 
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stepwise procedure: from product to industry level, from industry to groups of 
industries (branch) and from groups of industries to the manufacturing industry 
as a whole. The literature on the subject suggests the following (van Ark 1990): 
unit value ratios at product levels are weighted by product values to form 
weighted unit value ratios at industry level. Each unit value ratio at industry 
level is then weighted by net output to form unit value ratios at branch level. 
These unit value ratios are then combined into an aggregate measure using net 
output for each branch. In each step, unit value ratios are weighted by both 
countries’ weights and the geometric mean combines them into an overall 
measure67. The recent literature on productivity benchmarks has called attention 
to the inconsistency implied when using unit value ratios so obtained. At the 
product level, we assume that the ratio of prices for final products equals the 
ratio of prices for intermediate consumption, which is single deflation. At the 
industry level we subtract prices of intermediate consumption from gross output, 
which is double deflation. When old benchmarks have been re-calculated by 
double deflation techniques at product and industry levels, the perception of 
comparative productivity in the aggregate has remained unaltered, but the re-
calculation has brought forth a different picture of the relative standing of certain 
industries (Fremdling et al. 2007). In order to remain consistent at all levels and 
circumvent the absence of sufficient information on net output, I weight unit 
values by gross output at both the product and the industry levels. 
Still, a more severe shortcoming of the method of net value per worker is that 
only the products for which the census gives physical quantities underlie the 
computation of the unit value ratios. The unit value ratios are likely to suffer 
from a sample selection bias if we have reasons to believe that the excluded 
industries performed differently from the industries underlying the unit value 
ratios. The next section tries to get a grip on this matter. 
                                                 
 
67  The formula appears in section 4.3.1 below as the same stepwise procedure transforms 
benchmarks of comparative labour productivity at industry levels into a benchmark of 
comparative productivity for the manufacturing industry as a whole. 
TABLE 4.5. The share of industries estimated by the method of net value per 
worker 
 US/Sweden  UK/Sweden 
 US Sweden  UK Sweden 
1909 0.41 0.30  0.25 0.15 
1924 0.40 0.46  0.24 0.30 
1935 0.45 0.42  0.30 0.37 
Note: Gross value of output for industries estimated by the net value per worker method in relation 
to gross output for all industries  
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4.2.3. The relative weight of each method 
An inherent characteristic of Swedish industrialisation at the end of the 
nineteenth century is the increasing share of mechanical engineering whose 
output in physical quantities the Swedish Industrial Statistics fail to report. The 
proportion of industries for which productivity levels are estimated by the 
method of net value per worker thereby increases, as table 4.5 indicates. In the 
UK/Sweden comparison for instance, the Swedish share jumps from 15 to 37 per 
cent. This illustrates an important drawback of the industry of origin approach to 
the measurement of comparative productivity. Apart from spoiling Rostas’ 
method of physical quantities per worker, it also degrades the net value per 
worker method. The reliability of the unit value ratios, used to translate pounds 
and dollars into Swedish kronor, diminishes gradually because they do not 
reflect the relative price of these complex goods; instead, they embody the 
relative price of more homogenous, and mostly domestic, consumer goods. It 
seems likely that high tariffs provided shelter for consumer goods industries, 
which may have hampered incentives to carry on with efficiency 
improvements.68 The average unit value ratios, based as they are on mostly those 
protected industries, appear to be suspiciously high in relation to the official 
exchange rates, as table 4.6 reports. If the unit value ratios were multiplied by 
US and UK output they would impart a misleading impression of the gaps 
between Sweden the US and the UK. There are reasons to suspect that the 
difference between the exchange rate and the average unit value ratio mirrors 
inferior Swedish productivity performance in domestic consumer goods 
industries. The unit value ratio should therefore not be used to represent the 
relative price of traded goods. The official exchange rate is probably closer to 
the true unit value ratio for the engineering industry, as it reflects the price ratio 
of tradable goods.69 Thus, the official exchange rate transforms dollars and 
pounds into kronor in the engineering industry and the sawmill industry, while 
the weighted average of unit value ratios is used for the hosiery industry and 
glass industry, both representing domestic consumer goods industries, and the 
matches industry. 
                                                 
 
68  For information on the degree to which tariffs provided industries with shelter from foreign 
competition, see Bohlin (2005). 
69  In the first and second benchmarks of 1909 and 1924 Sweden stayed on the gold standard. In 
the last benchmark of 1935, however, the real exchange rate of the Swedish currency probably 
depreciated after its dissociation from the Gold Standard in 1931 and the concomitant pegging 
of it to the British pound at 19.4 in 1933 (Bohlin 1999). 
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4.2.4. Working hours 
Preferably, the denominator in a comparative labour productivity ratio should 
incorporate differences in working hours. What do we know about working 
hours in the three countries? The usual reference point is Maddison (1991), who 
gives data for annual hours worked per person for a sample of countries, 
including Sweden. Scarce evidence of working hours in the pre-World War I era 
provoked Maddison to rely on a number of quite heroic assumptions. He 
assumed that all countries’ weekly working hours were on a par with the British 
in 1870, and that they had the same number of public holidays as in 1950. The 
movement of annual working hours until 1913 was furthermore assumed to have 
followed the British path (Maddison 1995 pp. 255–9). This assumption is at 
odds with what one may expect from differences between rich and poor 
countries; diminishing working hours tend to go hand in hand with growth of 
income.70 More importantly though, the assumption is at variance with the 
existing evidence of average weekly working hours in Sweden in relation to 
Britain. Weekly working hours for Swedish industrial workers were on average 
58.9 in 1905 (Arbetsstatistik 1911), in fact only slightly shorter a working week 
than the British in 1850. The British working week in 1906 was on average 53.3 
(Bienefield 1972). A recent study by Huberman (2004), who draws on 
alternative sources, confirms our suspicions that Maddison underestimated the 
disparity in pre-World War I levels and movements of annual working hours.71 
He also presents a series of working hours for Scandinavia. In an unpublished 
study, Tegle (1982) puts together the scattered and incomplete observations of 
weekly work hours in Sweden from 1860 to 1913. His picture diverges 
somewhat from what Huberman’s picture of Scandinavia tells us. The use of 
                                                 
 
70  There are notable exceptions to this logic in the post-World War II era, in particular in the US 
(Gordon 2004b). 
71  Reports of British trade offices give Huberman (2004) a measure of workdays and a study by 
the US Department of Labor furnishes him with evidence of hours of work per week. 
TABLE 4.6. Unit value ratios and official exchange rates  
 US/Sweden  UK/Sweden 
 unit value ratio official 
exchange rate 
 unit value ratio official 
exchange rate 
1909 4.23 3.73  20.25 18.21 
1924 4.21 3.74  16.89 16.64 
1935 4.62 3.97  21.75 19.40 
Sources: The different sample years, 1907/1909, 1924/1925 and 1935/1937 are made 
comparable by adjusting for the overall price movement in a whole sale price index of the UK 
and the US (Mitchell 2003a, 2003b). Swedish official exchange rate from the database of the 
Swedish Riksbank: Historical monetary statistics of Sweden 1668–2008: 
http://www.riksbank.com/templates/Page.aspx?id=27399.
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Tegle’s Swedish evidence instead of Huberman’s Scandinavia tempers 
somewhat the rate at which work hours were cut between 1870 and 1913. I am 
inclined to trust Tegle’s estimate more because it comprises the Board of 
Trade’s benchmark in 1905, our most solid evidence of pre-1913 weekly work 
hours (Arbetsstatistik 1911). Table 4.7 shows Huberman’s pre-1929 estimates 
for the US and the UK along with Tegle’s estimate for Sweden. Maddison’s data 
are used for the years which ensue. Maddison’s figures for later years refer to 
weighted averages of different sectors, which is far from ideal as we seek a 
measure of working hours for the manufacturing industry proper. Still, as time 
went by the reduction of working hours progressed more uniformly among 
different sectors of the economy, which makes the figures most probably reflect 
the movement of working hours pertaining in manufacturing.  
The years between 1870 and 1950 witnessed a pronounced reduction of the 
differences in working hours among the three countries. I have adjusted all the 
labour productivity ratios by industry and the time series used to extrapolate 
from the benchmark in 1924 (section 4.4.1) to incorporate these differences in 
working hours. 
4.3. Evidence of relative productivity for benchmark 
years 
For each benchmark year comparative productivity levels by industry have been 
established. On the one hand, the aim is to build up an aggregate picture of 
relative performance and, on the other, to uncover the pattern of comparative 
advantage at industry levels. The usefulness of a benchmark of comparative 
productivity turns on how large a share of the manufacturing industry it 
comprises. In this investigation the captured share of total output in 
manufacturing ranges from 29 to 47 per cent, as the coverage ratios in table 4.8 
report. In the UK/Sweden comparison of 1924 for example the included 
industries account for 44 per cent of gross output in the UK but just 37 per cent 
TABLE 4.7. Estimates of annual hours worked per person, 1870–1950 
 Sweden US Great Britain 
1870 3399 3096 2755 
1880 3232 3044 2740 
1890 3113 2983 2669 
1900 2960 2938 2656 
1913 2831 2900 2656 
1929 2342 2286 2283 
1938 2062 2267 2204 
1950 1867 1958 1951 
Sources: 1870–1913: Sweden: Tegle (1982 p. 22); United States and Great Britain: Huberman 
(2004, table 6); 1929–1950: Maddison (1991 Table C.9). 
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of gross output in Sweden. The reason is that an industry included may have a 
large weight in one country but less weight in the other. The coverage in this 
study is similar to Broadberry (1997) and Rostas’ (1948) pre-World War I 
benchmarks. In general, as production has become more complex in the post-
World War II epoch, the coverage ratios have fallen (van Ark 1993). 
Every industry is allocated to a group of industries (branch). Apart from a 
few exceptions, the allocation of each industry into one of the seven branches 
follows the classification in the different censuses. The large weight the sawmill 
industry constitutes in the American and Swedish manufacturing sector makes it 
a suitable if sole representative of the wood industry. Table 4.9 shows the full 
sample of estimates of comparative productivity, where the bold figures are 
arithmetic means for each branch. The interpretation of the result requires 
caution because the sudden appearance of a previously excluded industry may 
markedly change the arithmetic mean of each branch and manufacturing at large. 
Furthermore, some results are open to objections, for instance the sudden 
contraction of the US/Sweden ratio in the sawmill industry: from 266 in the first 
benchmark to 140 in the second, and then to 236 in the third benchmark. It may 
illustrate how susceptible a benchmark is to the choice of benchmark year. With 
those caveats in mind, the results do cast light on relative performances by 
industry. 
In relation to Britain, some Swedish industries, mostly export-oriented ones 
such as paper, mechanical engineering and electro mechanical, stand out because 
they had surpassed the British level of productivity by the first benchmark of 
1909. Over time, the impression one gets is that Swedish domestic consumer 
industries moved in parallel with the British or lost ground, while export 
oriented industries surged ahead. These counteracting forces operate to keep the 
two last benchmarks, with a British lead of around 15 per cent, unchanged. In 
relation to the US, no noteworthy Swedish industry outperformed its American 
counterpart. In most industries, the gap was wide even though many ratios 
tended to contract, especially from 1924 to 1935, suggesting that convergence 
forces were at work after all. 
The large distance in labour productivity performance between the US and 
Sweden is an echo of what previous authors have concluded about the US/UK 
gap in productivity, both for particular industries like paper (Magee 1997) and  
 
TABLE 4.8. Total coverage ratios for each benchmark 
 US/Sweden  UK/Sweden 
 US Sweden  UK Sweden 
1909 0.41 0.52  0.47 0.41 
1924 0.29 0.42  0.44 0.37 
1935 0.44 0.49  0.37 0.45 
Note: Total gross value of output from industries under investigation divided by total gross 
value of output for the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
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TABLE 4.9. The full sample of comparative productivity ratios by industry 
(Sweden=100) 
 US/Sweden  UK/Sweden 
 1909 1924 1935  1909 1924 1935 
Mechanical engineering* 232 253 185 91 75 65 
Electro mechanical* 170 238 219 80 86 71 
Bulbs   415   112 
Shipbuilding* 242 215 169 138 89 78 
Engineering  215 235 247 103 83 82 
Glass* 270 370   162 172 
Cement 251 242 110 120 112 118 
Bricks    232 202 169 
Stone, clay and glass 260 306 110 176 159 153 
Sawmills* 266 140 236    
Wood 266 140 236    
Paper pulp   159    
Paper and board 207 219 146 83 84 81 
Paper  207 219 153 83 84 81 
Grain milling 410 271 192 195 143 120 
Slaughter and meat packing 210 158 141    
Margarine 148 126 144   101 
Beet sugar 169 192 121 297 159 150 
Brewery 275  271 191 161 184 
Spirit distillery   117  104 116 
Biscuits  341 285   92 
Fish curing      296 
Dairy products 238 29 227 133  145 
Food, beer and spirit 242 186 187 204 142 151 
Cotton 156 192 176 130 160 151 
Wool    82 124 110 
Jute 262 434 377    
Binder Twain 208 112 104 112 70 70 
Hosiery* 188 187 171 87 81 103 
Hats and bonnets      124 
Shoes 183 195 239 110 138 156 
Textiles, clothing and 
footwear 199 224 214 104 115 119 
Paints and varnishes 317 316   100 132 
Soap, candles and perfumery 233 260 200 110 91 75 
Seed crushing 81   110   
Matches*    160  214 
Fertiliser 169 178 99 111 78 57 
Explosives     135  
Chemical  200 251 149 123 101 120 
       
Total manufacturing 227 218 185 132 114 117 
Note: Asterisks indicate that productivity ratios have been estimated by the method of net value 
per worker; otherwise Rostas’ method of physical quantity per workers has been used. Bold 
figures are the arithmetic mean for each branch. Each benchmark is adjusted for the different years 
for which data were collected and differences in working hours among the three countries. The 
time series of labour productivity in (see section 4.4.1 and Appendix 4.1) are used to indicate the 
direction of change between the sample years. For instance, the original US/Sweden ratio for paper 
pulp was 176 (table 4.4). Adjusting it for working hours (table 4.7, extrapolations between the 
years) gives a new ratio of 167 (176*0.95) because in the US working hours were on average 5.5 
per cent higher than in Sweden, and adjusting it furthermore for the sample years (the American 
productivity grew by five per cent from 1935 to 1937, see Appendix 4.1) gives 159 (167*0.95).for 
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manufacturing as a whole (Rostas 1948; Broadberry 1994). The persistent and 
wide gap in labour productivity between the US and the UK, established in the 
nineteenth century, has long attracted unabated attention.72 What appears so 
remarkable is that this gap in labour productivity in manufacturing had already 
been established before the UK lost its economy-wide lead in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century.73 An intriguing question is whether our 
measure of productivity systematically overestimates the US output per unit of 
input, or assigns too low a weight to European goods produced with higher 
quality content. Probing into the matter requires detailed investigations of 
product varieties and qualities. 
4.3.1. Aggregation  
The weighting of industry specific productivity ratios permits compositional 
effects between industries to have a full impact on the size of the overall ratio of 
labour productivity in manufacturing. In addition, aggregation of the full set of 
productivity ratios aims to build three benchmarks that track, as precisely as 
possible, the movement of ratios of time series of labour productivity. The 
choice of weights for the benchmarks should therefore mirror the way output 
series used for extrapolation are constructed. As will become clear in a moment 
(section 4.4.1), both gross output and net output weights satisfy this requirement 
while employment weights cannot because none of the three countries’ series of 
output was constructed mainly using employment weights.74 The lack of 
information on Swedish net output justifies the use of gross output as weights for 
benchmarks, but the sensitivity test shows that net output and gross output 
weights lead to similar results. As with unit value ratios, the weighting proceeds 
stepwise: from industry to branch, and then from branch to the aggregate. The 
weights assigned to each industry, the lowest level, represent that industry’s 
gross output as recorded by the census (column 4 in table 4.1). For the next 
level, the weights represent the gross output of each branch as given by the 
census. For instance, the weight given to chemical industries does not amount to 
the sum of gross output for the industries included in the sample of chemical 
industries but gross output of all industries labelled chemical in each country’s 
                                                 
 
72  The literature on the American advantage is vast. Few issues in economic history have been so 
extensively covered. See for example Habakkuk (1962); Landes (1969); David (1975); 
Lazonick (1983); Chandler (1990); Wright (1990). 
73  There are disagreements as to when the US overtook the UK’s leading position at the 
economy-wide level. Direct benchmarks at the end of the nineteenth century gives an 
impression of an earlier American superiority than if Maddison’s methodogy of extrapolations 
backwards from a benchmark in 1990 is used (Ward and Devereux 2003, 2004; Broadberry 
2003). 
74  For a discussion of the construction of historical real output series in manufacturing in the US 
and the UK, see Thomas and Feinstein (2004). 
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census. To compile these weights in a systematic manner I have paid due 
attention to the way the different censuses classify industries, and some 
adjustments have been made along the way. For instance, matches belong to the 
wood industry in the US Census of Manufactures, but belong to the chemical 
industry here. The branch weights thus constructed circumvent the problem 
posed by the irregularity with which industries appear in the different 
benchmarks. For each comparison, there are two country weights. The literature 
on comparative estimates recommends the use of both countries’ weights, and 
the geometric mean of the two weighted ratios then gives a solution reminiscent 
of the Fisher price index formula (van Ark 1993). Formula (4.1) illustrates how 
this works, where iα  represents output per worker in industry i  in the US or the 
UK and *iα  the corresponding number in Sweden; iQ  represents gross output in 
industry i  in the US or the UK and *iQ  the corresponding number in Sweden. 
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Table 4.10 testifies to the significance of weighting as it changes our 
impression of the evolution of relative labour productivity. With reference to the 
UK/Sweden comparison, the size order of the benchmarks now coincides with 
the chronological order; the picture conveys a message of unbroken Swedish 
convergence. Swedish industries, with good relative performance, expanded 
their shares of gross output, which points to the favourable change in the 
composition of output. New and modern production technologies that fostered 
rapid productivity advances were taken up by industries epitomizing the ‘Second 
Industrial Revolution’. Even if these industries absorbed increasing shares of 
TABLE 4.10. Weighted labour productivity ratios at branch level and 
manufacturing as a whole (Sweden=100) 
 US/Sweden  UK/Sweden 
 1909 1924 1935  1909 1924 1935 
Engineering  226 249 189  97 78 68 
Stone, clay and glass 262 309 110  194 170 159 
Wood 266 140 236     
Paper 207 219 151  83 84 81 
Food  282 223 181  199 151 146 
Textile  175 193 194  109 138 130 
Chemical  188 258 167  120 95 94 
        
Total manufacturing 238 223 182  144 125 111 
Note: Based on the productivity ratios in table 4.9, thus adjusted for working hours and different 
sample years, and weighted by gross output shares according to formula (4.1). 
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gross output in all the three countries, this transformation was more pronounced 
in Sweden than Britain. This evidence may evoke the readers’ memories of the 
lively and longstanding discussion of the British climacteric.75 Some of those 
claiming that the late Victorian and Edwardian Britain slid into decline have 
adduced evidence of the British slowness to adopt the techniques of mass 
production and the far from impressive growth rates of steel, automobile and 
mechanical and electro mechanical engineering. Since it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to examine the changing composition of output in detail it suffices 
here to say that a closer look at the UK/Sweden comparison may cast some fresh 
light on this old and intriguing debate. 
4.4. The long-term picture 
Series of output and employment for manufacturing are used to indicate the 
movement of labour productivity in each country between 1869 and 1952. The 
ratio of any two countries’ series of labour productivity linked to one of the 
benchmarks permits exploration of long-term comparative performance. Before 
turning to the historical evidence, a note on the construction of historical time 
series of output in constant prices is warranted.  
4.4.1. Series of output and employment 
Ideally, the series of output should represent volume net output, constructed by 
deflating both the current value of gross output and the current value of 
intermediate inputs, and subtracting the volume of intermediate inputs from the 
volume of gross output.76 In historical national accounts a second best – and 
more commonly found – solution is series of volume gross output for separate 
industries combined into a series of manufacturing at large by using value added 
shares for benchmark years. If neither of these options is viable we have 
recourse to series of gross output in constant prices weighted by gross output 
shares.  
The second best solution was mostly used in the construction of the British 
and American output series used by Broadberry.77 For Sweden, Schön (1988) 
presents two options: either a series labelled volume net output or a series 
labelled volume gross output. The lack of net output in the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics before 1952 forced Schön to construct the series of volume net output 
                                                 
 
75 For an overview of the discussion of the British climacteric, see Magee (2004). 
76  The expressions output in constant prices and volume output are used interchangeably.  
77  Braodberry (1993) based his comparisons on output data from Kendrick (1961) and Feinstein 
(1972). For a discussion on the construction of these series, see Thomas and Feinstein (2004).  
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largely on the basis of the second best solution.78 It means that the Swedish 
series called volume net output rests in fact on the same methodological 
foundation as the British and American series, making it a better counterpart to 
the American and British series than the series labelled volume gross output. 
Furthermore, the Swedish output series needs to be purged of mining, public 
utilities and handicraft production to render it comparable to the American and 
British. My own work on manufacturing output in 1868–1912 (chapter 5) makes 
this adjustment straightforward for pre-1912 years but the way in which Schön’s 
(1988) output series are presented complicates matters from then on. He divides 
manufacturing into nine groups of industries. While public utilities constitute a 
separate series, mining does not; it is included in the series titled mining and 
metal industries. To purge the series I have subtracted from current net output of 
manufacturing the value of public utilities as given by Schön and the estimated 
value of current net output of mining and handicraft. Figures on gross output of 
mining are taken from the Swedish Industrial Statistics and multiplied by net 
output shares, the latter taken from benchmarks in 1913, 1926, and 1952, with 
linear interpolations filling in the gaps between these years.79 Then, I have 
adjusted Schön’s implicit deflator of gross output for the manufacturing industry 
to account for the absence of mining, public utilities and handicraft production, 
the weights being their respective annual shares of gross output in 1912 and 
1930.80 
Based on the information on working hours in table 4.7, the three series of 
employment have been adjusted to incorporate movements of working hours. 
The Swedish pre-1912 series of employment goes back to my own exercise to 
estimate the number of manufacturing workers in chapter 5. This series is then 
spliced to Jungenfelt's (1959) series of manufacturing workers less workers in 
                                                 
 
78  See chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion. 
79  Net output shares in 1913 from SOU (1923); in 1926, Kommerskollegium (1927); and in 1952, 
Sveriges officiella statistik. Industri (1952). The exclusion of handicraft production was made 
by subtracting, in Schön (1988), the value added for handicraft workers (shares of value added 
on pp. 101–5 times the value of gross output for handicraft production, table 15) from the 
series of value added for manufacturing and handicraft production (table I2). The deflator is an 
index which increases by a factor of two from 1890 to 1950 (see chapter 5 for a more detailed 
discussion).   
80  The years correspond to the deflation periods Schön (1988 pp. 196–8) used to construct the 
deflator. 
TABLE 4.11. Correspondence between time series projections for 1924 and 
the additional benchmarks of 1909 and 1935 (Sweden=100) 
 UK/Sweden  US/Sweden 
 benchmark Projection  benchmark projection 
1909 144 167  238 263 
1935 111 108  182 182 
 
ASPIRING TO A HIGHER RANK 
 106 
public utilities, mining and handicraft. Moreover, Broadberry (1993) has made 
the American and British series of employment from Kendrick (1961) and 
Feinstein (1972) comparable. Linear interpolation between the benchmarks of 
annual working hours per worker yields a series of working hours for the three 
countries. These indices are then multiplied by the employment series (number 
of workers) to yield a factual measure of the movement of total working hours. 
The output series divided by the series of total working hours indicates the 
movement of output per unit of comparable labour input in each country. The 
ratios of the American and the British to the Swedish series of labour 
productivity are linked to the respective benchmarks in 1924; the additional 
benchmarks in 1909 and 1935 can be used to verify the consistency between the 
benchmarks and time series projections. As table 4.11 shows, the benchmarks 
are reassuringly close to the time series extrapolations – well within the 
suggested margin of errors in the range from 10 to 20 per cent – which lends 
credibility to what has been accomplished hitherto. 
The American and British series of GDP in constant prices originate from 
Maddison’s (2003) latest compilation. The Swedish series there has, however, 
been superseded by two revisions, the most recent being Krantz and Schön’s 
(2007) eagerly awaited, and definitive, Swedish Historical National Accounts 
(SHNA). It was, however, long overdue and in the meantime an alternative 
option, Edvinsson (2005), saw the light of day.81 It represents a major attempt to 
construct alternative historical national accounts on the basis of the latest 
standard of national accounting, thereby achieving consistency over time. 
Although both these Swedish series of GDP are viable options, their different 
characteristics exert an influence on the long-term picture this section tries to 
establish. As the time series in this case captures a wide time span – Maddison’s 
methodology rests on extrapolations backwards from 1990 – small departures in 
one direction or the other accumulate into large gaps the further back in time the 
series stretches. It turns out that the estimated level of GDP between 1869 and 
1913 is on average no less than 20 per cent higher if Edvinsson’s series of 
constant GDP is used instead of Krantz and Schön’s, and on average 11 per cent 
higher between 1914 and 1950.82 In so far as the choice between the two series is 
concerned, a final affirmation as to their usefulness will have to await future 
work. In the meantime Edvinsson’s series is used. I divide the series of GDP by 
population, although in the ideal measure of economy-wide productivity 
performance GDP is divided by working hours or at least persons engaged. The 
                                                 
 
81  For a review of Swedish Historical National Account in general and more detail information 
on Krantz and Schön’s project, see Bohlin (2003). See also Bohlin (2008). 
82  The difference between the two Swedish GDP options was, however, less than one per cent in 
1990 so it did not significantly affect the new benchmark that year. To make the new Swedish 
GDP level in 1990 comparable to the British and American I have divided it by 8.979, the 
price, expressed in Swedish kronor, of a Geary-Khamis dollar (Maddison 2001 p. 189). 
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difficulties in finding reliable and comparable data for employment, 
unemployment and annual working hours for all sectors of the economy and for 
the three countries justify the rejection of working hours and persons engaged in 
favour of population. 
4.4.2. Historical evidence of long-term comparative performance 
We are now ready to pass judgement as to whether the Swedish labour 
productivity growth in manufacturing outperformed the British and American 
between 1869 and 1950. Before doing so, let us first focus on Broadberry’s 
(1997) previous evidence of the UK/Sweden productivity ratios between 1913 
and 1950 (graph 4.1). Broadbery put Sweden in a group of five countries 
labelled ‘North European’ whose level and movement of productivity were set in 
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GRAPH 4.1. UK/Sweden labour productivity ratios in the manufacturing 
sector, 1869–1950 (Sweden=100) 
Note: The series of comparative labour productivity (new) is linked to the new benchmark for 
1924 (table 4.10). The lack of annual British data explains the straight lines during the First 
and Second World War. The series of GDP per capita ratios is based on extrapolations from 
Maddison’s benchmark in 1990. The series underlying the graph appear in Appendix 4.1. 
Sources: Employment: Sweden: Appendix 5.1 and Jungenfelt (1959 tables 3a and 4); the UK: 
Broadberry (1997 table A3.1(a)). Output in manufacturing: Sweden: Appendix 5.1 and Schön 
(1988 table I14); the UK: Broadberry (1997 table A3.1(a)): Working hours: see table 4.7 
(extrapolations between the years); GDP per capita: Sweden: Edvinsson (2005 
http://www.historia.se); the UK: Maddison (2003). 
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relation to the UK.83 He concluded that ‘twentieth-century data for all five 
countries suggest that labour productivity in manufacturing was never far below 
British levels’ (pp. 54–5). Thus, if these countries’ levels of labour productivity 
never caught up with that of Britain, although they were already close behind, 
forces of convergence at the whole economy level in all likelihood operated 
elsewhere. The Swedish benchmark from which the time series are extrapolated 
refers to 1935, and is based on a sample of eight industries. The origin of this 
benchmark is Källström’s (1947) minor investigation conducted in order to track 
the movement of productivity in Swedish manufacturing. Källström divided 
physical quantities by number of workers for eight industries for a number of 
years. His intention was never to use the information for the purpose of 
international comparison, yet Rostas used Källström’s productivity estimates for 
1935 to compute a UK/Sweden benchmark, which came to 103 (Rostas 1947 p. 
40). Broadberry (1997) then used that benchmark, along with a time series 
projection based on series of output and employment from Statistics Sweden 
from 1913 to 1989, to document the movement of the UK/Sweden productivity 
ratio. In fact, it turns out that Rostas’ original UK/Sweden benchmark of 103, 
although resting on a tenuous evidential basis, is not that far off from the new 
benchmark of 111 (table 4.10). 
What makes Broadberry’s UK/Sweden evidence lead us astray is instead the 
failure to capture the latter half of the nineteenth century. As graph 4.1 brings 
out in full relief, the new series of UK/Sweden productivity ratios conveys the 
message of a considerable Swedish productivity lag in the manufacturing 
industry in the decades preceding the turn of the century. Before Swedish 
industrialisation gained momentum in the 1890s, British labour productivity in 
manufacturing was more than twice as high. A broad sweep of productivity 
improvements set Sweden on track towards convergence with Britain around the 
turn of the century.84 The spurt in productivity down to World War I contracted 
the ratio to no more than 125, and a second acceleration at the end of the 1930s 
erased the remaining part; in 1938, the Swedish labour productivity was on a par 
with the British, and it pulled ahead in the aftermath of World War II. The 
movement of relative GDP per capita looks familiar: over these eighty years 
relative GDP and relative labour productivity in manufacturing progressed at 
similar rates, with the UK/Sweden gap at the whole economy level remaining 
roughly twenty per cent higher than the gap in manufacturing. 
                                                 
 
83  The other countries were Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway (Broadberry 1997 
pp. 54–5). 
84  See chapter 5 for a discussion of the acceleration of Swedish labour productivity after 1900. 
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The US/Sweden comparison, whose constituent components are visualised in 
graph 4.2, contains a recognisable pattern. The ratio of American to Swedish 
labour productivity contracted slowly until around the turn of the century when a 
short era of rapid convergence set in, and lasted until the outbreak of World War 
I. The ratio then expanded somewhat in the 1920s, but fell quite steeply after the 
Great Depression.85 At the end of the period, American labour productivity was 
still fifty per cent higher than Swedish. However, the ratio of the series of GDP 
per capita shows a different pattern. Before the 1930s it was not subjected to any 
forces of convergence at all. It dropped along with relative labour productivity in 
                                                 
 
85  The Swedish labour productivity outgrowing the American in the 1930s is worth an 
examination of its own given all the attention devoted to the rapid technological progress 
which took place in the US in the interwar years (Gordon 2000; Field 2003; David and Wright 
2003). 
GRAPH 4.2. US/Sweden labour productivity ratios in the manufacturing 
sector, 1869–1950 (Sweden=100) 
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Note: The series of comparative labour productivity ratios (new) is linked to the new 
benchmark in 1924 (table 4.10). Lack of annual American data explains the straight lines in 
1869–1879 and 1879–1889 and during the First and Second World Wars. The series of GDP 
per capita ratios is based on extrapolations from Maddison’s benchmark in 1990. The series 
underlying the graph appear in Appendix 4.1. 
Sources: Employment: Sweden: Appendix 5.1 and Jungenfelt (1959 tables 3a and 4); US: 
Broadberry (1997 table A3.1(a)). Output in manufacturing: Sweden: Appendix 5.1 and Schön 
(1988 table I14); US: Broadberry (1997 table A3.1(a)): Working hours: see table 4.7 
(interpolations between the years); GDP per capita: Sweden: Edvinsson (2005 
http://www.historia.se); the US: Maddison (2003). 
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manufacturing after the Great Depression but soon returned to even higher levels 
during World War II. Although it dropped again to its lowest level in the wake 
of the war, it is doubtful whether it is possible to argue that the GDP per capita 
ratio contracted for the period as a whole. The substantial benefits the US 
economy reaped during the years preceding and spanning World War II explain 
why the Swedish catch-up era in the 1930s was suddenly broken.86 Furthermore, 
before the Swedish catch up commenced at the beginning of the 1930s the 
benefits of structural transformations, accruing to the aggregate performances in 
both Sweden and the US, probably explains why Sweden failed to narrow the 
economy-wide gap (further explored in section 4.5 below). 
Three aspects of this investigation into long-term productivity movements 
require commenting on. First, the similar evolution of the series of UK/Sweden 
and US/Sweden productivity ratios confirms Broadberry’s evidence of a stable 
US/UK productivity ratio. By inference, if the UK/Sweden and US/Sweden 
productivity ratios contrast at similar rates the US/UK ratio remains stable over 
time.87 Second, the Swedish catch-up with respect to labour productivity in 
manufacturing casts doubt on Broadberry’s (1993, 1994b, 1997 p. 71) 
conjecture, based on the evidence of long-term comparative productivity 
movements in the UK, the US and Germany, that convergence at the whole 
economy level comes about mainly through structural transformation and 
productivity advances in sectors other than manufacturing. The story here 
stresses the vital part played by dynamic manufacturing industries, thereby 
confirming earlier literature on income convergence preoccupied with 
technology transfer from developed to less developed countries and emphasising 
the manufacturing industry as a force propelling convergence forward. It also 
confirms a Swedish historiography in which manufacturing in general, and 
progress by mechanical engineering in particular, have taken central stage. The 
quantitative evidence here puts flesh on the bare bones of the argument that 
progress by manufacturing from 1890s onwards was crucial for the rapid 
Swedish growth record in the twentieth century. Third, the relative size order of 
the two ratios, in manufacturing and in the aggregate, varies. In the UK/Sweden 
comparison, the economy-wide ratio is larger than that of manufacturing 
throughout, while in the US/Sweden comparison the opposite holds for most of 
the period. Sectoral shares of employment and levels of value added per worker 
in different sectors provide the key to understanding the relative size of the two 
                                                 
 
86  For an overview of American productivity gains as a result of World War II, see Field (2008). 
87  Between 1898 and 1913 the UK/Sweden ratio fell from 215 to 125 (42 per cent) and the 
US/Sweden ratio fell from 327 to 202 (38 per cent). Between 1920 and 1950 the UK/Sweden 
ratio dropped 44 per cent while the US/Sweden dropped 30 per cent. The steeper fall in the 
UK/Sweden ratio reflects American gains from World War II. The US/UK productivity ratio 
in manufacturing reached an all time high in 1950, see Broadberry (2006 p. 22). 
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productivity measures, which turns the searchlight on structural transformation, 
the theme of the next section. 
4.5. Structural transformations 
The changing composition of employment in different sectors over time is an 
unmistakable characteristic of modern economic growth. The rate of economic 
maturity at the outset of the period significantly affects the path economy-wide 
convergence follows, because the levels of value added per worker vary by 
sector. In general, the private service sector has the highest value added per 
worker, followed by manufacturing and then agriculture. A large share of labour 
devoted to agriculture thus implies a potential to release labour to manufacturing 
or private service sectors, where value added per worker tends to be larger, 
boosting the average level of value added per worker.88 In addition, a large 
agricultural sector may also indicate that labour is almost freely available to be 
transferred to modern sectors of the economy. If there is surplus labour in 
agriculture, this transfer permits rapid growth of labour inputs in high value 
added industries without affecting agricultural output.89 No direct evidence exists 
as to the prevalence of surplus labour in Sweden but the unusually large share of 
agriculture is at least indicative of the large potential gain from structural 
transformation (Gadd 2005). Here it suffices to tabulate the changing shares of 
employment in the three countries to illustrate the bearing of structural 
transformation on the movement of relative GDP to capita ratio. Sectoral shares 
of employment also give clues as to why the size orders of the ratios, in 
manufacturing and GDP per capita, are reversed as we change the numerator 
from the US to the UK. 
In the UK and the US, the share of agriculture dwindled, that of 
manufacturing stayed constant and the share of services grew. Sweden deviated 
somewhat from this pattern because the share of manufacturing increased, thus 
underscoring again the significance we ought to attach to this sector; its 
productivity grew swiftly and it absorbed labour that was set free from 
agriculture. 
                                                 
 
88  I refer for simplicity to the release, transfer or shift of the labour force. In practice though the 
change in the distribution of the labour force has been brought about primarily by changes in 
the distribution of new entrants into employment and not by migration of workers. 
89  The argument that structural transformations matter for comparative growth rates can be traced 
to Kindleberger (1967), and was reiterated in a more explicit context of convergence by for 
instance Feinstein (1991), Broadberry (1997) and Temin (2002). It is however based on the 
insights of Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1966).  
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In the UK, the remarkably high degree of economic maturity by the 
beginning of the period hampered the potential gain from structural 
transformation; the British potential for productivity gains accruing from 
reallocation of labour seems to have been exhausted as far back as the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Besides, the remaining part of that potential was offset 
by a reallocation of labour into the governmental sector in which the potential 
for productivity progress was circumscribed. By contrast, the large share of 
agriculture in Sweden implied significant gains from structural transformation. 
The different order of magnitude of agriculture’s share of labour explains why 
the economy-wide UK/Sweden gap remained larger throughout than the 
productivity ratio in manufacturing. It also provides an explanation of the 
Swedish economy-wide convergence, completed around 1950. Yet, the potential 
for further income gains from structural transformation was still very large in 
Sweden at that time, but that untapped productivity potential may belong to a 
future story of mine. 
TABLE 4.12. Sectoral shares of employment in the US, the UK and Sweden, 1890–
1950 
 1890  1910 1930 1950 
  US    
Agriculture 39 Agriculture 32.0 20.9 11.0 
Manufacturing/Constr./Mining 27 Manufacturing/Mining 25.0 23.5 26.5 
Service 34 Construction 6.3 5.9 5.5 
Total 100 Utilities 0.5 0.8 0.9 
  Transport/Commun. 8.1 8.6 6.0 
  Distribution/Finance/Service 26.2 33.1 40.0 
  Government 1.9 7.2 10.1 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  UK    
Agriculture 16 Agriculture 11.8 7.6 5.1 
Manufacturing/Constr./Mining 44 Manufacturing/Mining 38.4 37.1 38.6 
Service 40 Construction 5.1 5.4 6.3 
Total 100 Utilities 0.6 1.2 1.6 
  Transport/Commun. 7.7 8.3 7.9 
  Distribution/Finance/Service 32.3 35.2 31.7 
  Government 4.1 5.2 8.8 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  Sweden    
Agriculture 58 Agriculture 49.6 36.6 21.7 
Manufacturing/Constr./Mining 24 Manufacturing/Mining 25.1 28.0 35.4 
Service 19 Construction 8.1 9.7 8.4 
Total 100 Transport/Commun. 4.5 6.1 7.8 
  Distribution/Finance/Service 8.2 14.0 17.7 
  Government 4.5 5.6 8.9 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Sweden: Jungenfeldt (1966 Appendix B table 1); the US and the UK: 1890: Maddison (1991 
table 2.1); 1910–1950: Broadberry (1997 table 5.1) 
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Two distinguished American attributes go a long way to explaining the way 
in which the US/Sweden economy-wide ratios tended to differ. First, and 
similarly to Sweden, the US had a large share of the work force in agriculture at 
the beginning of the period. Second, much of the subsequent release of labour 
from agriculture was channelled into the high value-added service sectors. Both 
countries benefited from reallocation of labour into sectors with high value 
added per employee; in the US, from agriculture into distribution and finance 
and in Sweden, from agriculture into manufacturing and distribution and 
finance. However, the relatively larger contraction of agriculture in Sweden 
combined with more rapid rates of labour productivity in manufacturing did not 
result in a sustainable reduction of the American economy-wide lead. The 
Swedish catch-up potential was never fully realised suggesting that 
counteracting forces may have been at work. The answer probably concerns 
growth rates of productivity in sectors other than agriculture. More rapid 
progress in American service sectors may have offset the benefits of the Swedish 
backwardness, and therefore the Swedish attempt to reduce the economy-wide 
gap in productivity came to nothing.90 
4.6. Conclusions 
This chapter adds the Swedish catch up experience to the growing number of 
convergence studies preoccupied with comparative levels of labour productivity 
by industry. It attempts to establish benchmarks of comparative labour 
productivity in Sweden vis-à-vis the UK and the US for 1909, 1924 and 1935 
using the industry of origin approach, mostly Rostas’ method of physical 
quantities per worker but at times also net output per worker. Time series of 
output and employment are linked to the benchmark of 1924 to cover the years 
from 1869 to 1950. The correspondence between the time series extrapolation 
and the additional benchmarks in 1909 and 1924 falls well within reasonable 
margins of error. The long-term picture shows that the Swedish labour 
productivity in manufacturing grew appreciably faster than the British and 
American. The first episode of manifest catch-up occurred around the turn of the 
century, persisting until World War I. The second took place in the 1930s, right 
after the Great Depression. These two episodes of productivity convergence in 
manufacturing brought Sweden on a par with the UK in 1940s, surging ahead 
further until 1950. The remaining American productivity lead in manufacturing 
stood at 50 per cent at the end of the period. 
                                                 
 
90  Broadberry (2002, 2006) has recently devoted special attention to the productivity 
performance of market services. He shows that the superior American productivity 
performance in market services served to expand the economy-wide US/UK productivity gap. 
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In order to assess comparative performance in manufacturing in relation to 
that of the aggregate the chapter also presents series of GDP per capita ratios. In 
the UK/Sweden comparison they accompanied the contraction of labour 
productivity ratios in manufacturing, although the economy-wide distance 
exceeded that of manufacturing. GDP per capita convergence came about in the 
aftermath of World War II. In the US/Sweden comparison, the economy-wide 
ratios remained largely unchanged, but they were smaller than the productivity 
ratios for manufacturing at the outset of the period. Structural transformation 
offers clues as to why Sweden erased most of the British lead in the aggregate 
while failing even to narrow the American. In relation to the UK, Sweden 
benefited from a large flow of labour from agriculture to services and 
manufacturing owing to Swedish relative backwardness and British maturity. 
The US enjoyed the benefits of relative backwardness too, which thwarted the 
Swedish attempt to narrow the economy-wide distance. More rapid growth of 
productivity in American sectors other than manufacturing may also have played 
a part. 
The evidence of manifest Swedish convergence of labour productivity in 
manufacturing contrasts with Broadberry’s evidence of stability in the long-term 
British, American and German comparative labour productivity ratios in 
manufacturing. The steady comparative productivity levels prompted 
Broadberry to suggest downplaying the role played by technology transfers in 
manufacturing and instead attributing the propelling force of convergence to 
structural transformation and catch-up in sectors other than manufacturing. The 
Swedish experience speaks in favour of an older convergence literature, laying 
stress on the relevance of manufacturing and spill-over effects of modern 
technologies developed in the leading countries. It also reiterates an argument, 
the norm in the Swedish historiography, that the rise of a wide array of 
manufacturing industries around the turn of the century, especially modern ones 
like mechanical and electro mechanical engineering, established the foundation 
for prosperity and modernisation in the century which lay ahead. 
Finally, the economy-wide picture confirms that a sizeable agricultural sector 
was one of the fundamental conditions from which the initial – and continuing – 
Swedish advantage of subsequently catching-up from behind arose, supporting 
Broadberry and others’ vision of convergence. This chapter adds to the list of 
Swedish fundamental conditions a propensity to foster dynamic manufacturing 
industries outgrowing those in the leading countries. So in a sense the Swedish 
experience unites the two visions of convergence. We need, however, an 
extended list of country studies of long-term comparative productivity ratios in 
manufacturing to tell us whether the Swedish case was unique or commonplace. 
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Appendix 4.1. Output, working hours and 
productivity in manufacturing  
TABLE A.4.1. Output in constant prices, employment and labour productivity in 
manufacturing in the UK, the US and Sweden, 1869–1950 (1924=100) 
 UK  US  Sweden 
 Output Work. 
hours 
Prod.  Output Work. 
hours 
Prod.  Output Work. 
hours 
Prod. 
1869 34 81 41 10 28 35 11 44 25 
1870 36 83 44    11 45 25 
1871 40 86 46    12 47 25 
1872 41 87 47    13 50 27 
1873 41 87 47    14 52 27 
1874 42 87 49    15 53 29 
1875 42 87 48    16 55 29 
1876 42 87 48    16 55 30 
1877 43 86 50    17 55 30 
1878 42 85 49    15 52 29 
1879 40 82 48 14 37 38 15 52 30 
1880 46 87 53    16 53 30 
1881 48 89 53    18 55 32 
1882 51 91 56    18 56 33 
1883 51 92 56    19 57 33 
1884 49 87 56    19 58 34 
1885 46 87 53    20 59 34 
1886 46 87 53    19 58 33 
1887 50 90 56    19 58 33 
1888 54 93 58    20 62 32 
1889 58 97 59 25 52 48 22 66 33 
1890 58 100 58 27 54 50 23 67 34 
1891 59 98 60 28 55 50 23 71 33 
1892 55 96 57 30 58 51 24 71 33 
1893 55 99 55 26 56 47 25 71 35 
1894 57 97 59 26 53 48 26 73 35 
1895 60 99 61 31 58 53 27 77 35 
1896 68 101 67 28 57 49 31 83 37 
1897 66 103 64 30 59 51 34 88 38 
1898 69 104 67 34 60 57 36 93 39 
1899 72 106 68 37 67 56 38 95 40 
1900 71 106 68 38 70 54 40 96 42 
1901 71 105 67 42 73 57 40 95 42 
1902 71 106 68 48 80 61 42 94 44 
1903 70 106 66 48 83 58 45 95 47 
1904 70 106 66 47 78 60 48 97 49 
1905 76 108 71 40 87 45 47 97 49 
1906 80 110 72 57 92 62 53 102 52 
1907 82 111 74 57 96 60 60 104 58 
1908 75 107 70 46 86 54 55 101 55 
1909 76 108 70 59 95 62 52 98 53 
1910 77 112 68 61 100 62 62 101 61 
1911 83 115 72 58 99 59 65 101 64 
1912 87 116 74 70 104 67 69 103 67 
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TABLE A.4.1 – continued 
 UK  US  Sweden 
 
Output Work. 
hours 
Prod.  Output Work. 
hours 
Prod.  Output Work. 
hours 
Prod. 
1913 92 120 77 73 105 70 83 108 77 
1914       83 108 76 
1915       96 113 85 
1916       109 119 92 
1917       101 119 85 
1918       87 112 78 
1919       87 113 77 
1920 94 121 77 90 118 76 88 115 76 
1921 73 94 77 73 90 81 67 89 76 
1922 85 98 87 93 97 96 79 87 91 
1923 91 99 92 105 108 97 88 96 92 
1924 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1925 103 100 103 112 101 110 103 101 102 
1926 100 96 104 117 102 115 113 104 109 
1927 110 101 109 119 99 120 119 103 115 
1928 110 100 110 123 98 125 131 110 119 
1929 115 101 114 136 103 132 143 135 106 
1930 110 93 118 117 92 127 146 111 132 
1931 102 87 118 98 78 126 126 103 122 
1932 103 88 117 73 66 112 120 95 127 
1933 110 90 122 86 71 121 122 92 133 
1934 120 94 128 94 82 115 155 102 153 
1935 131 96 137 113 87 130 170 107 159 
1936 144 101 142 132 94 140 185 112 165 
1937 152 106 144 141 103 136 200 118 169 
1938 148 104 142 110 89 124 209 118 177 
1939       232 120 192 
1940       211 120 175 
1941       202 119 170 
1942       200 122 164 
1943       221 127 174 
1944       235 128 184 
1945       237 133 178 
1946       293 133 220 
1947       342 135 254 
1948 178 111 160 251 132 190 359 133 270 
1949 190 112 169 236 121 195 358 131 273 
1950 203 114 178 274 127 217 406 130 311 
 
TABLE A.4.2 UK/Sweden and US/Sweden labour productivity ratios in the 
manufacturing industry and GDP per capita, 1869–1950 (Sweden=100) 
 UK/Sweden  US/Sweden 
 New ratios, 
manufacturing  
Broadberry’s 
ratios, 
manufacturing 
GDP per 
capita 
ratios 
 New ratios, 
manufacturing  
GDP per 
capita 
ratios 
1869 207  272  311  
1870 218  249   191 
1871 230  251   188 
1872 220  243   185 
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TABLE A.4.2 – continued 
 UK/Sweden   US/Sweden 
 
New ratios, 
manufacturing  
Broadberry’s 
ratios, 
manufacturing 
GDP per 
capita 
ratios 
 New ratios, 
manufacturing 
GDP per 
capita 
ratios 
1873 220  243   185 
1874 212  245   188 
1875 203  248   191 
1876 204  235   184 
1877 205  239   191 
1878 211  244   199 
1879 204  228  286 192 
1880 222  241   200 
1881 206  241   198 
1882 213  250   204 
1883 214  234   193 
1884 208  235   198 
1885 194  226   196 
1886 203  229   201 
1887 213  240   208 
1888 227  238   202 
1889 226  250  328 207 
1890 214  241  331 204 
1891 230  237  341 207 
1892 215  224  341 217 
1893 199  215  301 196 
1894 207  225  303 185 
1895 217  222  332 197 
1896 226  221  292 183 
1897 207  214  296 189 
1898 215  216  327 185 
1899 214  216  311 191 
1900 202  214  288 195 
1901 201  209  305 210 
1902 192  214  307 209 
1903 174  201  277 206 
1904 168  194  271 193 
1905 182  200  208 205 
1906 174  190  265 209 
1907 160  182  232 197 
1908 159  177  218 181 
1909 167  180  263 200 
1910 140  173  226 186 
1911 141  175  204 187 
1912 139  171  224 187 
1913 125 98 167  202 180 
1914   168   164 
1915   178   163 
1916   172   174 
1917   193   187 
1918   204   211 
1919   177   207 
1920 127 111 158  223 193 
1921 128  171  239 205 
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TABLE A.4.2 – continued 
 UK/Sweden  US/Sweden 
 
New ratios, 
manufacturing  
Broadberry’s 
ratios, 
manufacturing 
GDP per 
capita 
ratios 
 New ratios, 
manufacturing 
GDP per 
capita 
ratios 
1922 119  162  235 193 
1923 125  160  235 207 
1924 125 111 158  223 200 
1925 127 115 165  241 201 
1926 120  148  237 198 
1927 118  155  232 191 
1928 116  152  235 187 
1929 135 106 146  279 183 
1930 112 105 139  215 159 
1931 121  133  230 147 
1932 116  139  197 132 
1933 115  138  204 125 
1934 105  138  168 125 
1935 108 103 135  182 127 
1936 108  133  189 137 
1937 107 104 133  180 138 
1938 101  130  156 127 
1939   120   126 
1940   145   148 
1941   160   176 
1942   162   206 
1943   158   234 
1944   148   246 
1945   140   233 
1946   122   167 
1947   113   152 
1948 74  115  157 155 
1949 78  116  159 150 
1950 71 85 111  155 153 
Note: Bold figures refer to benchmark years from which time series of relative productivity have 
been extrapolated. 
Appendix 4.2. Output, employment and 
productivity by industry 
The following account covers the data underlying the computation of 
productivity ratios by industry and lists the different industries forming the gross 
output weight at branch level, used to build up overall benchmarks. An industry 
which appears in italics signals the exact definition of it in each country’s 
official statistics. Physical quantities are given in commensurable units while 
product value and total output value of industry are given in each country’s 
currency. Unless otherwise stated all information is taken from the US Census of 
Manufactures (1909, 1925, 1937), the UK Census of Production (1907, 1924, 
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1935) and Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik. D. Fabriker och manufakturer 
(1909) and Sveriges officiella statistik. Industri (1924, 1935). 
1. Engineering 
Apart from the estimate of comparative productivity of bulbs in 1935, all labour 
productivity estimates in the group of engineering industries are based on the 
method of net value per worker. The official exchange rate converts dollars and 
pounds into kronor. The weight given to the group of engineering industries is 
the sum of gross output for the industries included below. 
1.1. The mechanical engineering industry 
This is a heterogeneous category including a variety of different products. 
Information on quantities exists to some extent in all countries, but in Sweden 
and the UK, they are given in number of units and in the US in weights. In the 
UK, data come from mechanical engineering; in the US for 1909, from 
industries making more highly elaborated products (a subgroup of iron and steel 
and their products); agricultural implements; windmills (belong to 
miscellaneous industries); the automobile industry; bicycles, motorcycles, and 
parts; and the carriage and wagon industry. For 1925 and 1937, data come from 
machinery and transportation equipment, air, land and water less ship yards. In 
Sweden, data refer to mekaniska verkstäder; järnvägs- och spårvagnsfabriker; 
and andra vagnfabriker. 
 
TABLE A.4.3 Net output, employment and labour productivity in the mechanical 
engineering industry 
 Net output Number of workers Net output per worker 
US 1909 1,186,186 895,088 1,325 
US 1925 4,194,256 1,178,500 3,559 
US 1937 5,353,238 1,579,820 3,389 
UK 1907 72,600 713,200 102 
UK 1924 179,500 844,800 212 
UK 1935 184,900 810,300 228 
Sweden 1909 49,666 23,703 2,095 
Sweden 1924 191,854 39,283 4,884 
Sweden 1935 441,507 67,465 6,544 
1.2. The shipbuilding industry 
No comparable data for quantities exist. The earliest UK benchmark refers to 
1912. Only private companies are included. 
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TABLE A.4.4. Net output, employment and labour productivity in the 
shipbuilding industry 
 Net output Number of workers Net output per worker 
US 1909 42,146 40,506 1,040 
US 1925 110,883 50,224 2,208 
US 1937 149,046 62,274 2,393 
UK 1912 20,665 177,309 117 
UK 1924 24,443 132,530 184 
UK 1935 15,924 75,058 212 
Sweden 1909 6,776 4,304 1,574 
Sweden 1924 32,510 9,111 3,568 
Sweden 1935 57,731 11,405 5,062 
1.3. The electro mechanical industry 
No quantitative data is available. The US data for 1909 refer to electrical 
machinery, apparatuses and suppliers, for 1925 and 1937 to electrical 
machinery, apparatuses and suppliers and radios, tubes and phonograph (both 
subgroups to the engineering industry). In the UK, data come from the electrical 
engineering industry. Data for Sweden, come from elektriska maskiner och 
apparater. 
 
TABLE A.4.5. Net output, employment and labour productivity in the electro 
mechanical industry 
 Net output Number of workers Net output per worker 
US 1909 112,742 87,256 1,292 
US 1925 903,310 239,921 3,765 
US 1937 979,231 257,660 3,800 
UK 1907 6,800 57,000 119 
UK 1924 35,600 131,049 272 
UK 1935 51,600 218,600 236 
Sweden 1909 8,595 3,080 2,791 
Sweden 1924 17,797 3,249 5,478 
Sweden 1935 34,290 5,526 6,205 
1.3.1. The bulbs industry 
In both countries, the quantities produced consist of bulbs for ordinary use and 
for vehicles; in Sweden, only the first category was produced. The relative prices 
convert the different kinds of American bulbs into bulbs for ordinary use. The 
American data are taken from Rostas (1948 p. 183). 
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TABLE A.4.6. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the bulbs 
industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 
bulbs 
Product 
value 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Coverage 
ratio, 
per cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Bulbs 
per 
worker 
 
US 1937 585,000 65,600     7,400 79,054 
UK 1935 87,450 3,400       6,000 14,575 
Sweden 1935 13,341 8,331 8360 100 779        776 17,192 
2. Stone, clay and glass 
Apart from the industries included below, a couple of other industries 
traditionally belong to the group of stone, clay and glass industries, and their 
gross outputs have therefore been added to form the gross output weight for the 
group of stone, clay and glass industries. For the US, for 1909, I have added the 
clay products industries and the manufacture of glass and for 1925 and 1937, the 
stone clay and glass products. For the UK, the gross output weight includes the 
wholesale value of bricks, pottery, glass, cement etc and for Sweden jord och 
stenindustrin. 
2.1. The glass industry 
Comparable quantities for lamp chimney and bottles exist for 1935. On the basis 
of relative prices these are converted into bottles. The coverage ratio is 
unfortunately very low owing to the large proportion of the kinds of glass for 
which no comparison is possible. For the earlier benchmark years the net output 
per worker method is used and the weighted average of unit value ratios convert 
pounds and dollars into kronor. 
 
TABLE A.4.7. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the glass 
industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value 
of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Coverage 
ratio 
per cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
UK 1935 455,999 6,718 17,209 39 40,818 15,934 28,618 
Sweden 1935 38,343 11,787 28,623 41 5,789 2,384 16,083 
 
TABLE A.4.8. Net output, employment and labour productivity in the glass 
industry 
 Net output Number of workers Net output per worker 
US 1909 59,976 68,911 870 
US 1925 182,307 69,371 2,628 
UK 1924 8,200 34,179 240 
Sweden 1909 6,678 4,992 1,338 
Sweden 1924 13,579 5,250 2,586 
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2.2. The cement industry 
The cement industry probably represents the epitome of an industry whose 
output suits the method of physical output per worker. The overwhelming 
proportion of output in all countries consists of Portland cement. The coverage 
ratio is large in all benchmark years. 
 
TABLE A.4.9. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
cement industry 
 Quant. 
‘000 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Coverage 
ratio 
per cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
US 1909 11,019 53,611 63,205 85 26,775 22,711 485 
US 1925 27,008 296,691 300,895 99 38,437 37,900 713 
US 1937 19,509 173,315 183,201 95 26,426 25,000 780 
UK 1907 2,831 3,439 3,735 92 13,860 12,762 222 
UK 1924 3,189 6,987 8,071 87 12,522 10,840 294 
UK 1935 5,854 8,794 9,706 91 8,278 7,500 781 
Sweden 1909 220 7,064 7,064 100 1,160 1,160 190 
Sweden 1924 407 16,915 16,751 101 1,478 1,492 273 
Sweden 1935 740 20,299 20,624 98 1,174 1,155 641 
2.3. The bricks industry 
The British classification of brick production is divided into three main 
categories: building bricks, fire bricks and silica bricks. The Swedish output in 
1909 is given in number of units, without considering types of brick, which 
makes the comparison crude. For the successive benchmark years the 
comparisons are based on a variety of building bricks. 
 
TABLE A.4.10. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the brick 
industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 
bricks 
Value 
of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
 ratio 
per cent
Num. 
of 
workers
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Bricks per 
worker 
 
UK 1907 4,795,000 6,373 8,324 77 65,866 50,428 95,086 
UK 1924 4,066,000 11,636 21,101 55 65,508 36,124 112,557 
UK 1935 7,310,000 15,909 27,951 57 86,442 49,201 148,574 
Sweden 1909 332,971 9,677 11,874 81 9,753 7,948 41,894 
Sweden 1924 326,348 22,725 32,301 70 8,019 5,642 57,843 
Sweden 1935 454,657 24,796 36,920 67 7,973 5,355 84,903 
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3. Wood 
3.1. The sawmill industry 
For the US, data come from lumber and timber products, including sawmills, 
planing mills and logging, while for Sweden it includes only sawmills (sågverk) 
and planing mills (hyvlerier). 
 
TABLE A.4.11. Net output, employment and labour productivity in the sawmill 
industry 
 Net output Number of workers Net output per worker 
US 1909 648,011 695,019 932 
US 1925 1,149,322 585,327 1,964 
US 1937 640,439 390,742 1,639 
Sweden 1909 62,439 48,653 1,283 
Sweden 1924 207,083 42,635 4,857 
Sweden 1935 146,954 59,229 2,481 
4. Paper and pulp 
The total gross output weight given to the group of paper industries includes the 
industries below but excludes the printing and graphical industries which usually 
count as paper industries. 
4.1. The paper pulp industry 
For Sweden, data refers to the overall paper pulp quantities produced; for the 
US, it refers to quantities produced in paper mills whose production does not 
include paper. The assumption is that productivity levels of paper pulp are 
similar in paper and pulp mills and pulp mills. For the weighting procedure, see 
table 4.3. 
 
TABLE A.4.12. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
paper pulp industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per cent
Num. 
of 
work. 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
US 1935 15,901 199,673 247,192 81 26,994 21,805 729 
Sweden 1935 8,555 346,686 269,817 128 16,087 20,670 414 
4.2. The paper and board industry 
These comparisons are based on paper and board products produced at paper 
mills. A variety of differently shaped products makes non-weighed comparisons 
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rather crude. Converting the heterogeneous composition of output into 
comparable equivalents is only possible for 1935, however. It raises the Swedish 
quantity in relation to the US because of the large American share of the heavier, 
and less expensive, board. The UK and Sweden had similar composition of 
output. 
 
TABLE A.4.13. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
paper and board industry 
 Quant. 
‘000 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
US 1909 4,500 262,918 267,657 98 75,978 74,633 60 
US 1925 9,038 862,589 971,882 89 123,384 109,509 83 
US 1937 12,635 887,920 957,940 93 110,809 102,709 123 
UK 1907 854 13,026 13,621 96 38,642 36,954 23 
UK 1924 1,285 34,869 36,981 94 47,979 45,239 28 
UK 1935 2,218 38,524 40,624 95 54,515 51,697 43 
Sweden 1909 214 43,807 43,807 100 7,484 7,484 29 
Sweden 1924 524 171,717 175,816 98 15,360 15,002 35 
Sweden 1935 864 190,535 191,710 99 16,978 16,874 51 
5. Food and beverages 
Total gross output of the group of food and beverages industries includes more 
industries than those which appear below. The US data for 1909 also includes 
slaughtering and meat packing; butter, cheese and condensed milk industry; 
canning and preserving; flour-mill and gristmill industry; glucose and starch 
industry; manufactured-ice industry; rice cleaning and polishing; manufacture 
of salt; and sugar industry. For 1925 and 1937, it also includes food and kindred 
products. For the UK, it includes food, drink and tobacco less tobacco, and for 
Sweden, livsmedelsindustrin less tobaksindustrin. 
5.1. The grain milling industry 
Merchant mills are considered big plants for mostly commercial activities and 
custom mills are small and mostly self-supporting units. The share of each 
category affects the comparisons in the sense that levels of output per worker are 
considerably higher in merchant mills. The UK and the US data for 1925 and 
1937 refer only to merchant mills, making it necessary to exclude the Swedish 
custom mills. Problems arise though when dealing with the Swedish data. 
Employment is given for each category while quantity is lumped together. An 
estimate of the share of merchant mills’ quantity is done under the assumption of 
equal unit values, thus the total product value of the merchant mills divided by 
unit value yields the estimated quantity of merchant mills. 
CHASING THE PRODUCTIVITY FRONTIERS 
 125 
 
TABLE A.4.14. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the grain 
milling industry 
 Quant. 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per cent
Num. 
of 
worker 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
US 1909 22,349 871,456 883,584 99 39,453 38,911 574 
US 1925 17,983 1,211,366 1,298,015 93 31,988 29,853 602 
US 1937 15,945 803,776 856,310 94 26,390 24,771 644 
UK 1907 7,572 65,291 65,697 99 29,112 28,932 262 
UK 1924 7,191 99,798 106,365 94 26,826 25,170 286 
UK 1935 8,478 70,313 92,500 76 29,600 22,500 377 
Sweden 1909        353 70,333 111,436 63 4,064 2,565 138 
Sweden 1924        673 181,616 186,885 97 3,353 3,258 207 
Sweden 1935        581 131,189 139,947 94 2,051 1,923 302 
5.2. The slaughter and meat packing industry 
A good share of the value of sales in the US meat packing industry consists of 
by-products such as hides, oleomargarine and food for cats and dogs etc. 
implying low coverage ratios. The assumption is that labour input per unit of by-
product is similar to the labour input per unit of main product. Swine and cattle 
account for most of the total value of slaughtered and cured products in both 
countries. 
TABLE A.4.15. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
slaughter and meat packing industry 
 Quantity 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Est. 
num. of 
worker 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
US 1909 1,987,216 486,845 1,148,036 42 76,637 32,499 61,147 
US 1925 1,283,879 516,469 3,050,286 17 120,422 20,390 62,966 
US 1937 5,604,724 1,922,611 2,787,358 69 127,477 87,929 63,741 
Sweden 1913 8,892 9,574 22,421 43        728 311 28,592 
Sweden 1924 28,926 36,140 75,090 48 1,624 782 36,990 
Sweden 1935 132,180 158,437 169,757 93 3,464 3,233 40,885 
5.3. The margarine industry 
The US production of margarine is closely related to the meat packing industry 
and the margarine produced consists of oleo oil, lard, milk and cream and is 
called oleomargarine. This kind of margarine is produced in Sweden too but in a 
minimal proportion. Differences attributed to quality are said to be in favour of 
the kind of margarine mainly produced in Sweden (Rostas 1948 p. 211). The UK 
data only exists for 1935 because margarine was earlier accounted for in the 
same industry as butter and cheese and represented a very small share. 
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TABLE A.4.16. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
margarine industry 
 Quant. 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Est. 
num. of 
work. 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 19,474 5,964 8,148 73       606    444 43,860 
US 1925 76,263 34,407 39,856 86 1,639 1,415 53,896 
US 1937 107,789 31,032 44,563 70 1,214    845 127,561 
UK 1935 179,332 6,341 8,000 79 2,700 2,140 83,800 
Sweden 1909 12,251 14,330 14,330 100        421    421 29,100 
Sweden 1924 29,771 45,366 46,643 97        773    752 39,589 
Sweden 1935 55,900 41,750 45,119 93        757    700 79,857 
5.4. The beet sugar industry 
The Swedish beet sugar industry is engaged in the production of raw sugar and 
in refining it, while the US plants only refine raw sugar. In the UK, beet sugar 
was imported until the interwar period when the government – in order to 
increase the rate of self sufficiency – decided to protect and subsidise home 
producers (Kitson and Solomou 1990). In Sweden, separate data for employment 
and quantities are to be found for both raw sugar and refinement, but this is not 
the case in the UK. Since the comparisons are based on refined beet sugar, the 
UK quantities for 1935 are converted on the basis of British relative unit values. 
The by-products, such as molasses, treacles and beet mass, are excluded. 
 
TABLE A.4.17. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the beet 
sugar industry 
 Quant. 
‘000 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 547 45,646 48,122 95 7,204 6,833 80 
US 1925  1,186 124,026 132,339 94 8,872 8,315 143 
US 1937  1,418 99,557 107,396 93 9,366 8,682 163 
UK 1907 574 8,995 12,315 73 5,836 4,263 135 
UK 1924  1,006 44,454 53,273 83 11,400 9,513 106 
UK 1935  2,380 36,355 42,506 86 14,653 12,533 190 
Sweden 1909 131 67,494 68,063 99 2,848 2,824 46 
Sweden 1924 153 121,330 122,427 99 2,245 2,225 69 
Sweden 1935 246 77,957 81,593 96 2,109 2,015 122 
5.5. The brewing industry 
For the UK, the employment data excludes bottling, which appears as a separate 
industry. The correction factor is given by the value of bottling of beer, ale, 
porter and stout and the brewing of beer, ale, porter and stout divided by the 
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value of the wholesale bottling industry and the brewing and malting industry. 
This correction factor times the total employment of the bottling and brewing 
industry yields the estimated number of workers associated with the UK 
production of beer, comparable with Swedish and American output. Since the 
value of products might be influenced by taxes, the unit values are considered of 
no use. No American data for the brewing industry appear for 1925. 
 
Table A.4.18. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
brewing industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 litres 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Value of 
total 
output 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Num. 
of 
work. 
Est. num. 
of 
workers 
Litres per 
worker 
 
US 1909 6,597,291 374,730 374,730 100 54,579 54,579 120,876 
US 1937 6,509,159 521,881 537,105 97 47,037 45,704 142,420 
UK 1907 5,645,981 65,270 80,045 82 85,749 69,921 80,748 
UK 1924 3,357,249 156,476 196,561 80 69,999 55,724 60,248 
UK 1935 3,580,139 110,198 122,400 90 43,946 39,565 90,488 
Sweden 1909 264,082 39,349 39,349 100 6,113 6,113 43,200 
Sweden 1924 207,052 80,446 83,642 96 5,556 5,344 38,745 
Sweden 1935 252,996 92,688 102,575 90 5,900 5,331 47,458 
5.6. The spirit distilling industry 
Spirit quantities are given in litres of 50 % pure spirit. If the type of spirit affects 
the productivity – in the UK and the US a large share of the quantities distilled 
are different kinds of whisky, whereas in Sweden they mostly consist of 
Scandinavian vodka – then the estimates are biased. As in the case of the 
brewing industry, unit values are affected by taxes. The US data for 1909 is 
taken from Fabricant (1940 p. 412). 
 
TABLE A.4.19. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the spirit 
distilling industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 litres 
á 50 per 
cent 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Num. 
of 
work. 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Litres per 
worker 
 
US 1937 627,237 98,148 113,103 87 6,215 5,393 116,306 
UK 1924 154,655 5,458 7,070 77 3,979 3,072 50,343 
UK 1935 232,660 3,644 4,662 78 2,757 2,155 107,963 
Sweden 1924 20,076 30,928 36,814 84 478          402 49,940 
Sweden 1935 22,322 33,313 37,177 90 278          249 89,647 
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5.7. The biscuits industry 
The biscuits industry produces a variety of products with different unit values. 
No detailed information on the composition of output is available and the 
comparisons therefore must be considered quite crude. 
 
TABLE A.4.20. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
biscuits industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov.
ratio
per 
cent 
Num.  
of 
work. 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1925 530,855 242,986 244,527 99 32,377 32,173 16,500 
US 1937 638,294 197,348 208,298 95 28,791 27,277 23,400 
UK 1935 244,936 16,680 16,900 99 36,495 36,020 6,800 
Sweden 1924 1,186 3,351 3,713 90      293 264 4,492 
Sweden 1935 3,973 5,478 6,228 88      609 536 7,412 
5.8. The fish curing industry 
In the UK and in Sweden around 70 per cent of the fish cured consists of 
herring. That does not grant straightforward comparability since different 
treatments, salt, smoke, pickled etc might vary considerably. The British lead is 
surprisingly large which might indicate that the comparison is susceptible to the 
manner in which the herring has been preserved. 
 
TABLE A.4.21. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the fish 
curing industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Est. num. 
of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
UK 1935 144,786 4,099 4,324 95 4,974  4,715 30,708 
Sweden 1935 2,693 2,527 2,411 105       257      269 10,011 
5.9. The dairy industry 
Butter and cheese are the products given in physical quantities, but the 
comparisons aim to compare butter. For the US, quantities and employment data 
for butter and cheese are given separately, but for Sweden and the UK 
employment data includes both. Furthermore, the UK data for 1907 also includes 
margarine in the wholesale value of the dairy industry, which explains the low 
UK coverage ratio. The dairy industry did not enter the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics until 1913, hence the earliest benchmark year is based on Swedish data 
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for that year. The Swedish and British output of cheese and butter is converted to 
butter equivalents on the basis of relative prices. 
 
TABLE A.4.22. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the dairy 
industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Num. 
of 
workers
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 351,396 222,751 274,558 81 18,431 14,953 23,500 
US 1925 789,117 753,777 802,271 94 21,156 19,877 39,700 
US 1937 749,511 542,926 586,767 93 19,437 17,985 41,674 
UK 1907 57,652 6,033 10,164 59 7,754 4,603 12,525 
UK 1935 116,531 11,328 11,253 101 4,668 4,699 24,799 
Sweden 1913 39,007 81,372 80,830 101 4,007 4,034 9,670 
Sweden 1924 41,229 132,351 169,410 78 4,107 3,209 12,848 
Sweden 1935 83,836 181,180 181,829 100 5,082 5,064 16,555 
6. Textiles 
The total gross output weight given to the group of textile industries includes the 
following: for the US, for 1909, combined textiles and boots and shoes, for 1925 
and 1937, textiles and their products and boots and shoes. For the UK, textiles 
and clothing and footwear; and for Sweden, for 1909, spånadsämnen and 
skofabriker and for 1924 and 1935, textil- och beklädnadsindustri and 
skofabriker. 
6.1. The cotton spinning and weaving industry 
In general, there are two kinds of processes involved: the spinning part aiming at 
producing yarn and the weaving part producing woven goods. In Sweden and the 
US, the plants are generally integrated; yarn produced in one plant is used in the 
same plant as an intermediate product to produce the main product cloth, while 
in the UK there are separate units. It is therefore very difficult to produce 
separate estimates of spinning and weaving. The coverage ratio for Sweden for 
1924 exceeds 100 per cent implying double counting of intermediate products. 
All output is converted to yarn on the basis of relative prices. 
 
ASPIRING TO A HIGHER RANK 
 130 
TABLE A.4.23. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
cotton spinning and weaving industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov
ratio
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons 
per 
worker 
 
US 1909 945,368 565,404 628,392 90 378,880 340,902 2,773 
US 1925 1,159,043 1,558,199 1819,886 86 468,352 401,006 2,890 
US 1937 1,324,500 1,099,637 1272,954 86 435,428 376,143 3,521 
UK 1907 1,138,016 159,808 174,601 92 559,573 512,163 2,222 
UK 1924 1,049,431 349,962 367,545 95 512,582 488,061 2,150 
UK 1935 851,275 128,147 143,672 89 336,900 300,495 2,833 
Sweden 1909 20,515 50,844 51,209 99 11,811 11,727 1,749 
Sweden 1924 24,681 153,102 125,929 122 14,570 17,714 1,393 
Sweden 1935 34,668 146,909 141,206 104 18,426 19,170 1,808 
6.2. The wool spinning and weaving industry 
As in the case of cotton, a large share of the Swedish plants is integrated making 
it difficult to produce separate estimates for spinning and weaving. These 
comparisons are based on yarn and woven goods. The yarns consist of wool, 
worsted or wool mixed with other kinds of fibres. All output was converted to 
yarn on the basis of relative prices. 
 
TABLE A.4.24. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the wool 
spinning and weaving industry  
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
UK 1907 163,341 53,822 75,905 71 254,378 180,372        906 
UK 1924 192,556 124,250 196,771 63 261,783 165,301 1,165 
UK 1935 390,008 177,386 129,716 137 227,686 311,359 1,253 
Sweden 1909 12,640 64,217 65,955 97 11,524 11,220 1,127 
Sweden 1924 15,743 159,483 122,040 131 12,388 16,189        972 
Sweden 1935 14,913 120,802 118,677 102 13,345 13,584 1,098 
6.3. The jute industry 
In all countries’ official statistics, the jute industry is treated as a subgroup of the 
line, hemp and jute industry, but the value of jute goods is by far the most 
important. The jute industry deals with both yarn and textiles but these 
comparisons are based on yarn. It implies low coverage ratios and estimates of 
less accuracy. 
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TABLE A.4.25. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the jute 
spinning industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value 
of 
product 
‘000 
Value 
of total 
output 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 68,731 5,434 10,795 50 6,664 3,355 20,486 
US 1925 97,025 19,287 27,517 70 6,312 4,424 21,932 
US 1937 115,946 14,787 25,565 58 6,522 3,772 30,739 
Sweden 1909 5,560 3,093 6,523 47 1,528      725 7,669 
Sweden 1924 4,129 4,099 6,768 61 1,453      880 4,692 
Sweden 1935 7,030 5,349 7,399 72 1,324      957 7,346 
6.4. The binder twine industry 
Repslagerier in Sweden is the closest equivalent to the production of binder 
twine and twine in the UK and the US. The earliest benchmark year is based on 
Swedish data for 1913 since the productions of binder twine entered the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics that year. Since parts of the quantities produced come from 
the jute industry, the coverage ratios in Sweden exceeded one hundred per cent 
in 1913. In the US, the most common fibres are Manila and Sisal hemp. No such 
detailed information is available for the UK and Sweden. 
 
TABLE A.4.26. Output, employment and labour productivity in the binder twine 
industry 
 Quant.  
‘000 
tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross output 
of industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per cent
Num. 
of 
work. 
Est.  
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 229 42,865 61,020 70 25,820 18,138 12.6 
US 1925 260 107,959 139,122 78 24,492 19,006 13.7 
US 1937 190 64,158 66,142 97 14,043 13,622 13.9 
UK 1907 72 3,289 3,953 83 13,323 11,085 6.5 
UK 1924 101 7,495 8,556 88 14,965 13,109 7.7 
UK 1935 102 4,584 5,536 83 13,956 11,556 8.8 
Sweden 1913 3.3 3,215 2,694 119       463        553 5.9 
Sweden 1924 6.8 7,860 8,104 97       617        598 11.3 
Sweden 1935 8.8 6,590 7,110 93       788        730 12.1 
6.5. The hosiery industry 
There is no data for physical quantity available which means the net output per 
worker method is used instead. The weighted average of unit value ratios 
converts dollars and pounds into kronor. 
 
ASPIRING TO A HIGHER RANK 
 132 
TABLE A.4.27. Net output, employment and labour productivity in the hosiery 
industry 
 Net output Number of workers Net output per worker 
US 1909 89,156 128,708 693 
US 1925 356,034 186,668 1,907 
US 1937 330,485 231,064 1,430 
UK 1907 3,139 47,687 66 
UK 1924 15,421 90,092 171 
UK 1935 17,262 105,622 163 
Sweden 1909 4,966 3,077 1,614 
Sweden 1924 16,540 4,460 3,709 
Sweden 1935 32,341 9,672 3,344 
6.6. The hat and bonnet industry 
 
TABLE A.4.28. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the hat 
and bonnet industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 dozen 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Value 
of total 
output 
‘000 
Coverage 
ratio 
Per cent 
Num. 
of 
workers
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Dozen per 
worker 
 
UK 1935 4,891 8,599 10,719 80 28,133 22,569 217 
Sweden 1935        381 15,055 14,617 103 2,198 2,264 168 
6.7. The shoes and boots industry 
In the US, the production of shoes is divided into three parts, boot and shoes, 
boot and shoe cut stock and boot and shoe findings. The latter two are specialists 
whose products are bought by the main industry, the first one, boot and shoe 
industry. An adequate procedure is to treat them as one industry and add the 
employment of the two together. 
 
TABLE A.4.29. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
shoes and boots industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 pair 
of shoes 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Pair per 
worker 
 
US 1909 285,017 442,631 512,798 86 198,297 171,164 1,665 
US 1925 323,553 923,279 1,061,667 87 222,794 193,753 1,670 
US 1937 424,971 765,621 900,590 85 234,193 199,095 2,135 
UK 1907 99,387 20,225 23,011 88 117,565 103,331        962 
UK 1924 118,956 47,496 55,637 85 131,247 112,042 1,062 
UK 1935 132,468 37,619 40,180 94 108,649 101,724 1,302 
Sweden 1909 6,422 41,044 41,990 98 7,357 7,191        893 
Sweden 1924 7,851 93,800 92,877 101 9,770 9,867        796 
Sweden 1935 8,201 72,584 74,277 98 10,423 10,185        805 
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7. Chemical and allied products 
In the US data for 1909, the gross output weight for the group of chemical and 
allied industries includes chemical and allied industries; the coke industry; the 
manufacture of gas; petroleum refining; the soap industry; and the turpentine 
and rosin industry and for 1925 and 1937, the chemicals and allied products and 
products of petroleum and coal. For the UK, it includes the chemicals and allied 
industries and coal and petroleum products. For Sweden it includes kemisk-
teknisk industri. 
7.1. The paint and varnish industry 
In all three countries paint and varnish are recorded jointly in the paint and 
varnish industry, but the physical quantity of varnish is given in incomparable 
physical units. Therefore the comparisons are based only on paint which gives 
low coverage ratios 
 
TABLE A.4.30. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the paint 
and varnish industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov.  
ratio 
per 
cnet 
Num. 
of 
workers
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 413,771 43,500 94,572 46 11,864 5,457 75,824 
US 1925 968,082 164,029 470,736 35 25,490 8,882 108,994 
UK 1924 251,673 10,842 17,950 60 13,523 8,168 30,812 
UK 1935 530,000 16,080 22,140 73 15,597 11,328 46,787 
Sweden 1909 3,471 1,414 3,591 39       375        148 23,453 
Sweden 1924 7,206 4,335 8,798 49       457        225 32,027 
Sweden 1935 16,857 11,674 21,679 54       918        494 34,123 
7.2. The soap, candle and perfumery industry 
Soap is the only product given in physical quantity. In the UK and Sweden, soap 
has for some years been treated as a subgroup in the soap, candles and 
perfumery industry. In Sweden, this is the case for 1924 and 1935; for 1909, 
there is separate data for soap and the same is the case for all US benchmark 
years. To make the estimates more accurate the same products are included in 
wholesale value of the trade, which yields more similar coverage ratios in the 
three countries if somewhat less accurate estimates for a particular country. 
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TABLE A.4.31. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the soap, 
candle and perfumery industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Num. 
of 
workers
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 413,771 43,500 94,572 46 11,864 5,457 76 
US 1925 968,082 164,029 470,736 35 25,490 8,882 109 
UK 1924 251,673 10,842 17,950 60 13,523 8,168 31 
UK 1935 530,000 16,080 22,140 73 15,597 11,328 47 
Sweden 1909 3,471 1,414 3,591 39       375        148 24 
Sweden 1924 7,206 4,335 8,798 49       457        225 32 
Sweden 1935 16,857 11,674 21,679 54       918        494 34 
7.3. The seed crushing industry 
The comparison is based on the main product oil and the by-product cake. The 
only benchmark year is 1909 because Swedish employment data for the by-
products cake and meal and the main product oil is missing for later years. In 
Sweden, linseed oil, cocoa oil and soya oil are produced in equal proportions 
while in the US, the refinement of cotton seed accounts for the major part. In the 
UK, all these products appear. Thus, there is no perfect match making the 
comparisons crude. 
 
TABLE A.4.32. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the seed 
crushing industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value 
of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 1,601 91,100 147,868 62 17,071 10,517 152 
UK 1907 1,349 12,940 12,961 100 6,805 6,794 199 
Sweden 1909          28 6,175 6,804 91        167          152 184 
7.4. Matches 
Matches are given in physical quantity but in different units, by weight in 
Sweden and by number of units in the UK and the US. The net output per 
worker method is used instead. The weighted average of unit value ratios 
converts pounds and dollars into kronor. 
 
TABLE A.4.33. Output, employment and labour productivity in the matches 
industry 
 Net output  Number of workers Net output per worker 
UK 1907                 446 3,865                 115 
UK 1935 1,517 3,384                 448 
Sweden 1909 9,963 6,799 1,465 
Sweden 1935 11,297 2,574 4,389 
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7.5. The explosives industry 
The estimates are based on different kinds of blasting powders and dynamite. 
 
TABLE A.4.34. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
explosive industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value 
of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
UK 1924 24,029 2,457 5,328 46 7,681 3,542 6.8 
Sweden 1924 3,742 9,947 9,313 107        674        720 5.2 
7.6. The fertiliser industry 
This category includes fertilisers of different kinds: superphosphates made from 
minerals, bones, ammoniated fertilisers, concentrated phosphates and ready-
made fertilisers. In Sweden, most of it is superphosphates; in the US, mostly 
ready-made fertilisers; and no detailed information is available for the UK. Most 
of the quantities in the UK are produced by manufacturers not classified as part 
of the fertiliser industry; hence, the comparison includes only the amount 
produced by the fertiliser industry. For the UK, the low coverage ratios for 1907 
and 1924 are due to by-products and ancillary products produced by the fertiliser 
industry. 
 
TABLE A.4.35. Physical output, employment and labour productivity in the 
fertiliser industry 
 Quantity 
‘000 tons 
Value of 
product 
‘000 
Gross 
output of 
industry 
‘000 
Cov. 
ratio 
per 
cent 
Number 
of 
workers 
Estimated 
number of 
workers 
Tons per 
worker 
 
US 1909 4,604 92,370 103,960 89 18,310 16,269 283 
US 1925 9,070 195,040 206,773 94 19,644 18,529 490 
US 1937 10,250 167,901 195,759 86 20,893 17,920 572 
UK 1907 1,166 3,542 5,861 60 10,802 6,528 179 
UK 1924        753 3,662 8,347 44 8,912 3,910 193 
UK 1935 2,101 7,005 7,348 95 7,148 6,814 308 
Sweden 1909       144 6,742 6,742 100        876          876 164 
Sweden 1924       222 14,450 15,975 90        960          868 256 
Sweden 1935       281 14,121 13,896 102        528          537 523 
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Chapter 5 
Yeast or Mushrooms?  
Productivity Advances in the Swedish 
Manufacturing Industry, 1868–1912 
5.1. Introduction 
Arnold C. Harberger, in his 1998 presidential address to the American Economic 
Association, made a distinction between growth processes characterised as either 
mushrooms or yeast. In a ’yeast-like’ process the parts of a system expand 
simultaneously in response to common stimuli while in a ‘mushroom-like’ 
process the parts expand randomly without any identifiable, single cause. The 
analogy draws inspiration from the evenness with which yeast causes bread to 
expand whereas mushrooms tend to crop up in a very unpredictable fashion. 
Harberger deployed this dichotomy for real cost reductions at the firm or 
industry level, as measured by a large residual in growth accounting, where 
yeast symbolises a balanced and mushrooms an unbalanced growth process. 
Behind this metaphoric and admittedly witty characterisation lurks a particular 
vision of how cost reductions at the level of the firm or industry are really 
achieved. If magnitudes of real cost reductions tend to be uniformly distributed 
among different industries, and particularly among different firms in the same 
industry, it is appropriate to think of a factor x, let us say human capital, or just 
knowledge, shifting production functions of firms economy wide. This vision of 
progress may be captured in a simple model allowing outcomes of different 
policies to be predicted. If, however, cost reductions are largely concentrated to 
a few industries, perhaps also to a few firms within an industry, one may rather 
think of cost reductions as ’stemming from 1001 different causes’ (Harberger 
1998 p. 5). If this latter picture of reality is more apt, the importance of 
generalised externalities so often claimed by authors cannot be justified. Based 
on some late (1970–1994) twentieth century evidence of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth rates, broken down into a mosaic of experiences in American 
industries and Mexican firms, that is what Harberger endorses; the growth 
process resembles mushrooms rather than yeast. High rates of TFP growth were 
largely localised to a few industries, while the majority of industries and firms 
achieved modest real cost reductions or even real cost increases. Also, there was 
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no persistence in the rank of industries. Leading industries in one time period 
slid into decline in the other. 
However, as an economic historian, one would like to know more about what 
a fuller record would reveal, one that extends the limitation in time and place of 
Harberger’s minor investigation. Will it, too, confirm the mushroom-like 
advance of cost reductions that Harberger envisions? A cursory scan of the 
literature preoccupied with past experiences of TFP growth rates in 
manufacturing industries discloses two things: First, evidence of TFP growth 
rates in separate manufacturing industries is scarce, especially in the pre-World 
War I era. Second, the literature has mainly been engaged with the idea of 
general purpose technology (GPT), and the whole idea of GPT is partly at odds 
with Harberger’s vision of real cost reductions popping up like mushrooms in a 
field. For instance, David and Wright (2003) have called attention to the steep 
economy wide acceleration in TFP growth rates in the decades ensuing World 
War I, both in Britain and the US, with particular emphasis on the marked 
improvements in the manufacturing sector. Not only did growth rates of TFP 
accelerate for manufacturing as a whole, but 13 out of 14 separate groups of 
industries experienced acceleration in multifactor productivity, or what 
Harberger would call real cost reductions. Moreover, the overachievers were 
scattered over a wide array of industries, evidence of which, according to David 
and Wright, reflected broad and generic responses to common underlying 
mechanisms. They trace the factors impinging so widely on the rate of progress 
among different industries to engineering and organisational advances associated 
with the electrification of industry. For them ‘the dynamo’ embodies the idea of 
a general purpose technology and the interwar years the era when the diffusion 
and application of electricity culminated, which paved the way for fixed-capital 
savings and increased labour productivity. Thus their vision of the growth 
process, closely resembling the yeast-like expansion of uniform progress, stands 
in sharp relief against the Harberger’s pro-mushroom evidence for the late 
twentieth century. 
While the evidence of growth rates from the US and the UK in the interwar 
years seems to contradict the mushroom side of the dichotomy, the scattered 
evidence of growth rates in the pre-World War I period shows a less uniform 
pattern; more resembling the mushroom metaphor (Crafts 2000).91 In fact the 
revisionists’ view of the industrial revolution in Britain lends support to 
Harberger’s vision of growth, although it must be conceded that evidence of TFP 
growth for particular industries is in scarce supply. For revisionists, the story of 
the industrial revolution is centred on the role played by a few new and dynamic 
                                                 
 
91  Sokoloff’s (1986) exploration of early (1800-1860) productivity growth in American Northeast 
is an exception. He found that all industries grew at rates that were similar. The lack of an 
unbalanced growth pattern came as a surprise as the sample included both capital and labour 
intensive industries.  
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sectors of the economy, industries which made use of new technologies and 
sources of energies. The rest of the economy was dominated by older modes of 
production, mostly with handicraft-like techniques. It would take many decades 
for the more dynamic sectors to make an appreciable impact on the aggregate 
when the traditional sector was growing slowly, less than one per cent or so 
(Mokyr 1993). In the late nineteenth century, the British and the American 
evidence indicates that high growth rates were localised to few industries 
(Kendrick 1961; Matthews et al. 1982). 
For the pre-Word War I era there is scarce evidence of TFP for 
manufacturing industries to bring to bear on the challenging issues raised by 
Harberger’s vision of the growth process, owing to the scarceness of early 
censuses of manufactures and the laborious effort required to uncover old firm 
records from archives. The purpose of this project is therefore to add the 
Swedish experience to the short list of countries for which evidence of TFP 
growth rates in manufacturing industries exists, and to discuss how that 
experience relates to the previous discussion on the (past) nature of progress in 
manufacturing industries. While a peripheral country largely unaffected by the 
First Industrial Revolution in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century and the 
advent of industrialisation in some neighbouring countries a few decades later, 
Sweden entered a path of rapid growth and industrialisation as the nineteenth 
century drew to a close. The growth of the Swedish economy was manifestly 
linked to the progress made by the manufacturing industry, which makes it an 
object suited for close study. What facilitates this effort is the annual publication 
of the Swedish Industrial Statistics since its appearance in the mid-nineteenth 
century. 
However, the empirical ground needs to be established before the intriguing 
issues of growth patterns can be addressed. At the risk of boring the reader, a 
fairly long detour to gather consistent evidence of output and employment for a 
large sample of industries is required before a systematic treatment of labour and 
total factor productivity is possible. As previous writers have made clear to the 
entire readership of Swedish economic history, our knowledge of manufacturing 
output based on the Swedish Industrial Statistics is patchy.92 The reason is that a 
number of important industries were omitted or covered inadequately until at 
least 1896. The chapter therefore combines with previous attempts within 
                                                 
 
92  Three of these previous efforts made by distinguished Swedish scholars represent pillars in the 
historiography of Swedish economic history. They have all prepared the ground for what has 
been accomplished here. In being more narrowly concerned with manufacturing output as 
given by the Swedish Industrial Statistics, Jörberg (1861) antedates and resembles this project. 
The other two, Lindahl et al. (1937) and Schön (1988), are parts of a larger project within 
Swedish Historical National Accounts (SHNA). As this project relates closely to what these 
previous studies contain, I am sometimes inclined to look at them with painstaking attention to 
details. The few critical notes which found their way into the final text are by no means 
intended to disparage these authors’ great achievements. 
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Swedish Historical National Accounts (SHNA) to construct reliable series of 
output in the Swedish manufacturing industry. These previous attempts have 
contributed mainly through adopting ingenious methods to fill in the many gaps 
and deficiencies in the Swedish Industrial Statistics pre-1913. Holes and 
insufficiencies are in plenty. Thanks to these efforts we now have more reliable 
evidence of gross output and value added for groups of industries and 
manufacturing as a whole. What we do not have is, however, corresponding 
estimates of the number of workers. A first objective of the data collecting part 
of this chapter is therefore to match output as given by the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics and complementary studies with estimates of the number of workers. A 
second objective is to create a series of manufacturing industries proper, thus 
excluding the value of handicraft production and public utilities that previously 
was included in the series of output (Schön 1988). This requires the construction 
of new price deflators. The third objective is to establish net output in current 
and constant prices. Thereafter, to pave the way for the final analytical part of 
the chapter, I address the problems of estimating TFP when there is a 
conspicuous absence of information on capital investments. The preferred 
solution in much economic history literature is to compute TFP by using prices 
of wages, capital and final products, commonly referred to as the dual approach. 
It turns out to be impracticable because there is no information on capital returns 
for separate industries. The closest we can get to the true value of TFP is labour 
productivity times labour’s share of value added while invoking the assumption 
of constancy in the movement of output to capital ratio. The estimates of TFP so 
constructed are used in the final, analytical part of the chapter to lay bare the 
pattern of real cost reductions among industries. 
5.2. Gross output in the Swedish Industrial Statistics 
The Swedish Industrial Statistics93 represents a unique source of information on 
output in manufacturing industries. The uniqueness lies in its early and frequent 
publication. It was published for the first time in 1858 and has appeared annually 
since.94 In contrast, the British Census of Production was published in 1907 and 
appeared every second year thereafter. The US Census of Manufactures was first 
published in 1810 and appeared decennially until 1909. The Swedish Industrial 
Statistics requested firms to return information on gross output and number of 
workers in surveys. It excluded all industries closely related to forestry and 
                                                 
 
93  Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik. D. Fabriker och manufakturer. 
94  The Swedish Industrial Statistics began to be published in 1858 but the primary material is 
available annually in archives for the whole nineteenth century. Thus the statistical agency 
requested firms to send in returns long before it was made available in published form. The 
quality of that material deteriorates the further back in time we go, however. 
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agriculture, which implied the omission of, for instance, dairies (incorporated in 
1913) and sawmills (incorporated in 1896). Over the course of time it gradually 
improved the coverage, yet remained filled with lacunas until at least 1896. 
Some industries were not recorded at all and others inadequately so. 
Patching the holes in the Swedish Industrial Statistics has occupied two out 
of six generations of SHNA.95 The starting point was to estimate gross output for 
unrecorded industries by drawing on alternative sources, such as trade statistics 
and various public investigations, or by using movements of intermediate input 
materials as proxies for final products. The pioneering undertaking was started 
in 1937 by the authors of the first generation of SHNA, Lindahl et al. (1937). 
They estimated gross output for the following industries: sawmills (1860–1896), 
brickworks (1860–1872), book printing (1896–1930), flour mills (1860–1895), 
slaughter houses (1885–1890), spirit factories (1890–1981), dairies (1860–1912, 
and charcoal manufacturing (1860–1895). They divided the manufacturing 
sector into nine broad categories, a division which followed the more modern, 
post-1913 version of the Swedish Industrial Statistics. It would take more than 
fifty years before the next major revision was undertaken. With meticulous care 
Schön (1988) revised some of Lindahl et al.’s (1937) estimates of output and 
incorporated more of what the Swedish Industrial Statistics left unrecorded. He 
retained their nine-sector division. The scholarship and authority with which we 
associate these efforts affirm that the many gaps in the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics have been bridged satisfactorily, thereby improving our knowledge of 
movements in gross output for separate industries and the aggregate. 
After briefly describing these authoritative efforts to escape our reliance on 
the Swedish Industrial Statistics it may seem paradoxical to return to it again, 
but that is the only option at hand if we want to explore productivity advances at 
the level of separate industries. There is great scope to expand our knowledge by 
looking more closely at the Swedish Industrial Statistics. Jörberg (1961), in his 
magisterial enquiry into the growth and fluctuations of Swedish industry, for the 
period 1869–1912, was to my knowledge the first scholar to make more 
systematic use of the detailed if fragmentary evidence of output and employment 
it provides. He argued persuasively that it could be used to assess the 
performance of the various manufacturing industries because the coverage was, 
if defective, at least representative. He was fully aware of all the weaknesses and 
gaps in the material of the Swedish Industrial Statistics since he subjected it to 
close scrutiny. To ensure the usefulness of it he consulted the primary sources 
underlying the final publications of the following volumes: 1872, 1880, 1889, 
1897, 1903 and 1912, and furthermore collated information on some large 
enterprises’ internal bookkeeping and the figures they submitted to the statistical  
 
                                                 
 
95  Bohlin (2003), in a review article, dealt with five generations of SHNA but Edvinsson (2005) 
has since contributed to what may in fact be the sixth generation. 
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TABLE 5.1. The classification of manufacturing industries  
 Output and 
employment from the 
Swedish Industrial 
Statistics 
Output elsewhere 
1. Iron, metal and engineering   
1.1. Mechanical eng, ironware and foundry 1868–1912  
1.2. Metal 1868–1912  
1.3. Shipyard 1872–1912 1868–1871 
1.4. Electro mechanical  1885–1912  
1.5. Iron mines 1868–1912  
1.6. Iron and steel work 1868–1912  
2. Stone, clay and glass   
2.1. Glass 1868–1912  
2.2. Chinaware and tile 1868–1912  
2.3. Quarrying and refined stone products 1868–1912  
2.4. Cement 1874–1912  
2.5. Bricks 1873–1912 1868–1872 
2.6. Coal 1868–1912  
3. Wood   
3.1. Sawmills and planing mills 1896–1912 1868–1895 
3.2. Refined wood products 1872–1912  
4. Paper   
4.1. Pulp 1868–1912  
4.2. Paper 1868–1912  
4.3. Book printing 1868–1912 1896–1912 
5. Food   
5.1. Flour mills 1896–1912 1868–1912 
5.2. Pork butchery 1891–1912 1885–1890 
5.3. Margarine 1894–1912  
5.4. Sugar 1868–1912  
5.5. Tobacco 1868–1912  
5.6. Chocolate and candy 1868–1912  
5.7. Brewery 1872–1912 1868–1871 
5.8. Spirit 1892–1912 1868–1891 
5.9. Bakery 1890–1912  
5.10. Dairy  1868–1912 
5.11. Miscellaneous food industry 1868–1912  
6. Textile and clothing   
6.1. Textile 1868–1912  
6.2. Clothing 1868–1912  
7. Leather, hair and rubber   
7.1. Tannery 1868–1912  
7.2. Products of leather and fur 1868–1912  
7.3. Shoes 1868–1912  
7.4. Rubber 1868–1912  
8. Chemical   
8.1. Paint 1868–1912  
8.2. Soap and detergent 1868–1912  
8.3. Oil 1868–1912  
8.4. Matches 1868–1912  
8.5. Explosives 1868–1912  
8.6. Charcoal  1898–1912 1868–1912 
8.7. Chemicals and fertilizers 1868–1912  
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authorities. He concluded that there was a good measure of agreement and that 
we have no grounds to expect that the exclusion of some production units 
implies any systematic bias. Thus, Jörberg’s detailed account of the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics and final affirmation of its usefulness justify the reuse of this 
rich source of information. His work precedes much of what forms the basis of 
my effort and it supplies complementary information from primary sources. At 
the time his research was conducted, Jörberg lacked adequate series of prices for 
final and intermediate goods, which prevented him from exploring labour and 
total factor productivity. Today we are better equipped, thanks to Jörberg 
himself (1972a) and Ljungberg (1990), who have provided a wealth of 
information on prices for single products and price indices for various groups of 
industries. 
My compilation of output and employment sticks to the allocation into 9 
separate groups of industries which was established by SHNA, though I have 
excluded handicraft production and public utilities such as heating and power 
plants, since they are not generally considered manufacturing industries. Each 
group of industry is furthermore subdivided so as to comprise 41 industries in 
100
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GRAPH 5.1. The ratio of the new gross output level to Schön’s gross output 
level, 1868–1912  
Sources: Gross output in current prices for manufacturing and handicraft from Schön (1988 
table I1) minus gross output in current prices of handicraft production (table 15) gives the 
denominator. The numerator is set out in Appendix 5.1 and Appendix 5.3 contains a detailed 
description of the sources. 
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total (table 5.1).96 The exclusion of handicraft production merits a brief note. 
Schön (1988) estimated gross output of handicraft production on the basis of 
assumed incomes for handicraft workers. As no evidence of wages for handicraft 
workers exists, wages for workers in similar manufacturing industries were used 
as proxy. In other words, average annual wages for manufacturing workers times 
the number of handicraft workers were used to estimate current gross output for 
handicraft production. I have no objection to this solution, but it is desirable to 
exclude the value of handicraft production as the intention here is to address 
productivity advances for manufacturing industries proper. The value of 
handicraft production is processed; hence, we do not know its true production 
value or growth rate of labour productivity needed to transform the series in 
current prices into volumes. Handicraft production constituted a large if 
declining share of the manufacturing industry in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, so Schön’s decision to incorporate it affects our perception of 
productivity growth in the manufacturing industry. In all likelihood the growth 
of labour productivity in handicraft production was unimpressive. 
The reliability and coverage of the information given by the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics is of uttermost concern to this investigation. A large gap in 
the Swedish Industrial Statistics manifests itself as a wide margin between a 
gross output level based on only the Swedish Industrial Statistics and Schön’s 
(1988) gross output level which incorporates all additional information. 
However, after adding all the additional estimates to the series based on the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics, I have in fact established levels of gross output 
which at times surpass Schön’s levels of gross output.97 In for instance the iron, 
metal and engineering industry my level of gross output exceeds Schön’s by 
around 20 per cent in 1870–1880, and in the food industry it exceeds his by on 
average 13 per cent before 1896. It is difficult to uncover the reasons for this 
discrepancy because of the high level of aggregation in both Lindahl et al. and 
Schön. In the iron, metal and engineering industry a potential source of 
divergence concerns the multiplication of price indices by series of physical 
quantities. Output and employment for mining and closely related parts of 
manufacturing, for instance the production of pig iron and bar iron, appear in a 
volume separate from the rest of manufacturing.98 Before 1896 it gives physical 
quantities instead of current value of gross output. To assign these quantities a 
monetary value comparable to the other series of current gross output, I have 
                                                 
 
96  My classification of these 40 industries is almost identical to Ljungberg’s (1990 pp. 512-24), 
which makes the application of his price deflators to establish volume gross output 
straightforward. All information on gross output and employment is taken directly from the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics unless otherwise stated.  
97  In Appendix 5.3 I discuss the extent to which my different groups of industries’ gross output 
levels differ from Schön’s. 
98  Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik. C. Bergshandteringen. 
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multiplied series of quantities by series of corresponding prices. In historical 
national accounts this procedure is more common the farther off in history we 
direct our attention because physical quantities are easier to come by than 
current gross output value.99 The same series of prices are then used to convert 
these series of current gross output to series of constant gross output.100  
Over time the Swedish Industrial Statistics incorporated a growing share of 
the manufacturing sector. This gradual incorporation of more establishments 
implies a spurious impression of surging growth rates. The problem appears 
above all in 1891, 1892 and 1896, when the Swedish Industrial Statistics 
underwent a number of revisions, and has in my view not been properly dealt 
with by either Lindahl (1937) or Schön (1988).101 I have tried to even out some 
series of current gross output and employment, for instance book printing, for 
which there existed a striking discontinuity in 1896. The solution was to 
extrapolate backwards from that year when the Swedish Industrial Statistics 
sharply improved the coverage or in any other way changed its classification, 
assuming that the movement of output and employment for previously excluded 
industries followed the included ones. In many cases this amounts to nothing but 
pure guesswork. However, this quick fix does not affect significantly the relation 
between output and employment over time for that particular series though it 
raises the levels of output and employment. It attributes to that particular series a 
larger weight in the combined measure, which in turn implies that its rate of 
productivity change leaves a more visible mark in the aggregate record. After 
all, that is one of the things we want to achieve.102 
5.3. Employment 
Whereas Lindahl et al. and Schön have sufficiently remedied the shortcomings 
of the pre-1913 output figures provided by the Swedish Industrial Statistics, the 
                                                 
 
99  Most of the British historical national accounts for the nineteenth century have been 
constructed by multiplying indices of quantities by indices of prices.  
100  As Broadberry (2003) points out, it is important to deflate the series of current gross output 
thus constructed by the same series of prices. Otherwise one may run into difficulties defining 
what the series of constant gross output really represent. 
101  Admittedly, for the large industries entering the Swedish Industrial Statistics at different 
stages, first Lindahl et al. and then Schön have filled the vacuum for the preceding years. For 
instance, in 1891 pork butcheries accounted for around 80 per cent of the new industries that 
year; in 1892 spirit distilleries accounted for eighty per cent; and in 1896 sawmills and flour 
mills accounted for ninety per cent (Lindahl et al. pp. 174–7). For smaller industries the 
problem with discontinuities persisted. 
102  The crucial problem concerns the rate of change between the year of increased coverage and 
the previous one. In some cases it is possible to infer from the movement of similar industries 
the likely rate of change for that particular year. If that option is unavailable, a prediction 
based on previous years’ growth rates may serve as a guideline. 
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corresponding number of workers has faded into the background, implying that 
there is scarce evidence to bring to bear on issues of labour and total factor 
productivity advances within and between industries.103 Paucity of employment 
data, moreover, makes it hazardous to say something about the share of wages in 
value added.104 In sum there are two problems that are urgently in need of 
solutions. First, when the coverage of an industry’s output and employment in 
the Swedish Industrial Statistics was defective and Lindahl et al. and Schön 
raised the level of gross output. Second, when the Swedish Industrial Statistics 
failed to record output altogether and Lindahl et al. and Schön filled that output 
gap with complementary information. Jungenfelt (1959, 1966), in his pioneering 
studies of the share of wages in value added, was the first author who attempted 
to bridge the gap between the number of workers as given by the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics and the higher level of gross output as estimated by Lindah 
et al. (1937). The part of his work that concerns employment is therefore the 
predecessor of my attempt here to make the number of workers given by the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics correspond with the even higher level of output as 
estimated by Schön (1988). Like Lindahl et al. (1937), Jungenfelt (1959) divided 
the manufacturing sector into three parts. The first concerned employment given 
by the Swedish Industrial Statistics. The second and more challenging part dealt 
with the industries it ignored and whose gross output was estimated by Lindahl 
et al. (1937). The third part, which this study disregards, dealt with small-scale 
production units and above all handicraft workers. Let us start with the former 
and easier to handle problem. To derive the number of workers in industries with 
faulty coverage, Jungenfelt and I depend on the basic assumption that the gross 
output to worker ratios for the production units included in the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics do not differ significantly from the gross output to worker 
ratios for the production units left out of account. The assumption works so long 
as the Swedish Industrial Statistics did not systematically exclude small and 
mainly handicraft-like production units with likely different gross output per 
worker ratios, whose output was estimated and incorporated by either Lindahl et 
al. (1937) or Schön (1988). Formula (5.1), where Q  represents gross output, E  
represents employment and the subscript census signals that the information 
refers to the Swedish Industrial Statistics, and the subscript estimated that it was 
attained from Schön or Lindahl et al, elucidates the procedure at work as long as 
this basic assumption holds. The correction factor, put there to reckon with the 
                                                 
 
103  Holmquist (2003) may serve to illustrate the drawback of studying productivity without 
reliable employment figures. He constructed capital stocks for groups of industries and 
manufacturing as a whole for 1870-1930, but lack of employment figures prevented him from 
computing TFP growth rates for the same groups of industries before 1890. 
104  Schön (2004b) may serve to highlight the problems of studying the wage share for 
manufacturing as a whole without employment figures. He based the estimate of the wage 
share on only the industries whose employment figures were reported in the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics. 
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eventuality that it does not, then becomes one. However, in for instance the flour 
mill industry the Swedish Industrial Statistics excluded all small production 
units.105 One may infer from Jörberg’s (1961 appendix III) compilation of 
industries classified by size groups that the excluded firms’ productivity levels 
were substantially inferior to the included industries’ because the gross output to 
worker ratio for the largest size group was approximately 250 per cent of the 
gross output to worker ratio for the smallest size group. The correction factor in 
formula (5.1) then becomes 2.5, thus raising the estimated level of employment 
above the level that would have been established had we invoked the assumption 
of equal productivity. 
= + * * correction factorcensuscensus estimated
census
EEmployment E Q
Q
 (5.1) 
Let us now turn to the latter and arduous problem that appears as a result of a 
complete output gap in the Swedish Industrial Statistics and was later filled in by 
Lindahl et al. and Schön. Jungenfelt employed a variety of assumptions and 
techniques. In some cases he assumed that the constant gross output per worker 
ratio as found in the Swedish Industrial Statistics for later years held for earlier 
years too (brickworks, shipyards, slaughter houses, spirit factories and 
breweries). For flour mills he assumed that constant gross output increased by a 
factor of two from 1870 to 1896 and for charcoal manufacturing in 1870–1898 
he assumed that the average annual change in productivity was the same as 
between 1898 and 1930. For sawmills and dairies he assumed a constant cost 
share of wages in gross output. In the sawmill industry he used the year 1896, 
when the number of workers appeared for the first time in the Swedish Industrial 
Statistics, to compute the wage sum and the wage share of gross output. He 
concluded that wages accounted for 23 per cent of gross output in 1896 and 
assumed that this ratio did not change between 1870 and 1896. Then he divided 
the wage bill by the average annual wage to derive the number of workers.106 
The heroic assumption of a constant wage share cannot be corroborated with 
what scarce evidence there is on the development of the profit share. Gårdlund’s 
(1947) investigation of financing in Swedish industry included six sawmill 
firms. The gross profit margin of these companies fluctuated considerably with a 
                                                 
 
105  The Swedish Industrial Statistics did not report gross output and employment for flour mills 
until 1896. After 1896 it excluded all smaller production units and the significance of these 
industries can be attained by comparing the reported gross output with Schön’s estimate, the 
latter based on the likely consumption of grain (Schön 1988 p. 51). In 1896 the excluded grain 
mills accounted for fifty per cent of Schöns estimate of total consumption. It decreased to 38 
per cent in 1912. 
106  Jungenfelt derived the annual wage by linking the series of annual wages from Bagge et al. 
(1933) to a benchmark in 1913. The wage benchmark in 1913 was based on the official wage 
statistics (Social Board).  
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trend pointing slightly downwards. If the share of profit varied, so did the share 
of wages. Furthermore, the series of wages for workers in the sawmill industry 
used to compute the wage sum exhibits a very slow growth. Between 1870 and 
1912 annual wages in the sawmill industry increased by 0.8 per cent annually, in 
contrast to 1.9 per cent for manufacturing as a whole. By inference, the slow 
growing wage series brings a high wage level for earlier years and lowers the 
estimated number of workers.107 A more serious objection to this method is that 
the estimates of employment relate to gross output in current prices. That makes 
the employment figures highly susceptible to price changes of final products. 
Instead, changes in employment should be related to changes in the volume of 
gross output. 
Whereas Jungenfelt’s approach to matching is adaptable, mine is uniform and 
based on the idea that there exists a relationship between movement in output 
and movement in productivity. When output goes up, so does productivity. If 
this relationship can be identified it is possible to associate a change in the 
volume of gross output with a change in the volume of gross output to labour 
ratio, and hence a change in employment. Econometrically the relationship is 
very simple, thus  
α βln(Q / L) = + lnQ   (5.2) 
where Q  represents the volume of gross output and L  number of workers.108 
The model produces significant coefficients in most instances, whether the 
sample consists of time series for single industries or cross sections of a sample 
of industries. As both output and labour productivity are expressed in natural 
logarithms β  shows the elasticity of output with respect to labour productivity; 
it indicates how much labour productivity changes in response to a one 
percentage change in output. The estimated elasticity usually ranges from 0.6 to 
0.8 (Cornwall 1977). Informed readers recognise this model as Verdoorn’s law 
or Kaldor’s second growth law according to which productivity growth in 
manufacturing is positively correlated with growth of output in manufacturing 
(Verdoorn 1949; Kaldor 1967). The model has also been used to bolster the 
argument that positive externalities flow from accelerating rates of output 
growth in the manufacturing sector. 
The econometric model implied by Verdoon’s basic idea has not eluded 
criticism. A number of arguments have been raised against its applicability, 
some of which relate to the econometrics involved. The most serious objection is 
the presence of output on both the right and left hand sides, violating the 
assumption of independence between x and y variables. In response to this, 
                                                 
 
107  Graph A.5.1 (Appendix 5.3) shows the difference between Jungenfelt’s and my series for 
employment in the sawmill industry. 
108  First difference of the time series was used to remove unit-root problems. 
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models regressing employment against output have been proposed as an 
alternative, but they suffer from the same violation of basic assumptions. To 
escape the problems of endogeneity we would have to use instrument-variable 
estimation techniques but finding suitable instruments for output or employment 
is a challenge that has not yet met with success. Furthermore, there are 
theoretical objections closely related to the specification problems. They 
question is whether we can really infer from the model that causation runs from 
higher rates of output growth to higher rates of productivity growth? It may be 
that causation runs the other way around. In defence of the model, the use of it to 
match output and employment escapes the intricate problem of causation. It is 
beyond the scope of the present study to make inferences from the model as to 
the importance of externalities in the growth of output. The model produces 
coefficients applied to guesstimate the number of workers associated with a 
particular level of output. 
Each estimated elasticity imposes a particular rate of productivity change on 
the estimated series of employment; the higher the elasticity the higher the rate 
of productivity change, and the smaller the estimated number of workers for 
earlier years. I have assigned a unique elasticity to each industry by running a 
regression on time series of productivity and employment for a sufficient 
number of years after the industry appeared in the Swedish Industrial Statistics, 
assuming that the estimated elasticity is applicable for earlier years too. The 
simplicity and usefulness of the model for estimating employment are revealed 
most clearly after logarithmic differentiation of formula (5.2), which gives 
formula (5.3), where dots represent time derivatives: 
β− = Q L Q
Q L Q
  (5.3) 
1 β− = ( ) Q L
Q L
  (5.4) 
Then one minus the elasticity times the growth in output yields the growth in 
the number of workers, as in formula (5.4). This information can be utilized in 
backward extrapolation of employment from the year in which the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics started recording output and employment. 
The industries for which employment needs to be estimated constitute a 
significant if diminishing share of total gross output in manufacturing, falling 
from 62 to 45 per cent between 1868 and 1895. The share of sawmills and flour 
mills alone fell from 44 to 26 per cent. The large shares of these industries 
signify the great extent to which Swedish economy relied on raw material based 
industries closely related to the agricultural and forestry sectors, both of which 
remained unnoticed by the Swedish Industrial Statistics before 1896. It is 
therefore somewhat of a surprise to find that the movement of the new series for 
manufacturing workers sticks closely to Jungenfelt’s (1959) (handicraft workers 
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excluded), as graph 5.2 brings out in full relief. In addition, the level of my series 
is quite congruent with the level of his series, which deserves a remark. My new 
estimate of employment relates to Schön’s (1988) higher level of gross output, 
while Jungenfelt’s estimate relates to Lindahl et al.’s (1937) lower level of gross 
output. For 1868 Schön’s estimated level of current gross output is fifteen per 
cent higher than Lindahl et al.’s, though the difference declines gradually and 
disappears altogether around the turn of the century. My method thus results in 
fewer workers per unit of output which, ceteris paribus, gives way to an 
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GRAPH 5.2. Estimates of employment in the Swedish manufacturing industry, 
1868–1912 
Note: The estimates exclude handicraft workers and public utilities. 
Source: The series titled new is set out in Appendix 5.1 and Appendix 5.3 details the sources; 
the series titled Jungenfelt: Jungenfelt (1959 tables 3a and 4) public utilities excluded but 
complemented with employment in brickworks and shipyards (pp. 31–2); the series titled 
Krantz & Schön: Krantz and Schön (2007 table 5B) less handicraft workers from Schön (1988 
table 14) and workers in public utilities from Jungenfelt (1959 table 3a). 
TABLE 5.2. Industries not represented in the Swedish Industrial Statistics for 
which employment is estimated  
Industry Time period 
Shipyards 1868–1871 
Brick works 1868–1872 
Sawmills 1868–1895 
Flour mills 1868–1895 
Slaughter houses 1885–1890 
Breweries 1868–1871 
Spirit factories 1868–1891 
Dairies 1868–1912 
Charcoal manufacturing 1868–1897 
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interpretation of the share of wages in value added that is different from 
Jungenfelt’s.109 Graph 5.2 also includes Krantz and Schön’s (2007) series of 
employment for manufacturing workers. I have purged it of handicraft workers 
and workers in public utilities to make it comparable. There is a gap between 
their series on the one hand and Jungenfelt’s and my new series on the other, 
especially for the mid-1870s and around the turn of the century. They give no 
detailed information on the construction of their series, but elsewhere we are 
informed that Jungenfelt’s (1966) employment series has been used to 
interpolate between an early benchmark in 1870, based on the population census, 
and a second in 1896, based on the Swedish Industrial Statistics (Schön 2004a). 
The justification for this solution is the claimed incompleteness of Jungenfelt’s 
pre-1896 series. Yet, in relation to Jungenfelt’s series, theirs seems incomplete. 
110 
5.4. Single deflation 
The construction of price indices to deflate current gross output represents a first 
step to remove the influence of prices from the movements of volumes of goods 
and services. There are various sources of information on prices that may be 
used to compute representative price indices. Four compilations of prices have 
been particularly useful. Ljungberg’s (1990) comprehensive lists of prices for 
particular goods and for groups of industries, based on a countless number of 
sources, cover most of the needs for the years after 1885. Three other sources 
cover the years before 1885: Jörberg’s (1972a) voluminous lists of market price 
scales (markegångstaxor), Myrdal’s (1933) supplementary list of prices 
underlying the computation of his cost-of-living index and Åmark’s (1921) early 
list of prices based mostly on market price scales. For most groups of industries 
it is necessary to combine a number of price series, inevitably calling for 
                                                 
 
109  Several authors, who have surveyed, from a macro economic perspective, the Swedish 
economic development in the latter half of the nineteenth century have to some extent put their 
faith in the accuracy of Jungenfelt’s series of workers. Edvinsson (2005) uses backward 
extrapolation from a benchmark in 1950, based on the number of manufacturing workers given 
by the Statistics Sweden and the number of handicraft workers given by Schön, to 1870 by 
using Jungenfelt’s series as an indicator of employment. Schön (2004a) uses the population 
census in 1870 and the Swedish Industrial Statistics in 1896 to pin down the number of 
workers and uses Jungenfeld’s series to interpolate between these end points. Thus, both rely 
on the accuracy of the trend in Jungenfelt’s series. Vikström (2002), in his study of the share 
of wages in the manufacturing industry, uses Jungenfelt’s number of workers proper and 
Schön’s revised number of handicraft workers to compute the wage bill, thus putting his trust 
in the level of Jungenfelt’s series. 
110  In Krantz and Schön (2007 p. 24) the reader is directed to Schön (2000b p. 14) but in fact no 
description is available there. Information on the construction of the series was instead found 
in Schön (2004a p. 276).   
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considerations of what is frequently referred to as the index number problem. 
That consideration becomes even more delicate at higher levels of aggregation. 
Previous authors working within SHNA were guided by the principle of finding 
consecutive time periods of around 20–25 years that share common 
characteristics, especially stable relative prices. These time periods have been 
imposed on the data by using them as deflation periods, i.e. applying the same 
weights to 20–25 years. Healthy scepticism about this method has been put 
forward by for instance Edvinsson (2005) and Vikström and Lindmark (2004), 
who argue that it presupposes an idea of the underlying process of economic 
growth, in this case the preconception of the existence of long swings with 
duration of 20–25 years.111 But what if this idea is plainly wrong – is it not better 
then to apply a more neutral deflation method to divert suspicion from the fact 
that we have imposed on our data a fixed and ready structure? I feel free to 
pursue a different strategy, although it is important to remember that some price 
indices for groups of industries that I make use of have, in their turn, been 
constructed by other authors employing different methods. 
There are two points of departure for the construction of price indices to 
deflate current production values, and a combination of them, which gives a 
third, ideal one. Because a Laspeyres price index applies the same weight for the 
entire period, it generally records a more rapid increase of prices when relative 
prices change than a Paasche price index, where quantities are changed each 
year.112 If relative price tendencies are cumulative, the gap between the two 
indices tends to expand as our study period lengthens. They represent an upper 
and lower bound of price increases. A preferred method should therefore be to 
even out the discrepancy between the Paasche and the Laspeyre price indices, 
and one well-known solution is to use a Fisher index, which is the geometric 
mean of the two indices. If in addition the indices are rebased for each 
consecutive year, the discrepancy between the two choices slips away even more 
(System of National Accounts 1993). The difference between chained Paasche 
and Laspeyres indices is negligible in most cases. Still, it is convenient to 
compute their geometric mean yielding a chained Fisher index. In many cases it 
is impossible to compute a Paasche, or chained indices in general, because they 
take annual weights as a prerequisite. The weights used to combine price indices 
of final products to form price deflators for groups of industries and 
manufacturing as a whole should be based on gross output. The data collecting 
part of this project supplies the annual gross output weights needed to compute 
chained Paasche and Laspeyres indices combined into chained Fisher. Formula 
(5.5) and (5.6) show the Laspeyres and Paasche methodology, where P  and Q  
represent prices for final products and gross output in the ith industry in the base 
                                                 
 
111  In their latest contribution to SHNA, Kranzt and Schön (2007) have substituted a chained 
Paasche index for their previous deflator based on deflation periods. 
112  This regularity only applies if the Laspeyres index has been constructed by early-year weights. 
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year, 1t − , or the year of comparison, t . This results in binary comparisons 
(links) between year t  and 1t −  of Laspeyres and Paasche type. The geometric 
mean of the two links gives links of Fisher type, as in formula (5.7). In the final 
stage, the Fisher index is formed by multiplying each year’s binary comparison, 
the first year being set to 1.  
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Apart from the different weighting scheme applied in the construction of the 
new deflator it is also purged of the influence of handicraft production. Schön 
(1988) assumed that handicraft production did not enjoy any gains in 
productivity before 1890, hence the deflator was simply the same series of 
annual wages used to estimate current gross output. For the period between 1890 
and 1955 he assumed that productivity increased by a factor of two. The deflator 
is thus the wage series divided by an index that moves from 1 to 2 in 65 years. A 
modest improvement of productivity it would seem, but it matters as craftwork 
in 1890 accounted for between 10 and 80 per cent of the weights given to 
different price series for each group of industries (Schön 1988 pp. 193–4). Graph 
5.3 shows unequivocally that a gap between Schön’s and the new deflator slowly 
appears after the mid-1880s; between 1885 and 1912 Schön’s deflator decreases 
by one per cent while my new deflator increases by 8 per cent. It is hard to tell 
whether it is the weighting scheme or the absence of a deflator for handicraft 
production that induces a different movement of the new deflator. Schön 
himself, in a joint effort with Kander (2002 pp. 206–8), has computed a chained 
Paasche deflator for manufacturing, which also records a faster increase of 
prices than his deflator with fixed deflation periods, at least for the period 
between 1895 and 1910. Likewise, in the most recent work within SHNA, 
Krantz and Schön (2007) show that after the 1880s their new chained deflator 
for GDP increases faster than their previous one based on fixed deflation 
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periods. Graph 5.3 also shows Edvisson’s (2005) price deflator, based on 
chained Fisher index methodology, which is very similar to the new one, thus 
reinforcing the impression that weighting counts. The more rapid increase of 
prices recorded in the new deflator will at any rate temper estimated increase of 
the volume of gross output in the latter half of the period. 
5.5. Double deflation 
This project shares with all historical national accounts the objective of 
establishing measures of the volume of value added. Ideally, value added should 
be measured at constant prices by deflating the current value of gross output and 
the current value of intermediate consumption with separate deflators, after 
which the volume of intermediate consumption is subtracted from the volume of 
gross output. Formula (5.9), where Qp  represents a price index of final products, 
Q  the quantity of gross output, Mp  a price index of intermediate consumption 
and M  the quantity of intermediate consumption, describes the ideal way to 
establish value added in constant prices. This is also known more commonly as 
value added by double deflation, dV . 
= − = −/ /d Q Q M MV p Q p p M p Q M   (5.9) 
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GRAPH 5.3. Price deflators for the Swedish manufacturing industry, 1868–
1912, (1868=100)  
Source: The series labelled new is set out in Appendix 5.1 and Appendix 5.3 details the 
sources. The series labelled Edvinsson: (www.historia.se). The series labelled Schön: the 
ratio of current gross output to the volume of gross output in Schön (1988 tables I1 and I13). 
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Following this procedure in historical national accounts has proved a great 
challenge, as it requires more data than our sources can provide. In most cases 
official sources give information on current gross output ( Qp Q ), or simply 
quantities ( Q ), which can be reflated by an appropriate indicator of output 
prices ( Qp ), but they remain silent when it comes to the volume of intermediate 
consumption ( M ). The Swedish Industrial Statistics fail to give information on 
cost shares of intermediate consumption pre-1952; hence the method of double 
deflation as in formula (5.9) is not applicable. To circumvent the constraints 
imposed by the lack of information on intermediate consumption, authors have 
often resorted to movements of the volume of gross output. Series of the volume 
of gross output for separate industries have been weighted by value added shares 
for a benchmark year in which information on cost shares of intermediate 
consumption appear and are combined into an aggregate series which has served 
to indicate the movement of the volume of value added to the next benchmark 
year. This, for instance, has been the response in the construction of historical 
output series for manufacturing in Britain (Hoffman 1955; Lewis 1978) and the 
US (Fabricant 1940). The accuracy of the method turns on the frequency with 
which the shares of value added are updated. The inherent problem with 
historical studies is that shares of value added for a particular benchmark year 
have served as weights for wide stretches of history. Rebasing appears more 
frequently for more recent times. Infrequent rebasing may turn the series of the 
volume of gross output into a poor indicator of the volume of value added. The 
tacit assumption is that the ratio of the volume of material inputs to the volume 
of gross output remains unchanged over time. That ratio is sometimes referred to 
as a technical coefficient, which indicates how much inputs of material per unit 
of output change as a result of new technologies or changed composition of 
goods. To presume that the technical coefficients are time invariant implies a 
strong, if for practically reasons clarified below, necessary assumption. Even if 
no new products appear, structural transformation in a modern economy goes on 
in every bit of its constituent parts; it is in the very nature of economic growth to 
change the composition of output perpetually, because the proportions in which 
consumers allocate their growing incomes to different categories of expenditure 
change as time goes by. A change in the composition of output within an 
industry may affect technical coefficients in both directions: either through the 
use of more materials and fuels per unit of final produce or through the use of 
fewer materials. It is only on rare occasions that the study object in historical 
analysis of output in manufacturing represents a single homogenous product. 
The evidence of output by industry that researchers obtain from official sources 
is an aggregate of many products, in the first place, and, in addition, further 
aggregation is often necessary to circumvent the lack of related information on, 
for instance, prices of final products and intermediate consumption and capital 
stocks. The changing composition of final goods is probably what bears mostly 
on the technical coefficients. 
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Focusing instead on a single product, an assumption of a fixed relationship 
between M  and Q  can only be justified as long as no major technological 
innovations substantially alter the amount of material required to produce a unit 
of output. Some new production methods may imply the use of less material per 
unit of output. In that case the assumption of a fixed input-output relationship 
will underestimate the growth of the volume of value added. Innovations may as 
well lead to more intensive use of material, which results in an overestimation of 
the growth of the volume of value added. An example of a more material-using 
technique which came to be widely used from the 1880s onwards, is chemical 
paper pulp. To produce a unit of paper pulp with the sulphite and sulphate 
methods requires twice as much forest products as with the mechanical pulp 
method (Lindahl et al. 1937 p. 152). With material saving scenarios in mind, 
Thomas and Feinstein (2005) discuss and simulate the potential bias of assuming 
a fixed input-output relationship for a long period of time. In the first scenario 
major technological breakthroughs occur, markedly reducing the use of material. 
In this case we may think of a brief and quite dramatic change in technology 
which implies new ways to combine materials, labour and capital. The bias, if 
our measure of the volume of value added does not capture this change in 
technology, may be large enough to give a false impression as to the movement 
of the true measure of the volume of value added. In the other scenario the 
potential for material saving is in the gradual reduction of waste. Firms are able 
to economize on the use of material by learning by doing and gradual refinement 
of given technologies. The scope for material saving by the reduction of waste is 
more limited than material saving associated with major new technologies, 
leading to a smaller bias when our measure ignores its impact. Thomas and 
Feinstein, however, overlook the third scenario in which the use of material per 
unit of output increases as a result of product innovations or through changed 
composition of output. 
To get a grip on the change in the technological coefficient as a response to a 
completely new technology, we need to know a great deal about all the 
conditions under which the shifts in technology occur. That is beyond reach in 
TABLE 5.3. Cost shares of material, labour and capital in gross output, 1913 
 Material Labour Capital 
Mines, iron and steel and machinery 0.48 0.30 0.22 
Quarrying 0.24 0.37 0.39 
Wood 0.58 0.22 0.20 
Paper 0.54 0.22 0.25 
Food 0.74 0.09 0.17 
Textile 0.59 0.20 0.21 
Hides 0.73 0.15 0.12 
Chemical 0.40 0.18 0.41 
    
Total manufacturing 0.54 0.23 0.23 
Source: SOU (1923). 
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most cases. Besides, older modes of production and new technologies often 
coexist. Before superior technology eventually leads to the demise of an older 
one, the latter keeps a tenacious hold on the future path of the economy, making 
it even harder to estimate technical coefficients. What we need, therefore, is a 
new benchmark based on detailed input-output relationships for a large share of 
the manufacturing industry, the further from 1913 the better. That would impose 
stern discipline on our conjectures, although the construction of an input-output 
table is admittedly a questionable exercise in the absence of any comprehensive 
public investigation or any form of census with information on cost shares.113 
Until then, the volume of value added in year t amounts to nothing but the 
product of the value added share of our benchmark of 1912 and gross output in 
constant prices year t. It implies that the movement of value added in constant 
prices equals the movement of gross output in constant prices for industry 
specific series, while the aggregate series for manufacturing is constructed by 
weighting these series by constant value added shares for 1913. 
5.5.1. Net output in current prices 
Although a double deflation of value added to establish the volume of value 
added is unattainable, there is still scope for improving our measure of value 
added in current prices. Now, the movement of relative prices, in the form of the 
ratio of prices for intermediate consumption goods to prices of final goods, 
enters the picture. Among intermediate consumption goods materials of different 
kinds matter a great deal more than fuels; the cost share of materials in gross 
output relative to fuel is in most cases very large, around 97 per cent. The share 
of intermediate consumption in gross output varies widely by industry, from 
being 5 to 15 per cent in extractive industries such as iron ore and stone 
quarrying to between 80 and 90 per cent in sugar industries and flour mills, 
which are very intensive in their use of raw materials. Movements of relative 
prices are a great deal more important for material-intensive industries than 
extractive ones. For most industries the share of intermediate consumption in 
gross output ranges from 40 to 50 per cent. The weighted share is closer to 40 
while the median and the arithmetic mean are closer to 50. 
Two requirements must be met to make our measure of value added in 
current prices reflect changing relative prices. First, we need prices for the whole 
gamut of final products and intermediate consumption in manufacturing. This 
                                                 
 
113  Interestingly, the British series of volume output in the nineteenth century suffers from the 
same flaw, as it is based on only the value added weights in 1907, coinciding with the 
publication of the first British Census of Production. The late Charles Feinstein’s last project 
was to establish a new benchmark in 1851 in order to resolve some of the issues previously 
discussed. The project has been carried to an end by Mark Thomas and will be published 
posthumously by Cambridge University Press (Lyons et al. 2008 p. 287). 
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condition is partly met, at least after 1885, thanks mostly to Ljungberg’s (1990) 
detailed compilation. 114 Second, we need information on cost shares of materials 
in gross output and input-output relationships between different industries, 
preferably through a detailed input-output table at some point in time (not too far 
off). The point of departure is a public investigation, conducted on behalf of a 
committee appointed to investigate the consequences of the protectionist turn in 
Swedish trade policy in 1888, which presented a detailed study of the cost shares 
of material and fuel for no less than around 180 industries in 1913 (SOU 1923). 
It did not give any information on the kinds of material inputs each industry 
purchased, so the usefulness of this source is limited to information on the cost 
share of fuel relative to that of material and the share of net output relative to 
gross output. Net output is defined as gross output less costs of materials and 
fuels. This is not equivalent to value added, each industry’s contribution to GDP, 
because net output still contains costs for maintenance and repair work. It is, 
however, additive over all industries within the manufacturing sector without 
any appreciable duplication. Supplementary public investigations and in-depth 
studies of particular industries have provided additional information on input-
output relationships, and Bohlin (2007) made use of these sources to construct 
an input-output table for the manufacturing sector at a level of aggregation fairly 
close to the present one.115 Proper matching between prices of intermediate 
consumption and final goods is intuitive in some cases, for instance flour mills 
(grain in and flour out) while for others it is trickier (e.g. shipyards), requiring 
additional information from special investigations; for some it is simply 
impossible (e.g. chemicals). If we assume that the amount of material per unit of 
output is time invariant, the computation of net output in current prices becomes 
straightforward. Material inputs divided by gross output in 1912 gives the share 
of material for a benchmark year from which we make a backward extrapolation 
using the relative movement of the prices of intermediate consumption, Mp , and 
the prices of final goods, Qp , as in formula (5.10).116 One minus that cost share 
times gross output derives value added in current prices. 
                                                 
 
114  The number of price series is far from enough to allow the estimation of value added shares for 
all industries, which means that for some of the industries current gross output multiplied by a 
constant value added share in 1912 expresses the movement of current value added.  
115  The details behind the input-output table do not appear in Bohlin (2007) but the sources are 
numerated in his Appendix 1b pp. 31–2. My calculations are based on his unpublished 
material. Appendix 5.3 details the weights given to the different material inputs and lists the 
sources of the price series used to compute net output in current prices. 
116  Backward extrapolation from a large number, let us say a cost share of material of 0.8, results 
in much greater volatility (in absolute numbers) than if it is done from a smaller number. The 
combination of a large cost share of materials and a volatile relative price ratio yield negative 
value added in some instances. Although negative value added is thinkable for a very limited 
time period, it is probably due more to measurement errors. When negative value added occurs 
as a result of backward projection from a benchmark it is in all likelihood the result of errors in 
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1912
1912
=
,
,
* cost share year tM t
Q t
pM
Q p
  (5.10) 
1− ,( cost share year t ) * = value added in current prices year tt Q tQ p  (5.11) 
Schön (1988 pp. 123–51) used this method to compute value added in current 
prices for five of the most important industries, textile, iron and steel, 
mechanical engineering and sawmills for the pre-1913 period. For the rest he 
used the shares of value added in 1913, which were presented in the public 
investigation on cost shares, assuming that they remained constant over time. 
Therefore, movements of value added shares reflect the evolution of relative 
prices in the above mentioned five industries accounting for around 50 per cent 
                                                                                                                        
 
the measurement of prices for either intermediate consumption or final products, or both. 
Another reason might be changed technical coefficients. 
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GRAPH 5.4. Value added shares in the Swedish manufacturing industry, 
1868–1912 
Note: To render Schön’s series of value added shares comparable to mine I have subtracted the 
value of handicraft production from his final series of gross output and value added in current 
prices. 
Sources: The series titled new: The series of value added and gross output are set out in 
Appendix 5.1, and Appendix 5.3 details the sources; the series titled Schön: gross output for 
manufacturing and handicraft in Schön (1988 table I1) minus gross output for handicraft 
workers (table 15). For his series of value added for manufacturing and handicraft (table I2) 
minus value added for handicraft workers (shares of value added on pp. 101–5). 
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of gross output in 1870, with a tendency to diminish somewhat towards the end 
of the period. My new estimate of value added in current prices, using (5.10) and 
(5.11), encompasses a larger share of the manufacturing industry, accounting for 
75 per cent in 1870 and close to 90 per cent in 1912. The inclusion of more 
dynamic industries, such as paper pulp and paper, causes the share to expand 
over time. The new net output shares differ from Schön’s value added shares in 
some aspects, as graph 5.4 visualises. The two series are not straightforwardly 
comparable, though. In addition to the difference between net output and value 
added, I need to assume that the value added share in 1913, as estimated by the 
public investigation into cost shares (SOU 1923), was the same in 1912. Schön 
does not have to invoke this assumption since his series spans and continues 
after 1913. Still, these incompatibilities cannot alone account for the different 
behaviours of the two series. First, the new measure has a more volatile nature. 
Second, the level of my series is on average 16 per cent higher. Third, my series 
turns downwards after the mid 1890s while Schön’s series tends to increase from 
at least the turn of the century.117 
5.6. Productivity measures 
Any productivity measure seeks to estimate the efficiency with which different 
inputs are used to produce final goods. Labour productivity, i.e. output per unit 
of labour input, either on a rate-of-change or level basis, serves frequently as a 
measure of productivity in historical studies. In its rate-of-change version as in 
formula (5.12) labour productivity is defined as the growth of the volume of 
value added, dV , less the growth of labour input, L . 
Labour productivity growth rate d
d
V L
V L
= −
 
  (5.12) 
As has become clear in the discussion above, difficulties often arise in the 
measurement of output, but problems may also arise when measuring labour 
inputs. If the number of hours has moved in one or another direction, the number 
of workers gives a misleading impression of labour inputs. In addition, a quality-
adjusted measure of labour input, allowing for factors such as, for instance, the 
level of education and training of the labour force, might be preferable. The most 
important objection to the use of labour productivity is that it does not reveal 
whether or not improvements have been achieved by substituting capital for 
                                                 
 
117  The difference in 1912 is, as we would expect, small, only 6 per cent. I have replicated 
Schön’s (1988 pp. 133–5, 142) adjustments of value added shares to take account of the 
differences in the way gross output was recorded before and after 1913 in the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics. 
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labour. A higher capital to labour ratio normally raises labour productivity. 
Labour productivity growth is thus a partial and insufficient measure of the 
efficiency with which both labour and capital are used. When data permit, 
economists and economic historians therefore prefer to look at the growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP), which subtracts from the growth of output the 
growth of total factor inputs (TFI); a weighted average of the growth of capital, 
K , and labour, L . The weights used to combine capital, α , and labour, 1 α−  
into TFI are their income shares of value added. A different representation of 
TFP, as in formula (5.14), shows that it also equals the sum of labour 
productivity and capital productivity, with each productivity component 
weighted by its share of income. 
1α α= − = − − −
   
Total factor productivity growth rate ( )d d
d d
V VTFI L K
V TFI V L K
 (5.13) 
1α α
   
= − + − −      
  
Total factor productivity growth rate ( )d d
d d
V VL K
V L V K
 (5.14) 
Two dimensions of this simple formula merit further treatment: first, how 
should we interpret TFP growth rates; and second, how to compute them in the 
absence of information on capital inputs. There has been a large number of 
different interpretations of what in fact TFP growth embodies. Earlier 
generations of economists – those who stumbled across a contribution of TFP to 
output growth which exceeded 50 per cent – tended to view TFP growth as 
technological change, if in very broad terms (Abramovitz 1956; Solow 1957;). 
The large weight given to TFP in the first growth accounting exercises pointed 
to an unknown dimension of economic growth, in Moses Abramovitz’ evocative 
words ‘a measure of our ignorance’. The hunt for an explanation of TFP has 
since been centred on either human capital or technical change. To view TFP as 
an expression of technical change suffers, however, from the fact that the capital 
stock is an intrinsic carrier of new technology. New technology is embodied in 
the capital stock. Without technical change, capital accumulation would just 
amount to piling capital goods of already existing technology, and diminishing 
returns would thwart further efforts to raise output. The pioneers of growth 
accounting were challenged by two articles by Zvi Griliches and Dale Jorgenson 
(Griliches and Jorgenson 1966; Jorgenson and Griliches 1967). They claimed 
that the large share attributed to TFP in raising output was in fact the result of a 
failure to account for improvements in the growth of input quality. Thus TFP 
was nothing but a measure of our measurement errors. Quality adjusted indices 
of labour and capital made the residual go away. Disembodied technical change 
as identified by the residual was non-existent. Most technical change now 
became embodied, hidden in the indices of capital and labour, or as Gordon 
(2004 p. 92) put it: ‘Griliches and Jorgenson have thrown the baby out with the 
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error-ridden bathwater’. To find a pathway out of the quagmire of attempts to 
interpret TFP growth, this study instead appeals to Harberger’s (1998 p. 3) 
‘paean in praise of real cost reduction as a standard label’. Real cost reduction is 
an apt description of TFP in the sense that it distils the essence of what economic 
agents try to achieve, namely to reduce costs by saving on the factors of 
production, be they personnel, buildings, tools or fuels. But before delving into 
that matter we need to tackle another measurement issue. 
An important limitation of TFP as computed in formula (5.13) or (5.14) is the 
requirement of information on volumes of output, capital stock and number of 
workers/working hours. As the discussion above has made clear, information on 
labour inputs is far from satisfactory, at least not pre-1896, and we have had to 
substitute growth of gross output in constant prices for our preferred measure, 
growth of value added by double deflation. An even severer problem is the 
capital stock, evidence of which is harder to come across, especially at industry 
and sector levels. Seemingly there is an urgent need for a different solution. We 
may have recourse to the accounting identity in formula (5.15), where Q , M , 
K  and L  are volumes of gross output, material, capital and labour and Qp , 
Mp , Kp , r , and w  are their respective prices. It illustrates how current gross 
output, qp Q , can be dissolved into remuneration to labour, capital and costs of 
purchase of materials. 
= + +Q K Mp Q wL rp K p M   (5.15) 
Taking logs and differentiation of (5.15) gives formula (5.16), where , α β  
and 1- -α β are cost shares of labour, capital and intermediate consumption. By 
rearranging formula (5.16) we obtain formula (5.17) which shows a measure of 
total factor productivity advance on both sides. On the left hand side the 
percentage change in total factor productivity is computed by the difference 
between the percentage change in volume gross output and the percentage 
change in quantities of labour, capital and material (primal way); and on the 
right hand side total factor productivity is the sum of the percentage change in 
wages, rent and prices of capital goods, and prices of material inputs less the 
percentage change in final products (dual way). 
( )1α β α β    + = + + + + + − − +         
      MQ K
MQ K
p p pQ w L r K M
p Q w L r p K p M
 (5.16) 
( ) ( )1 1α β α β α β α β − − − − − = + + + − − −  
       M QK
M QK
pQ L K M w r p p
Q L K M w r p p p
 (5.17) 
As economic historians often have much better information on prices than on 
quantities, this accounting identity delivers the promising message that TFP in 
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fact can be computed despite lack of information on capital investments and 
number of workers/working hours.118 To complete the computation of TFP the 
dual way takes as prerequisites the following components: price data for final 
goods, intermediate consumption goods, industry-specific wage series, estimates 
of cost shares and a measure of the returns to capital. Prices of final products 
were dealt with in a previous section (5.5) and Bagge et al. provide industry-
specific wage series. As to cost shares, in section 5.6 an attempt is made to 
estimate net output in current prices, which makes it possible to compute labour 
and capital’s shares of income by drawing on Jungenfelt’s (1966) annual wages 
and my new series of employment. The wage bill in 1913 is known thanks to the 
public investigation on cost shares (SOU 1923) and backward extrapolation 
from that benchmark gives annual industry-specific wage bills between 1868 
and 1912.119 Dividing net output in current prices by the wage bill derives 
labour’s share of income; the other part accrued to capital. In sum, reasonably 
reliable estimates of all but the last component, returns to capital, are at our 
disposal. How to establish a measure of the returns to capital thus warrants 
special attention in what forms the subject of the coming section. 
5.6.1. Returns to capital 
To complete the computations of TFP the dual way requires information on the 
cost of capital, r . In fact, if it is not possible to come across information on the 
growth rate of r , TFP will not be more accessible through the dual than the 
primal approach, as will become clear below. In attempts to come up with a 
measure of the growth of r  in aggregate series most authors have tended to 
conceive of it as a rental cost of capital. It follows therefore that the measures 
they have constructed involve the use of the interest rate, the nominal price firms 
pay for an additional unit of capital. The use of the interest rate is premised on 
the assumption that the relation between the profit rate and the interest rate is in 
a state of equilibrium. The equilibrium is reached when the profit rate equals the 
real interest rate. It is, however, easy to come by historical evidence of the profit 
rate and the interest rate following different pathways for long stretches of time. 
Still, from the perspective of this undertaking the foremost objections to using 
the interest rate are twofold: first, it introduces a foreign element into a system 
                                                 
 
118  For application of the dual approach to TFP in manufacturing, see for instance McCloskey 
(1973) and Voth and Antras (2003).  
119  Jungenfelt’s (1966) annual wage series cover only groups of industries. The group-specific 
wage series are used to indicate the movement of annual wages for all industries in a particular 
group. The employment series do not contain any salary employee as they were not reported in 
the Swedish Industrial Statistics. If salary-employee were included labour’s share of income 
would be larger, and the share of capital, accordingly, lowered. The exclusion of salary 
employee – provided that their share of the entire labour force was fairly constant – does not 
affect the estimated growth rate of labour productivity.  
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whose usefulness rests on a simple accounting identity.120 Secondly, the interest 
rate is quite time invariant over long stretches of time, while the wage rate, 
perforce, tends to grow at the same rate as average labour productivity (Kaldor 
1957). If r  hardly changes over time it has a small impact on the estimate of 
TFP. Over the long-run a time invariant measure of r  works quite well for the 
manufacturing industry as a whole, be our conception of it the rental cost of 
capital, the profit rate or otherwise. But, as we shift our attention from the 
aggregate into separate industries and from the long to the short run, the idea of 
equilibrium between the rate of interest and profit rates makes no sense. The 
capital owners in a firm are rewarded by their own profit rate, not by the general 
rate of interest. Through direct and indirect evidence we know the profit rate 
exhibits marked upswings and downswings depending on the business cycle, for 
instance. The share of wages in value added provides indirect evidence. 
Obviously, if the wage share goes up and down – and it does – so does the share 
of capital. Those swings are caused by changed magnitudes of the capital to 
output ratio and/or the profit rate. Direct evidence is rare. Gårdlund’s (1947) 
investigation into the profit rate for a number firms points to wide swings in the 
course of time. The only way to circumvent the dearth of independent 
information on the rate of profit for separate industries is to derive it 
endogenously from formula (5.17) which shows the accounting identity in rate-
of-change form. The result of this exercise appears in formula (5.18), where I 
utilise the assumption that gross output and the volume of intermediate 
consumption, and consequently value added, grow at the same rate (see section 
5.5.) The same assumption is also used in formula (5.19) below. 
1 1 α β α
β β β
  − −
= − + − − + − −     
     Q M d d K
Q M d d K
p p V V pr L w K
r p p V L w V K p
 (5.18) 
Formula (5.18) shows – somewhat discouragingly, perhaps – that the paucity 
of independent information on the rate of profit makes the computation of TFP 
still depend on the capital stock and the number of workers. The result also 
illustrates how the rate of change of a large number of components influences 
the evolution of the profit rate. It rises with prices of final output, Qp , and falls 
with prices of intermediate consumption, Mp , and prices of capital goods, Kp . It 
furthermore rises with the share of profit (growth of labour productivity less 
growth of wages) and capital productivity (growth of output less growth of 
capital stock). After inserting the growth of r  so defined into formula (5.17) we 
arrive at formula (5.19): 
                                                 
 
120 Voth and Antràs (2003 p. 60) seem to be aware of that problem but ignore it. 
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   
− − = − + −      
     
d d d
d d d
V V VL K L Ka b a b
V L K V L V K
,  (5.19) 
where a α
α β= +  and b
β
α β= + . 
What remains is a neat expression which tells us that TFP computed the dual 
way (right hand side) is the weighted sum of the growths of labour productivity 
and capital productivity, where each component is weighted by its share of 
income. Hence we have reverted to the same expression as in formula (5.14) and 
the effort that was made to escape our reliance on the capital stock is belittled. 
Nevertheless, if we take just a final assumption on board, there are really 
grounds for closing this section in a more hopeful mood. If we assume that the 
output to capital ratio remains constant over time, the capital productivity 
component will just go away and we are left with the notion that TFP is nothing 
but the growth of labour productivity times the wage share. This underscores the 
need to attain series of employment to compute labour productivity, which is one 
of the stated objectives of this investigation. It furthermore renders unnecessary 
the series of industry-specific wage series and all the price series, all of which 
were necessary ingredients in the dual approach to TFP. Instead, the crucial 
issue now becomes whether assuming constant output to capital ratio is 
warranted. In the very long-run this assumption is rather uncontested; it remains 
a stylised fact of economic growth since Kaldor (1961). For more narrow time 
spans the ratio may exhibit changes in one or another direction – certainly the 
ratio expands and contrasts in association with the business cycle and the rate of 
utilisation – but in the long-run it probably remains quite stable. At the very 
least, in relation to labour productivity the output to capital ratio is less liable to 
significant and sustainable movements in either direction, and will therefore 
exercise a considerably smaller influence on the estimate of TFP. As will 
become clear below, evidence of the Swedish capital stock in the manufacturing 
industry seems to buttress the assumed constancy in the long-run trend of the 
output to capital ratio for the study period in its entirety. 
5.7. Evidence of productivity in the manufacturing 
industry 
Despite the seemingly endless flow of articles dealing with one or another of the 
various aspects of TFP there are a mere handful of instances where authors have 
addressed its very long-run evolution or pondered on the role it might have 
played in the historical narrative (Field 2003). Before looking closer at the 
evolution of TFP and the light it may cast on Swedish economic development in 
a wider perspective, let us focus first on labour productivity. The measure of 
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labour inputs should reflect working hours. Information on pre-World War I 
working hours is in short supply but an attempt is made in chapter 4 to add our 
fragmentary pieces of evidence together to make a reasonable assessment. That 
series of working hours is used to compute the series of labour productivity 
plotted in graph 5.5. Three productivity regimes are discernible. First a short-
lived acceleration until 1877; then one of moderate increases until the mid-
1890s; and finally a shift to a more upward track which was followed until 1912, 
with the exception of the setbacks during the turmoil preceding and spanning the 
labour conflict in 1909. Table 5.4 breaks down the investigated era in its entirety 
into 11 consecutive five-year time spans and confirms the visual impression; 
acceleration, deceleration and acceleration again, now stronger than ever before. 
Pre-1900 labour productivity growth never exceeded 3.5 per cent annually while 
in 1900–1904 and 1908–1912 it grew by an annual rate of 4.5 and 6.1 per cent 
respectively. Table 5.4 also shows labour’s share of value added and the product 
of it and labour productivity which equals TFP, providing the output to capital 
ratio did not change. It puts further emphasis on the acceleration after the turn of 
the century as a consequence of the rise in labour’s share of income. 
Previous studies for Sweden have shown that TFP in manufacturing 
progressed moderately, if at an accelerating rate, in the decades before World 
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GRAPH 5.5. Labour productivity in the Swedish manufacturing industry, 
1868–1912 (1900=100) 
Note: The series of output consists of industry-specific series of volume of gross output 
weighted by net output shares from 1913. The series of labour input is derived by 
multiplication of the series of number of workers and the series of total annual working hours. 
Sources: The series of output and number of workers are set out in Appendix 5.1, and 
Appendix 5.3 details the sources; working hours: see chapter 4, table 4.7. Net output shares 
from SOU (1923). 
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War I. Schön (2004a) computes TFP by subtracting the growth of labour inputs 
and capital inputs weighted by income shares from the growth of value added in 
constant prices between 1870 and 2000. Here it suffices to compare his result for 
the two sub-periods, 1870–1890 and 1890–1910. He finds that the annual growth 
of TFP was virtually zero in the first sub-period, while it was 0.7 per cent in the 
second. Before him Holmquist (2003) established a similar rate for the latter 
sub-period. Table 5.4 shows my results for the same sub-periods: 0.57 in the first 
and 1.45 in the second. Thus Schön’s and my new results uncover an upturn in 
TFP growth rate after 1890. The issue that begs an answer is how the estimates 
of TFP attained by my approach will change in the event of a systematic change 
in the output to capital ratio. An increase in the true output to capital ratio will 
bias my estimate of TFP downwards, whereas a decrease will bias it upwards. 
The simulation in table 5.5 shows how the estimate of TFP would change in the 
event of a change in the output to capital ratio of 0.5 per cent annually, a rate of 
change of capital productivity which is, I think, on the upper side. If the 
direction of change in the output to capital ratio is reversed halfway through the 
1870–1910 era, first increasing, and then decreasing, the difference between the 
two sub-periods is almost wiped out. TFP would have increased by 0.88 in 
1870–1890 and by 1.18 in 1890–1910. If it moved the other way around, the 
difference would, it hardly needs saying, escalate; from 0.27 in the first sub-
period to 1.72 in the other. A change in the capital to output ratio of the order of 
magnitude suggested here counts.  
TABLE 5.4. Labour productivity, labour’s share of value added and TFP in 
the Swedish manufacturing industry, 1868–1912 
 Annual percentage 
growth rates of labour 
productivity 
Labour’s share of 
income 
Annual percentage 
growth rates of TFP 
1868–1912 2.01 0.43 0.86 
    
1870–1890 1.46 0.39 0.57 
1890–1910 3.14 0.46 1.45 
    
1868–1872 3.19 0.36 1.14 
1872–1876 3.18 0.34 1.09 
1876–1880 -0.02 0.39 -0.01 
1880–1884 2.53 0.40 1.00 
1884–1888 -1.54 0.44 -0.68 
1888–1892 0.99 0.45 0.44 
1892–1896 2.43 0.45 1.09 
1896–1900 2.75 0.45 1.24 
1900–1904 4.49 0.46 2.06 
1904–1908 3.95 0.49 1.93 
1908–1912 6.13 0.50 3.06 
Note: TFP is a product of labour productivity and labour’s share of income. To some extent 
TFP is underestimated because labour’s share of income does not include salary employee.  
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However, attaining a reliable measure of the net stock of tangible assets is 
fraught with great difficulties, as the uncertainty surrounding the available 
measures testifies. Holmquist (2003) is a recent attempt to construct a capital 
stock, for manufacturing as a whole and for groups of industries. Instead of 
using the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM), which calculates the stock of 
produced assets indirectly from investment in preceding accounting periods, he 
takes as his points of departure the three benchmark years of 1879, 1913 and 
1926 for which there exist values of fire insurances. They give an indirect 
measure of the stock of fixed assets at three points in time. He then uses 
horsepower per worker from the Swedish Industrial Statistics to interpolate 
between these benchmarks and shows in a growth accounting exercise that TFP 
took on a modest role in raising output, just 7 per cent. The rapid decline in the 
output to capital ratio explains why TFP was found to have contributed so little. 
To support his evidence Holmquist argues that the era of rapid investments in 
factory buildings and new technology, ushered in by the industrial revolution, 
entailed rapid enlargement of the capital stock in many industries. That, 
combined with more than average growth rates for capital intensive industries, 
may well have lowered the output to capital ratio in the manufacturing industry. 
Labour productivity was raised through the substitution of physical equipment 
for artisan workers. As this initial phase of the industrial revolution was ebbing 
out the growth of output (and labour productivity) owed more to forces we 
usually fail to identify properly but often label technical progress.  
Edvinsson (2005 p. 108) has expounded criticism against Holmquist’s 
evidence, in particular the levels of net stock of machinery and equipment in 
1913 and 1926. They are too high, he claims, making the series of capital stock 
grow unreasonably fast from the earlier benchmark of 1879 to the benchmarks 
of 1913 and 1926. What Homquist identifies as a drop in capital productivity in 
the wake of industrialisation, Edvinsson instead attributes to measurement 
errors. It is surprising though to find controversy in the estimated levels of net 
stock of machinery and equipment for the benchmarks of 1913 and 1926, as in 
all likelihood they rest on more firm evidence than the earlier benchmark of 
TABLE 5.5. Simulation of the impact of changed capital productivity on the 
estimate of TFP 
  Impact on the estimate of TFP if the 
output to capital ratio changes by: 
 
TFP estimated 
assuming constant 
capital to output 
ratio 
 +0.5 % annually -0.5% annually 
1868–1912 0.86  1.15 0.58 
     
1870–1890 0.57  0.88 0.27 
1890–1910 1.45  1.72 1.18 
Note: adding to or subtracting from the TFP estimate in table 5.4 0.5 times capital’s share of 
value added (see formula 5.19). 
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1879; the public investigations in 1913 and 1926 captured a larger share of 
industries than did the investigation in 1879.  
Graph 5.6 compares two output to capital ratios, where the denominator is 
either Holmquist or Edvinsson’s (based on the PIM) real net stock of capital, and 
the nominator is the series of value added in constant prices in manufacturing 
and handicraft from Schön (1988).121 The difference between the two lies at the 
beginning and the end; Holmquist output to capital ratio declines while 
Edvinsson’s remains quite stable. If the truth hovers somewhere in between the 
two measures, we can safely conclude that the assessed rate of TFP change for 
the manufacturing industry for the period as a whole, assuming zero change in 
capital productivity, is at least not too low. The estimates of TFP within my 
accounting framework, for instance those in the 11 consecutive time spans in 
table 5.4, fail to accommodate the short-term movements (if taken at face value) 
in the capital productivity in graph 5.6, but for assessing the long-term evolution 
of TFP the assumption of constancy in capital productivity is plausible. 
Finally some remarks on how the Swedish evidence relates to some previous 
discussions about TFP growth in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
Abramovitz and David (1973, 2000) have championed the idea that economic 
                                                 
 
121  Schön’s (2004a) capital stock is also based on the Perpetual Inventory Method but since he 
does not report the figures his output to capital ratio could not be reproduced here.  
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GRAPH 5.6. Estimates of the output to capital ratio (in fixed prices) for the 
manufacturing industry, 1868–1912 (1900=100) 
Sources: Value added in constant prices: Schön (1988 table I14); Capital stock: Edvinsson 
(2005 www.historia.se); Holmquist (2003 Appendix table 1) 
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growth in the nineteenth century was achieved mainly through greater capital 
intensity. That means workers were aided by an increasing stock of capital at 
their disposal, which contributed to making their efforts more productive. 
Physical capital goods were piled up at a faster rate than the growth of output, 
which entailed negative capital productivity growth rates; as a result, in the 
growth accounting exercise TFP bears little weight in relation to the capital to 
labour ratio (capital intensity), or in relation to capital and labour inputs, 
depending on how one prefers to carry out the computation of TFP. Only in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century did the growth experience turn out to 
be a story more centred on the marked rise in TFP. Output outgrew the 
accumulation of capital goods, and the role played by TFP in boosting real 
output was augmented. With this evidence of TFP growth in mind, Abramovitz 
and David place their interpretative emphasis on the difference between tangible 
and intangible capital formation. The former we associate with investments in 
physical equipment, those that enter our measure of the capital stock. The latter 
comprises investments in education and training and research and development, 
the evidence of which is more indirect, embodied in the capital stock or affecting 
output otherwise, mainly through the residual. They notice a marked shift in 
1890, when a previous growth regime based on increased capital intensity was 
broken, paving the way for another regime which relied more on intangible 
capital formation. In the period 1855–1890 the residual accounted for 35 per 
cent of the recorded labour productivity growth, a share that increased to 69 per 
cent in the period 1890–1927. What Abramovitz and David identify as a raise in 
the significance of TFP after 1890 corresponds to the subsequent gradual 
increase in the output to capital ratio, which was documented in a seminal 
contribution by Gallman (1966). He showed that the output to capital ratio 
declined in the US during most of the nineteenth century and much effort has 
been made to identify the capital-augmenting factors responsible for that decline 
(Gallman 2000). It remained stable after around 1890 and increased in the 
interwar period. An intriguing issue is whether the Abramovitz/David story, 
however firmly rooted in the (North) American context, is a parallel to the 
Swedish growth experience. 
Since total factor productivity, as defined here, is nothing but labour 
productivity multiplied by labour’s remunerative share of value added, it is not 
possible to attribute to TFP and capital intensity their contributions to 
augmenting labour productivity. Yet, by merely looking at the evidence of 
capital productivity in graph 5.6 we can conclude that the answer can only be in 
the negative, the Swedish TFP experience is certainly not a replica of the 
Abramovitz/David American story. A prerequisite for a shift in growth regime 
such as Abramovitz and David depicted, from capital to knowledge intensive, is 
that the capital to output ratio was subjected to a sustainable increase. The 
available evidence of the Swedish output to capital ratio fails to reflect such an 
upturn; it fluctuated considerably but if anything it drifted somewhat 
downwards. What the evidence does show is that the growth of labour 
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productivity accelerated after the 1890s, and chapter 4 also documented that the 
Swedish labour productivity outgrew the American from 1900 to World War I. 
The shares attributable to TFP in the US (increasing) and Sweden (stable) may 
indicate that the Swedish convergence, measured in terms of labour productivity, 
has been somewhat overestimated. The significant upward drift of labour 
productivity in Sweden was due to investments in tangible assets to a greater 
extent than in the US. However, if the capital goods that were piled up at a rate 
paralleling the growth of output hosted all the knowledge, technology and 
productivity potential for increasing growth rates of output, we cannot put much 
faith in our measure of TFP. Furthermore, to draw implications for the historical 
narrative on evidence of output to capital ratios in each country’s manufacturing 
sector is risky. What are required are more thorough investigations into separate 
industries as the physical capital requirements at the aggregate level depend on 
the combined effects of the trends in the output to capital ratios within industries 
as well as changes in the relative importance of industries with different output 
to capital ratios. Although high value added industries grew vigorously at the 
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century Sweden was still 
dependent on large raw material-based industries whose output to capital ratios 
were larger than the average. Their relative importance overshadowed the 
progress made in more dynamic industries. Perhaps the awaited increase in the 
output to capital ratio in the manufacturing industry, the analogy of the 
American experience, occurred in the interwar period when the dynamic 
industries encroached sufficiently on the older raw-material based industries’ 
share of output. 
5.8. Evidence of productivity growth patterns 
The path of the growth of productivity in the manufacturing industry is governed 
by the combined effects of separate industries’ trajectories (within) and the 
shifting weights attributable to each industry (between). This section focuses on 
the former effect, evidence of productivity broken down into annual growth rates 
by industry in five subsequent sub-periods. The account does not intend to detail 
the myriad of possible explanations, with respect to, for instance, new 
technologies, political and institutional settings and conditions in the world 
markets, for the observed pattern of growth rates. Useful such descriptions exist 
elsewhere.122 Instead, a few words about some of the key findings serve our need 
to make the empirical investigation form a suitable background for the last 
                                                 
 
122  If we restrict attention to overviews the best example is Gårdlund’s (1942) colourful portraits 
of nearly all the different manufacturing industries. Other overviews can be found in, for 
instance, Montgomery (1947), Jörberg (1961), Magnusson (1996), Schön (2000b). 
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section, which discusses the extent to which our evidence squares with different 
visions of the growth process.  
The investigated era needs to be divided into sub-periods, short enough to 
catch the dynamics in the differences across industries and long enough to 
mitigate the influence of short-term swings and the fragile nature of our data. If 
the stated purpose of this investigation had been to estimate with accuracy the 
rate at which the different industries’ productivity grew, the choice of time 
periods would have had to incorporate due considerations of the business cycle; 
estimates of exponential trend coefficients are highly sensitive to starting and 
end points. However, the actual aim of the study, to identify the pattern of 
growth rates across industries with respect to two different views on the growth 
process, eases the otherwise firm constraints imposed on the choice of starting 
and end points of the time periods. My choice of time periods reflects, instead, 
the access to additional information on, for instance, firm size which is confined 
to five benchmark years, namely 1872, 1880, 1889, 1897, 1903 and 1912, thanks 
to Jörberg’s (1961) painstaking research into the primary sources underlying the 
publication of the Swedish Industrial Statistics for these years.123 That 
additional information will be employed in a future endeavour to explore the 
determinants of the observed pattern of growth rates, so the benchmarks 
constitute the five overlapping time periods used below. 
Whereas we could buttress the assumption of constancy in the trend of the 
output to capital ratio in the manufacturing industry as a whole with a series of 
capital stock and output, the mass of productivity evidence by industry 
represents a more blurred image with respect to the impact capital productivity 
may have exercised on our estimates of TFP. We cannot exclude the fact that the 
output to capital ratio was subjected to episodes of sharp acceleration and 
deceleration in some or all of the industries during at least one of the 
investigated sub-periods. Henceforth the TFP expression will therefore, when it 
refers computed figures, be accompanied by an asterisk to signal the slender 
foundation on which its estimated dimension rests. Since a particular industry’s 
growth rate should be interpreted with caution, the primary objective of what 
follows must therefore be merely a commitment to uncover the underlying 
pattern of productivity growth rates. 
The mosaic of different growth records calls for a useful tool that can bring 
order to the complexities and puzzles we all associate with economic growth. 
We need an expression able to capture the essence of a wide variety of growth 
experiences. Harberger’s dichotomy, yeast versus mushroom, provides an 
instrument to set apart two possible images with respect to the pattern 
productivity growth rates over time and across industries brought forth in the 
                                                 
 
123  Jörberg (1961 p. 218) proposed a different division of the 1869-1912 period. He explored 
various aspects of the Swedish manufacturing industry in five time spans based on the 6 
troughs in the business cycles, namely 1869, 1879, 1887, 1893, 1901 and 1909. 
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five overlapping time periods.124 A yeast-like process is one in which growth 
rates are quite uniformly distributed; there is communality in TFP experiences 
across a majority of industries in a particular time period. Furthermore, the rank 
of industries in TFP growth rates remains similar over time, which means that 
there is persistence from time to time of the leaders and those lagging behind. In 
contrast, mushroom-like patterns are characterised by large distances between 
those industries that achieve high rates of TFP growth rates and those that 
underachieve. The large variability in rates of TFP growth rates attributes a 
significant importance to the impact of underachievers on the average growth 
rate of the economy. There are also frequent shifts in the ranks of industries 
according to their achieved growth rate; leading industries in one time period 
may slip into decay in the other and vice versa, time and again as we shift from 
one period to another. The methodology used to uncover the pattern of growth 
experiences draws inspiration from Harberger’s view that TFP embodies real 
cost reductions, achieved by each production unit to reduce the required amount 
of labour, capital or material per unit of final produce. The following section 
expounds on the foundation of real cost reduction. 
5.8.1. Real cost reductions in 1872-1880 
The cost reductions (or increases) undertaken by each firm or industry are 
additive. Table 5.6, showing the full sample of 26 industry experiences in the 
first sub-period, 1872–1880, makes it possible to appreciate the notion behind 
treating real cost reductions as additive. Column (1) shows annual growth rates 
of TFP* by industry in descending order, while column (2) reports their initial 
value added in 1872.125 The first step is to compute the magnitude of each 
industry’s real cost reduction expressed in initial (1872) prices (column 3).126 It 
illustrates how much output would have increased between 1872 and 1880 had 
the industry operated with the same quantity of inputs as in 1872. Columns (4) 
and (6) are the cumulative sums of initial value added and real cost reductions. 
In column (5) the cumulative sums of column (4) are scaled to percentages. Thus 
100*0.5/7.94 gives 6.29, the percentage share of the paper pulp industry’s 
cumulative sum of real cost reductions. Column (7) similarly shows the 
                                                 
 
124  As this investigation only covers the experiences of entire industries, it is not possible to say 
anything about the performance of separate firms. We do not know if a commonality of TFP 
experiences was more prevalent than diverse ones within industries. 
125  All estimates of annual productivity growth rates are derived by running a regression of the log 
of productivity on time. Then (Exp(b)–1)*100 gives the annual percentage growth rate of 
productivity. 
126  Colum (1) reports annual growth rates. For instance the paper pulp industry grew 6.02 per cent 
annually in 1872–1880 and its value added in 1872 was 0.83 million kronor. Then, 
0.83*1.06058–0.83 yields 0.50, the amount of cost reduction the paper pulp industry achieved 
in the same period. 
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percentage shares of the cumulative sums of value added in column (6). 
Columns (5) and (7) give us immediate insights into the distribution of real cost 
reductions. We may, for instance, infer from them that the 16 first industries in 
the table, accounting for 36.04 per cent of total value added in 1872, together 
contributed 100.8 per cent of the total real cost reduction. Even if another four 
industries also achieved real cost reductions, their contributions were offset by 
the remaining ones suffering from real cost increases. 
The implicit growth pattern in table 5.6 can be comprehended more easily 
through a graphical visualisation (graphs 5.7–5.11). Plotting the cumulative 
sums of real cost reductions from table 5.6 (column 4 and 6) along a straight line 
would make the graph bear a close resemblance to the Lorenz curve. It is also 
illustrative to include a measure of the average growth rate of TFP* in the graph. 
This is done by computing the weighted TFP* growth rate (initial value added as 
weights) for each period; then creating a right vertical axis labelled with this 
annual growth rate; and finally scaling the cumulative real cost reductions so as 
to comply with the same annual growth rate. The vertical axes are furthermore 
scaled identically in all sub-periods, rendering the shapes of the different graphs 
comparable. The straight line represents the hypothetical situation in which all 
industries achieve the same rate of TFP* growth. The area between the curve 
and the straight line is the combined effect of variations in size of the industry 
and the TFP* growth rate. The slope of the straight line visually assesses how 
fast aggregate TFP* grew annually: the steeper the slope of the line the faster 
was TFP* progress. A downward sloping line would signal negative annual  
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GRAPH 5.7. Pattern of real cost reductions, 1872–1880 
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TABLE 5.6. Real cost reductions by industry, 1872–1880 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 Industry 
Annual 
TFP* 
growth 
rates (%) 
Value 
added  
1872, 
mil. kr 
Real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum  
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
%-age 
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum of 
initial 
value 
added 
Cum. 
 %- age 
of initial 
value 
added 
2 Pulp 6.05 0.83 0.50 0.50 6.29 0.83 0.42 
3 Prod. of leather, fur 4.80 0.18 0.08 0.58 7.30 1.01 0.51 
4 Coal 3.15 0.76 0.21 0.79 10.00 1.77 0.89 
5 Refined wood prod. 3.05 1.04 0.28 1.08 13.57 2.81 1.42 
6 Clothing 2.67 1.47 0.35 1.42 17.92 4.28 2.16 
7 Chemicals and fert. 2.40 0.49 0.10 1.53 19.21 4.77 2.41 
8 Paper 2.05 4.25 0.75 2.27 28.64 9.02 4.55 
9 Bricks 2.00 1.19 0.21 2.48 31.22 10.21 5.16 
10 Sawmills* 1.47 28.49 3.53 6.01 75.71 38.71 19.54 
11 Dairy* 1.22 1.25 0.13 6.14 77.31 39.95 20.17 
12 Iron mines 1.16 4.52 0.44 6.58 82.78 44.47 22.45 
13 Matches 1.12 2.82 0.26 6.84 86.09 47.29 23.87 
14 Textile 0.75 10.77 0.66 7.50 94.44 58.07 29.31 
15 Tobacco 0.68 4.51 0.25 7.75 97.60 62.58 31.59 
16 Paint 0.39 0.12 0.00 7.76 97.65 62.70 31.65 
17 Sugar 0.36 8.68 0.25 8.01 100.80 71.39 36.04 
18 Charcoal* 0.25 10.11 0.20 8.21 103.33 81.49 41.14 
19 Iron and steel work 0.10 63.49 0.50 8.71 109.63 144.98 73.19 
20 Breweries 0.04 2.32 0.01 8.72 109.73 147.30 74.36 
21 Flour mills* 0.00 26.68 0.00 8.72 109.72 173.98 87.82 
22 Spirit* -0.06 7.13 -0.03 8.68 109.29 181.11 91.42 
23 Soap and detergent -0.09 0.88 -0.01 8.67 109.21 181.99 91.87 
24 Mech. eng. ironware -0.48 13.03 -0.49 8.18 102.99 195.02 98.45 
25 Tannery -0.48 0.93 -0.04 8.15 102.54 195.96 98.92 
26 Glass -0.50 1.15 -0.05 8.10 101.97 197.11 99.50 
27 Chinaware and tile -2.12 0.99 -0.16 7.94 100.00 198.10 100.00 
Note: Unless otherwise stated output and employment are taken from Bidrag till Sveriges officiella 
statistik. D. Fabriker och manufakturer. (*) implies that output from other sources is combined 
with my estimates of employment (see section 5.3), thus entailing a higher degree of uncertainty. 
TFP is defined as the growth of labour productivity times labour’s share of value added, where 
labour productivity is defined as the growth of volume of gross output divided by number of 
workers. The straight lines in column (5) indicates when 100 percent of cumulative sum of real 
cost reduction has been achieved and the straight line in column (7) the corresponding percentage 
of the cumulative sum of value added in initial prices. 
growth rates. The left vertical axis represents percentiles of cumulative real cost 
reductions while the x-axis shows the percentiles of initial value added. The 
dashed line crosses the left vertical axis when 100 per cent of cumulative real 
cost reductions have been achieved. A large area between the dashed line and 
the curve gives life to the idea of a strikingly uneven distribution across 
industries according to the extent to which they achieved significant real cost 
reductions. It would probably make most of us inclined to gravitate towards the 
mushroom side of Harberger’s dichotomy. It also indicates that significant real 
cost reductions were highly concentrated to relatively few industries, implying 
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that the majority did not enjoy any significant real cost gains, and that some may 
even have suffered from real cost increases. If, on the other hand, the area 
between the curve and the dashed line is small, the growth pattern is more even, 
characterised by a commonality in TFP* growth experiences. 
The 1870s marked the beginning of a growth process characterised by 
advances across a broader frontier of the economy.127 Still, most industries, 
including those that would become high-flyers in the decades to come, were 
small and relied mostly on handicraft-like production technologies. That 
circumscribed their potential to gather a sustainable acceleration in the rate of 
output and hence productivity growth. Additionally, the moderate size of many 
industries makes the assessment of their TFP* growth rates more prone to errors. 
That said, the average growth rate looks somewhat bleak, 0.46 per cent annually. 
The growth pattern which asserts itself between 1872 and 1880 is quite uneven. 
The paper pulp industry grew vigorously but the breakthrough of new chemical 
(sulphite) pulp was still in its infancy. As number two in rank comes, perhaps as 
a surprise, products of leather and fur, a small scale and consumer based  
 
                                                 
 
127  The following sections, 5.8.1–5.8.5, discuss briefly some quite well-known features of the 
Swedish economic development without references being made to the literature. They also 
contain some descriptions, based on Gårdlund (1942) unless otherwise stated, of technological 
developments within some of the most important industries. 
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TABLE 5.7. Real cost reductions by industry, 1880–1889 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Industry 
Annual 
TFP* 
growth 
rates (%) 
Value 
added  
1880, 
mil. kr 
Real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum  
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum.  
%-age 
of  
real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum of 
initial 
value 
added 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of 
initial 
value 
added 
1 Paint 4.68 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.99 0.14 0.06 
2 Coal 3.49 1.13 0.41 0.48 6.72 1.27 0.58 
3 Metal 3.09 0.70 0.22 0.70 9.81 1.97 0.91 
4 Prod. of leather, fur 3.03 0.27 0.08 0.78 10.98 2.24 1.03 
5 Quarrying  2.45 0.60 0.14 0.93 13.01 2.83 1.31 
6 Clothing 2.26 1.26 0.28 1.21 16.96 4.10 1.89 
7 Dairy* 1.75 1.93 0.33 1.54 21.54 6.03 2.78 
8 Paper 1.35 5.00 0.64 2.18 30.57 11.03 5.08 
9 Glass 1.31 1.46 0.18 2.36 33.11 12.49 5.76 
10 Chemicals and fert. 1.13 1.17 0.12 2.48 34.86 13.66 6.30 
11 Bricks 1.10 1.74 0.18 2.66 37.39 15.40 7.10 
12 Pulp 0.71 1.38 0.09 2.75 38.65 16.77 7.73 
13 Sawmills* 0.63 37.51 2.17 4.93 69.13 54.28 25.02 
14 Tannery 0.61 0.80 0.04 4.97 69.76 55.08 25.39 
15 Mech. eng. ironware 0.53 21.20 1.04 6.01 84.37 76.29 35.16 
16 Iron and steel work 0.47 48.92 2.13 8.14 114.26 125.20 57.71 
17 Textile 0.45 10.23 0.42 8.57 120.16 135.43 62.42 
18 Chinaware and tile 0.35 2.09 0.07 8.63 121.10 137.52 63.38 
19 Tobacco 0.19 6.45 0.11 8.74 122.65 143.96 66.35 
20 Iron mines 0.02 3.24 0.01 8.75 122.74 147.20 67.85 
21 Sugar 0.01 9.17 0.01 8.75 122.81 156.37 72.07 
22 Spirit* -0.03 6.05 -0.02 8.74 122.56 162.42 74.86 
23 Refined wood prod. -0.08 3.45 -0.03 8.71 122.20 165.87 76.45 
24 Matches -0.15 5.60 -0.07 8.64 121.15 171.47 79.03 
25 Flour mills* -0.17 32.25 -0.48 8.16 114.47 203.72 93.90 
26 Breweries -0.34 2.36 -0.07 8.09 113.47 206.08 94.98 
27 Soap and detergent -0.38 0.78 -0.03 8.06 113.10 206.86 95.35 
28 Charcoal*  -1.06 9.72 -0.89 7.17 100.59 216.59 99.83 
29 Cement -1.31 0.37 -0.04 7.13 100.00 216.96 100.00 
 
industry. The industries achieving high productivity growth rates were all 
modest in size; the first eight industries accounted for merely 10 per cent of 
initial value added. The value added of the 16 industries responsible for 100 per 
cent of cumulative real cost reductions amounted to merely 36.04 per cent of 
total initial value added, hence the curve symbolizing the cumulative sum of real 
cost reductions crosses the dashed vertical line early. In contrast, the large 
industries, which in descending order were iron and steel works, sawmills and 
flour mills, alone accounted for 60 per cent of initial value added. None of them 
grew particularly fast, but the ground on which our knowledge about their 
developments rests is quite thin. Most surprising is perhaps the negative  
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productivity growth of mechanical engineering and iron industry, at least with 
the rapid expansion of railways in the 1870s in mind. It would, however, aspire 
to become one of the forerunners around the turn of the century. 
5.8.2. 1880–1889 
For the period between 1880 and 1889, the growth pattern looks quite similar to 
the previous period, which may partly be explained by the similar weak growth 
rate of the whole; it decelerated from 0.41 to 0.33. The sample of industries is 
expanded to comprise the cement industry, the metal industry and the stone 
quarrying industry. Once again 16 industries accounted for 100 per cent of real 
cost reductions. These 16 industries constituted 57.71 per cent of initial value 
added. Once again the overachievers were all small industries. Eleven of the 12 
highest ranked industries – the paper industry aside – had a value added below 2 
million kronor. Together these twelve industries’ share of the total sum of initial 
value added was no more than 7.7 per cent. The impressive growth of the pulp 
industry was brought to a halt despite the advance of the sulphite method, and 
the paint industry took over its role as front-runner. The leather product industry, 
the coal industry and the clothing industry enjoyed productivity growth rates 
above two per cent annually in the first sub-period as well as in this one. Two of 
the six industries which suffered from real cost increases in the first period 
joined another six industries whose TFP* growth rates turned negative in this 
period. The mechanical engineering and iron ware industry climbed the table 
somewhat. The larger degree of overshooting above the 100 per cent real cost 
reductions can be explained by the productivity performance of the iron and 
steel work industry. Its large size and improved growth rate enlarges the area 
between the curve and the dashed line. 
5.8.3. 1889–1897 
In the third sub-period, from 1889 to 1897, the growth of productivity reached 1 
per cent annually, thus accelerating in relation to the previous decades. This sub-
period spans part of the important 1890s and precedes the years around the turn 
of the century when Swedish industrialisation gathered momentum. The sample 
of industries is extended by six new industries: the electro mechanical industry, 
the shoe industry, the explosives industry, the chocolate and candy industry, the 
slaughter house industry, the printing industry and the shipyard industry. It 
required the collected effort of only 13 of the 36 industries, representing 55.8 per 
cent of initial value added, to exceed the 100 per cent of cumulative real cost 
reductions. The reason a smaller number of industries was needed to surpass the 
100 per cent cumulative reduction was the modest improvement in productivity 
of the iron and steel work industry; its sheer size influenced the distribution of 
the cumulative sum of real cost reductions. 
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TABLE 5.8. Real cost reductions by industry, 1889–1897 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Industry 
Annual 
TFP* 
growth 
rates (%) 
Value 
added  
1889, 
mil. kr 
Real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
Sum 
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum of 
initial 
value 
added 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of  
initial 
value 
added 
1 Metal 6.26 2.07 1.29 1.29 5.06 2.07 0.73 
2 Cement 6.00 0.76 0.45 1.75 6.83 2.83 1.01 
3 Electro mechanical 5.12 0.26 0.13 1.88 7.34 3.10 1.10 
4 Shoes 4.23 0.09 0.03 1.91 7.47 3.18 1.13 
5 Pulp 3.53 4.51 1.44 3.35 13.10 7.69 2.73 
6 Iron and steel work 3.37 44.80 13.62 16.97 66.32 52.49 18.62 
7 Iron mines 2.31 3.18 0.64 17.61 68.81 55.67 19.75 
8 Paint 2.03 0.21 0.04 17.65 68.95 55.88 19.82 
9 Prod. of leather, fur 1.87 0.62 0.10 17.75 69.34 56.51 20.04 
10 Paper 1.86 6.39 1.02 18.76 73.32 62.90 22.31 
11 Tannery 1.17 1.02 0.10 18.86 73.70 63.92 22.67 
12 Sawmills* 1.09 58.57 5.30 24.16 94.41 122.48 43.44 
13 Mech. eng. ironware 1.02 34.92 2.96 27.12 105.97 157.40 55.83 
14 Charcoal*  0.97 7.14 0.58 27.69 108.22 164.54 58.36 
15 Glass 0.96 1.81 0.14 27.84 108.78 166.35 59.01 
16 Quarrying  0.85 1.64 0.11 27.95 109.23 168.00 59.59 
17 Breweries 0.79 4.76 0.31 28.26 110.44 172.76 61.28 
18 Dairy* 0.60 5.25 0.26 28.52 111.45 178.01 63.14 
19 Matches 0.46 6.11 0.23 28.75 112.34 184.12 65.31 
20 Explosives 0.42 0.28 0.01 28.76 112.38 184.41 65.41 
21 Sugar 0.31 14.72 0.37 29.13 113.83 199.13 70.63 
22 Bricks 0.30 2.11 0.05 29.18 114.03 201.24 71.38 
23 Clothing 0.25 2.58 0.05 29.23 114.24 203.82 72.29 
24 Textile 0.21 9.04 0.15 29.39 114.83 212.85 75.50 
25 Chemicals and fert. 0.19 3.37 0.05 29.44 115.02 216.22 76.69 
26 Flour mills* 0.09 30.61 0.22 29.65 115.88 246.83 87.55 
27 Tobacco 0.01 6.14 0.01 29.66 115.91 252.97 89.73 
28 Chinaware and tile -0.52 3.17 -0.13 29.53 115.40 256.14 90.85 
29 Chocolate and candy -0.60 0.40 -0.02 29.51 115.32 256.54 90.99 
30 Spirit -0.72 5.38 -0.30 29.21 114.14 261.92 92.90 
31 Pork butcheries -0.81 1.80 -0.11 29.10 113.70 263.72 93.54 
32 Soap and detergent -0.87 1.00 -0.07 29.03 113.44 264.72 93.90 
33 Shipyard -0.93 2.25 -0.16 28.87 112.81 266.97 94.69 
34 Book printing -2.63 5.67 -1.09 27.78 108.56 272.64 96.70 
35 Refined wood prod. -2.86 6.86 -1.42 26.36 103.00 279.50 99.14 
36 Coal -4.62 2.43 -0.77 25.59 100.00 281.93 100.00 
 
At the top of table 5.8 we find the metal industry, followed by four relatively 
recently established industries: the cement industry, the electro mechanical 
industry, the shoe industry and the pulp industry. These industries’ different 
characteristics underpin the difficulties in explaining the observed growth 
pattern. The electro mechanical industry is the epitome of the Swedish triumph 
of engineering in an era often referred to as the Second Industrial Revolution 
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(Landes 1969) in economic history literature. Just recently founded, it began to 
grow swiftly during the 1890s, accompanied by successive improvements in 
productivity and an unending flow of product innovations. It would become one 
of the most important export industries in the twentieth century. The premise of 
expansion of the paper pulp industry was, needless to add, the previously ample 
but at the time rapidly declining Swedish forest supply, but the breakthrough 
cannot be understood without taking into reckoning its close connection to the 
chemical industry. During the 1990s the chemical methods, sulphite and 
sulphate, encroached on the output share of the mechanical method. The shoe 
industry represented a domestic consumer goods industry whose production was 
safeguarded against foreign competition by tariffs of a fair size. This former 
handicraft-based industry belonged to the group of industries whose 
performance stands out in the last three sub-periods. The tariffs may have been 
conducive to development and improvements of productivity followed vigorous 
growth of output. The first cement industry was established in 1873 but another 
five industries came into being at the end of the 1880s and during the 1890s. 
Cement came to an increasing extent to be used in all kinds of construction 
works, not the least in social overhead construction. At the other end of the scale 
nine industries experienced real cost increases, four of which did so in at least 
one of the previous sub-periods, namely the chinaware and tile industry, the 
spirit industry, the soap and detergent industry and the refined wood products 
industry. Apart from the coal industry there is no previous evidence of the 
remaining laggards. Needless to add, we cannot exclude the fact that their weak 
and even negative productivity records may in fact reflect measurement errors. It 
is not entirely likely that an industry suffers from recurrent real cost increases. It 
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GRAPH 5.9. Pattern of real cost reductions, 1889–1897 
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is not probable either that they belong to the club of industries enjoying 
considerable progress. 
 
TABLE 5.9. Real cost reductions by industry, 1897–1903 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Industry 
Annual 
TFP* 
growth 
rates (%) 
Value 
added  
1897, 
mil. kr 
Real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum  
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum of 
initial 
value 
added 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of 
initial 
value 
added 
1 Electro mechanical 4.17 4.19 1.16 1.16 3.41 4.19 0.92 
2 Mech. eng. ironware 3.95 61.21 16.04 17.20 50.46 65.40 14.43 
3 Matches 3.60 6.09 1.44 18.64 54.69 71.49 15.77 
4 Pulp 3.53 9.83 2.27 20.92 61.35 81.32 17.94 
5 Paper 3.33 10.78 2.34 23.26 68.22 92.10 20.32 
6 Cement 3.27 1.74 0.37 23.63 69.30 93.84 20.71 
7 Shoes 3.17 2.52 0.52 24.15 70.83 96.37 21.26 
8 Paint 2.74 0.39 0.07 24.22 71.03 96.76 21.35 
9 Tannery 2.66 1.57 0.27 24.48 71.82 98.33 21.70 
10 Shipyard 2.65 4.60 0.78 25.27 74.11 102.93 22.71 
11 Margarine 2.43 0.67 0.10 25.37 74.42 103.60 22.86 
12 Chemicals and fert. 2.38 3.41 0.52 25.89 75.93 107.00 23.61 
13 Book printing 2.29 8.78 1.28 27.16 79.67 115.78 25.55 
14 Prod. of leather, fur 2.01 2.02 0.26 27.42 80.43 117.80 25.99 
15 Clothing 1.41 7.95 0.70 28.12 82.47 125.75 27.75 
16 Bricks 1.38 6.16 0.53 28.64 84.02 131.91 29.11 
17 Quarrying  1.35 10.44 0.87 29.51 86.58 142.34 31.41 
18 Flour mills 1.28 35.94 2.86 32.38 94.97 178.29 39.34 
19 Textile 1.25 22.48 1.74 34.11 100.06 200.77 44.30 
20 Iron mines 1.17 8.38 0.61 34.72 101.84 209.15 46.15 
21 Charcoal 1.04 10.30 0.66 35.38 103.78 219.45 48.42 
22 Glass 0.80 4.05 0.20 35.58 104.36 223.50 49.32 
23 Chinaware and tile 0.79 4.30 0.21 35.79 104.97 227.80 50.27 
24 Soap and detergent 0.72 1.72 0.08 35.86 105.19 229.52 50.65 
25 Tobacco 0.56 8.85 0.30 36.16 106.08 238.36 52.60 
26 Refined wood prod. 0.55 10.28 0.34 36.50 107.08 248.65 54.87 
27 Chocolate and candy 0.33 1.74 0.03 36.54 107.18 250.38 55.25 
28 Breweries 0.33 6.03 0.12 36.66 107.54 256.42 56.58 
29 Dairy* 0.06 8.04 0.03 36.69 107.61 264.46 58.36 
30 Sugar -0.07 34.12 -0.14 36.55 107.21 298.58 65.89 
31 Iron and steelworks -0.17 56.77 -0.57 35.98 105.55 355.35 78.41 
32 Spirit -0.18 8.52 -0.09 35.89 105.28 363.88 80.29 
33 Sawmills* -0.21 80.75 -1.00 34.89 102.34 444.63 98.11 
34 Explosives -0.51 1.51 -0.05 34.84 102.21 446.13 98.44 
35 Pork butcheries -1.42 2.31 -0.19 34.65 101.65 448.44 98.95 
36 Rubber -1.46 1.29 -0.11 34.54 101.33 449.73 99.24 
37 Bakery -2.17 1.75 -0.22 34.33 100.70 451.48 99.62 
38 Coal -2.47 1.70 -0.24 34.09 100.00 453.19 100.00 
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5.8.4. 1897–1903 
The 1897–1903 sub-period coincides with the sharp bend of the series of 
average rate of productivity growth in the manufacturing industry in 1899, 
which shifts the ensuing course upwards (graph 5.5). The progress of a wide 
array of industries around the turn of the century makes the period crucial in 
Swedish economic history literature. Sweden was leaving the premature stage of 
development in which raw material based industries governed the direction 
output and productivity growth would take; instead, it was entering a phase 
signified by transformation and refinement. As was shown in chapter 4, Sweden 
rapidly reduced the thitherto wide labour productivity gap vis-à-vis the UK and 
the US. The sample now captures two further industries: the bakery industry and 
the rubber industry. Compared to the previous period the average growth rate of 
TFP* increased slightly, from 0.99 to 1.15 per cent annually. The average 
growth rate of the whole would have been a great deal more impressive without 
the signs of faltering in the sawmill industry and the iron and steelworks 
industry. Their substantial weight in the sample drags down the average growth 
rate. 100 per cent of real cost reductions was the joint effort of 19 industries, or 
fifty per cent of all industries in the sample. Fourteen of the industries, or one 
third, achieved TFP* growth rates above two per cent. Among these top scoring 
industries there were those that we have already become acquainted with, such 
as the paper pulp industry, the cement industry and the electro mechanic 
industry, but there were also newcomers such the paper industry and matches 
industry as well as a rare example of a food industry (margarine) growing by 
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more than two per cent annually. The production of matches underwent a 
spectacular upswing in terms of output and the number of firms after the turn of 
the century. The earlier strike-anywhere matches containing phosphorus in the 
head faded into the background, while paving the way for the safety matches, 
which had to be struck on a specially prepared surface to ignite. Mass production 
techniques, which boosted output significantly, were developed in the 1890s. It 
was a very old industry where innovation in product design and new 
standardised production methods caused a sudden upsurge in output, 
productivity and exports. 
Most important, though, was the progressing mechanical engineering and 
ironware industry, whose importance now was becoming unrivalled; it alone 
accounted for 47 per cent of the cumulative sum of real cost reductions. The 
significant jump that stands out in the graph stems from the large weight it bears; 
the magnitude of its real cost reduction dwarfs the rest in comparison. This 
industry’s asserted dominance over the rest of the industries expands the area 
between the curve and the straight line. It has not been possible to separate the  
mechanical engineering industry from the ironware and foundry industry for 
reasons that are further explicated in Appendix 5.3. The ironware and foundry 
industry delivered iron and steel products, either in the quite crude form of 
manufacturing plates, rails, tubes, wires and nails, or further processed into 
various machine-made products. Mechanical engineering had roots back in the 
1830s, grew steadily in latter half of the nineteenth century, and blossomed in 
the 1890s into being an industry highly competitive in the word market and yet 
able to supply the domestic industries until World War I with an almost infinite 
variety of manufacturing machines, some of which were based on Swedish 
inventions. 
Two of the largest industries, the sawmill industry and the iron and steel 
industry, had to bear a cessation of productivity growth. Their contribution to the 
shape of the productivity pattern is almost zero. Seven further industries endured 
real cost increases; three of them did so anew, the slaughter house industry, the 
spirit industry and the coal industry; four of them did so for the first time, while 
for the remaining two there is no prior evidence. 
5.8.5. 1903–1912 
The last sub-period, 1903–1912, extended and reinforced the rapid growth track 
established in the previous period. The swift development of TFP* covered a 
vaster swath of industries than ever before. The overall TFP* growth of the 
manufacturing industry which had been on a course of steady rise since 1880, 
achieved an annual rate of 1.46, a rate which would have been higher had not the 
sawmill industry burdened it by its sheer size and sedate pace. The pattern is 
extremely even when judged by the number of industries that furnished at least a 
bit of real cost reductions; no less than 32 industries, or 82 per cent of all 
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industries in the sample, took part in the accumulation of 100 per cent real cost 
reduction. Their value added accounted for 93.63 per cent of the total sum of 
value added. If ever the metaphor ‘a yeasty growth process’ has been an apt 
description of the pre-World War I productivity record in the Swedish 
manufacturing industry, it is here. The area between the curve and the dashed 
lined disappears almost altogether. 
The picture of wide-spread progress by industry painted in table 5.10 is 
colourful. Among the 15 industries whose growth rate of productivity exceeded 
2 per cent per annum we find the – by now well-known – cement industry, the 
electro mechanic industry, the matches industry, the shoe industry, mechanical 
engineering and iron industry and the paper industry. But something in the 
environment fostered rapid improvements of productivity for a host of other 
industries too. Unexpected achievements by small players such as the tannery 
industry, the book printing industry and refined wood product industry adds 
colour to the growth picture. If we take just a further step down the ladder we 
also find the first food industry, the slaughter industry; it ranked 17 but recorded 
a respectable annual growth rate of productivity of 1.7 per cent amid booming 
growth rates in general. Only four industries were burden by real cost increases: 
the charcoal industry for which there is no earlier evidence at hand, the spirit 
industry, a notorious underachiever, and the margarine industry, a former fast 
growing industry now descending into lower ranks. A quick scan of the lower 
half of table 5.10 discloses that the majority of industries which failed to  
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TABLE 5.10. Real cost reductions by industry, 1903–1912 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Industry 
Annual 
TFP* 
growth 
rates (%) 
Value 
added  
1903, 
mil. kr 
Real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum  
of real 
cost red. 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of real 
cost 
red. 
Cum. 
sum of 
initial 
value 
added 
Cum. 
%-
ages 
of 
initial 
value 
added 
1 Cement 4.51 2.50 1.22 1.22 1.52 2.50 0.45 
2 Matches 3.28 7.49 2.53 3.74 4.66 10.00 1.79 
3 Electro mechanical 3.22 6.42 2.12 5.87 7.31 16.42 2.93 
4 Paint 2.78 0.54 0.15 6.02 7.50 16.95 3.03 
5 Shipyard 2.69 7.51 2.03 8.04 10.02 24.46 4.37 
6 Shoes 2.65 6.21 1.65 9.69 12.07 30.68 5.48 
7 Book printing 2.60 15.32 3.98 13.67 17.03 46.00 8.22 
8 Paper 2.59 18.16 4.71 18.38 22.89 64.16 11.47 
9 Tannery 2.57 3.37 0.87 19.24 23.97 67.53 12.07 
10 Mech. eng. ironware 2.54 77.03 19.52 38.76 48.29 144.56 25.83 
11 Explosives 2.51 2.02 0.50 39.27 48.92 146.58 26.19 
12 Chemicals and fert. 2.39 7.00 1.66 40.92 50.98 153.58 27.45 
13 Iron mines 2.28 14.03 3.16 44.08 54.92 167.62 29.95 
14 Metal 2.24 8.67 1.92 46.00 57.30 176.28 31.50 
15 Refined wood prod. 2.17 17.17 3.65 49.65 61.85 193.45 34.57 
16 Bricks 1.73 8.43 1.41 51.06 63.61 201.88 36.08 
17 Textile 1.72 36.96 6.13 57.19 71.25 238.84 42.68 
18 Pork butcheries 1.70 2.99 0.49 57.68 71.86 241.83 43.22 
19 Iron and steel work 1.52 52.36 7.62 65.30 81.35 294.19 52.57 
20 Quarrying  1.50 17.58 2.53 67.83 84.50 311.77 55.71 
21 Pulp 1.38 13.51 1.77 69.61 86.71 325.28 58.13 
22 Sugar 1.22 27.95 3.22 72.82 90.72 353.22 63.12 
23 Tobacco 1.01 10.26 0.97 73.79 91.92 363.49 64.96 
24 Clothing 0.98 12.74 1.17 74.96 93.38 376.22 67.23 
25 Rubber 0.82 2.46 0.19 75.14 93.61 378.68 67.67 
26 Dairy 0.79 5.32 0.39 75.54 94.10 384.01 68.62 
27 Bakery 0.74 5.50 0.38 75.91 94.57 389.51 69.61 
28 Glass 0.64 5.22 0.31 76.22 94.95 394.73 70.54 
29 Prod. of leather, fur 0.58 2.09 0.11 76.33 95.09 396.82 70.91 
30 Flour mills 0.53 31.60 1.53 77.86 97.00 428.42 76.56 
31 Chinaware and tile 0.50 4.71 0.22 78.08 97.27 433.13 77.40 
32 Sawmills* 0.44 90.83 3.67 81.75 101.84 523.96 93.63 
33 Soap and detergent 0.24 2.34 0.05 81.80 101.91 526.30 94.05 
34 Breweries 0.17 5.74 0.09 81.89 102.02 532.04 95.08 
35 Coal 0.04 2.72 0.01 81.90 102.03 534.76 95.56 
36 Margarine -0.04 3.26 -0.01 81.89 102.01 538.02 96.15 
37 Chocolate and candy -0.12 2.06 -0.02 81.87 101.98 540.08 96.51 
38 Spirit -0.64 10.80 -0.61 81.26 101.23 550.88 98.44 
39 Charcoal  -1.33 8.71 -0.99 80.27 100.00 559.59 100.00 
 
participate in the upswing belonged to the food industry or consumer goods 
industries in general, an exception being the coal and sawmill industry, although 
the reader has by now become accustomed to coming across these industries at 
the bottom of the table. The other two large and natural resource based 
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industries, iron mines and iron and metalworks, did better in the last sub-period 
than in the previous ones. In iron mining, magnetic prospecting, machine boring 
with steel-drills, blasting with nitroglycerine, electrical rails and elevators were 
some of the most important contrivances. They contributed a competitive edge 
to the iron ore mining that enjoyed increasing export rates thanks to growing 
demand from Germany above all. The large-scale concentration of ironworks 
which took place in the latter half of the nineteenth century probably raised the 
average productivity of each production unit. After the turn of the century the 
new ingot-steel production, based on the methods of Bessemer, Martin and 
Thomas, surpassed the production of bar iron which was based on the 
Lancashire method. Sweden was ahead of many of its competitors in the 
application of the new methods within steel making. 
5.8.6. Summing up the evidence 
The empirical investigation serves to disclose whether there is a recognisable 
pattern of TFP* growth rates formed by the manufacturing industries included in 
the sample. Does the observed pattern make us inclined to gravitate towards the 
mushroom-side of Harberger’s dichotomy; or does the evenness with which 
yeast expands fit better as a portrayal of the Swedish growth process in the 
manufacturing industry. If we start by considering what the shapes of the 
different graphs disclose, it is clear that there is nowhere near any overshooting 
of the same magnitude as in Harberger’s evidence of American industries and 
Mexican firms in the latter half of the twentieth century, when overshooting of 
50–100 per cent sometimes occurred. That overshooting did not amount to more 
than 20 per cent owes much to the relatively narrow span within which growth 
rates ranged. Yet, overshooting is a salient feature in all but the last sub-period 
in the sense that less than fifty per cent of the industries, measured in initial 
value added, were sufficient to accumulate the 100 per cent of real cost 
reductions. Seen through the lens of the measurement tool that Harberger 
proposes, the overall impression that the growth pattern was quite uneven 
predominates. 
Evidence which would furthermore tilt the interpretative emphasis towards 
the mushroom side is a lack of persistence in leadership over time. It is 
straightforward to let Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients test whether the 
rank of industries shifts predominantly as we move from one time span to 
another. None of the correlation coefficients set out in table 5.11 are particularly 
large and none are statistically significant; the test thus fails to single out a 
sustainable rank order among the included industries. This sets into sharp relief 
the disparate pattern of high and low rates of TFP* growth rates across 
industries; the shifts in rank outweigh any tendency towards persistence. 
However, even if the presence of growth experiences of all kinds is an 
indisputable characteristic of Swedish pre-World War industrialisation, we must 
not let that evidence mask salient and recognisable features of the growth record. 
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The 1903–1912 period marks a tendency towards forming a more even pattern 
of productivity growth. The coefficient of variations for TFP growth rates and 
real cost reductions were roughly halved in the last period, as table 5.12 shows. 
Additional evidence is provided by graph 5.11 in which the area between the 
dashed line and the curve almost disappear, which highlights that an 
overwhelmingly large share of the industries (measured by the share of initial 
value added) added to the 100 per cent of the cumulative sum of real cost 
reductions. Few industries experienced real cost increases and those who did so 
were either insignificantly small in size or suffered from insignificantly low rate 
of real cost increases. The evidence of a marked upturn in average growth rate 
after the turn of the century fits well with the rapid Swedish catch up in labour 
productivity vis-à-vis the UK and the US found in chapter 4 for the same period. 
In addition, even if the Spearman rank correlation coefficients fail to single out 
any sustained rank among the industries, there are at least two reasons why 
further considerations should not come to a halt here. First, even small shifts in 
rank affect the size of the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. The quality of 
the data does not permit firm conclusions about minor changes in rank. Second, 
our focus should be set on whether an industry appears in the upper one fourth of 
the table, is anchored in the middle or if it notoriously underachieves. 
When we shift our attention to the broader pattern discernable in tables 5.6–
5.10 a quite clear picture begins to emerge. The 18 industries, whose growth rate 
of TFP* falls below one per cent per annum in at least 50 per cent of the sub-
periods in which they appeared, are found in the first column in table 5.13. Half 
of them belong to the food industry, which is equivalent to saying that, apart 
from the margarine industry, all food industries joined the group of 
underachievers. The preponderance of industries suffering from sluggish 
productivity growth belonged to the consumer goods sector. The second column 
of table 5.13 shows in the same manner the industries which performed 
systematically better than average, with a growth rate exceeding two per cent 
annually.128 With the exception of book printing and the two consumer goods 
                                                 
 
128  It is very likely that the mechanical engineering industry would have joined the club of fast 
growing industries had it been possible to separate it from the iron ware and foundry industry. 
TABLE 5.11. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for the consecutive 
time spans 
 Spearman’s rank coefficient Number of industries 
1872–1880/1880–1889 -0.315 28 
1880–1889/1889–1897 -0.132 31 
1889–1897/1897–1903 0.073 38 
1897–1903/1903–1912 0.115 41 
Note: Spearman’s rank coefficient measures the stability of rank orders of achieved TFP 
growth rates between two different time spans. 
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industries, the shoe industry and the leather and fur industry, all of the 
overachievers belonged to the ‘capital goods sector’ as classified by Jörberg 
(1961 pp. 42–3). The fast growing industries were furthermore quite small; apart 
from the paper, pulp and book printing, all had value added below 10 million 
kronor in 1903 (table 5.10, column 2). Some of them were recently established, 
which explains why their output levels were moderate (cement, shoes, electro 
mechanical), but for most of them the transformation from small scale and 
handicraft-like production methods into mechanisation and mass production 
provides a more generic explanation. That resulted in manifest growth of output 
from very low levels, which encouraged rapid productivity growth rates. It is, 
however, only a small and incomplete menu of possible explanations as a more 
exhaustive coverage of the determinants of our observations is beyond the scope 
of the present investigation. A more encompassing study requires that we 
attribute to each industry a number of qualities and explore causalities within an 
econometric framework. Yet, the elementary classification into overachievers 
and underachievers deployed here brings compelling evidence of a sharp divide 
between the domestic consumer goods industries lagging behind the industries 
which relied on more dynamic properties. 
5.8.7. Searching for common stimuli 
The search for underlying causes motivated the effort to illustrate the prevalence 
of either yeast- or mushroom-like growth patterns. Observations of productivity 
across industries or firms that refuse to obey any easily recognisable order may 
challenge the very idea of modelling, at least those models which pose a strong 
link of the TFP growth rates to one or just a few parameters. In Harberger’s 
(1998 p. 16) own words: ‘it really is a jungle out there’. If we recognise that the 
actual growth record is of a very multifaceted nature, it becomes more far-
fetched to think of simple models predicting a particular outcome as a result of 
externalities flowing from new technologies. The number of restrictions 
necessarily imposed on such a model would make it alien in relation to the 
historical narrative. Whereas economists manifest an unquenchable appetite for 
neat models, economic historians are more reluctant. The belief that the nature 
of economic growth eludes our attempt to capture it may indeed translate into an 
appeal for more history. The concept of General Purpose Technology (GPT) 
                                                                                                                        
 
The mechanical engineering industry’s output grew appreciably faster than the ironware and 
foundry industry’s output. 
TABLE 5.12. Coefficient of variations for TFP* and real cost reduction 
 1872–1880 1880–1889 1889–1897 1897–1903 1903–1912 
TFP* 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.4 0.8 
Real cost reductions 2.3 2.5 3.4 2.9 1.6 
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reflects one of numerous efforts to forward our understanding of the growth 
process. It unites to some degree the idea of a yeasty growth process on the one 
hand and new technology that has great scope for improvement, broad 
externalities and many technological complementarities on the other (Lipsey et 
al. 1998). If the positive externalities which stem from a new technology boost 
TFP growth rates economy-wide, it should result in a quite even growth pattern, 
indicating that a wide spectra of economic activities benefit from this 
technology. In contrast, a situation in which a mere handful of industries reach 
high levels of TFP growth rates is difficult to reconcile with the essence of GPT. 
However, historical studies of important technological breakthroughs, such as 
the steam engine, electricity and information and communication technologies, 
have persuasively shown that their initial impact on the economy is 
inconsequential. Several decades may have to elapse before the full potential of 
a new technology can be realised. One reason for the delayed impact is the 
dependence on investments in technologies that are complementary to the 
GPT.129 By implication, it is risky to attempt to match evidence of a productivity 
pattern at the industry or firm level with a GPT. What we perhaps can expect to 
find is a linkage between a uniform yeasty growth pattern and a GPT which is 
about to, or has eventually, realised its complete potential. The challenging task 
of tracking the origin, application, diffusion and eventual realisation of a GPT’s 
ability to generate positive externalities with fare-reaching implications for real 
                                                 
 
129  On the steam engine, see Crafts (2004); on electricity and ICT in general, see David (1990) 
and David and Wright (2003). On electricity in Sweden, see Schön (1990, 2000a), Hjulström 
(1940) and Norgren (1992). 
TABLE 5.13. Overachievers and underachievers with respect to annual growth 
rate of TFP* 
Growth rate of annual TFP* > 2 per cent Growth rate of annual TFP* < 1 per cent 
Cement Charcoal  
Electro mechanical Glass 
Paint Breweries 
Shipyard Dairy 
Shoes Explosives 
Book printing Sugar 
Paper Textile 
Chemicals and fertilizers Flour mills 
Metal Tobacco 
Pulp Chinaware and tile 
Products of leather and fur Chocolate and candy 
 Spirit 
 Pork butcheries 
 Soap and detergent 
 Coal 
 Sawmills and planning mills 
 Rubber 
 Bakery 
Note: The industries are classified as overachievers if their recorded growth rates of TFP 
exceeded 2 per cent annually in at least half of the sub-periods in which they appeared. In the 
same manner, the industries classified as underachievers achieved annual growth rates below 1 
per cent. 
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cost reductions is preferably assigned to economic historians. 
In the last sub-period, 1903–1912, there was commonality of significant real 
cost reductions among a majority of industries, suggesting a possible link 
between this yeast-like expansion and a new technology with great scope for 
externalities. Although the attributes given to a GPT are numerous, arguably 
only the steam engine and electricity could possibly have qualified as GPTs in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Edquist and Henrekson 2006). 
Mechanisation, measured as the increase in horse power per worker, increased 
steadily in the 1870s onwards (Jörberg 1961). It is unknown, though, how large 
a share of the motive power installed came from the steam engine. It affected the 
sawmill industry most, but several other industries also made headway with the 
application of steam. The irregular pattern of productivity progress until the turn 
of the century questions the existence of a GPT, be it steam power or otherwise. 
The role of electricity is more delicate. Contemporaries and most economic 
historians have concurred with each other in the view that the electric unit drive, 
running each machine with individual electric motors, was a lever in production; 
not so much because of the energy and direct cost savings it entailed, but 
because of its great scope for increased flow of production, improved working 
environment, improved machine control and ease of plant expansion (Devine 
1983). It is uncertain though if these effects of indirect savings were also 
sufficiently pervasive in the years preceding World War I to argue that there was 
a link between electrification and the uniform productivity pattern. David (1990) 
and David and Wright (2003) have argued that it would take yet another decade 
or so before electricity possibly could have taken on the role as primus motor in 
manufacturing because the electric group drive, one electric motor running a 
group of machines, which dominated before World War I, did not bring all the 
great cost saving potential of electricity generating motive power. Schön (2000a) 
nevertheless argues that electricity was the new technology on which a new 
development block was created in the 1890s. Electrification of Swedish industry 
proceeded rapidly owing to scarcity of domestic supply of fossil fuel, abundance 
of hydropower and energy-intensive industries. Initially the mechanised 
processes driven by motive power were electrified while the electrification of 
thermal processes in the iron, steel, pulp and paper lagged behind. Around the 
turn of the century roughly 10 per cent of all motive power was electrified and 
by the outbreak of World War I that share had increased to 50 per cent. Norgren 
(1992), for instance, has shown that 80 per cent of the large establishments in the 
mechanical engineering industry had installed electric motors with the explicit 
intention of raising productivity, either in the form of unit drive or group drive. 
In particular, plants producing quite few and homogenous goods adopted 
electricity to enhance efficiency, which underscores the potential electricity had 
to foster mass-production technology. 
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The evenness with which a multitude of industries advanced in 1903–1912, 
along with rapid electrification, represents a possible nexus.130 We know that the 
US and the UK experienced a marked upturn in TFP growth rates in the interwar 
years at the same time as a quite uniform pattern of growth rates among 
industries began to assert itself (Kendirck 1961; Matthews et al. 1982). David 
and Wright (2003) argue that electricity was one of the most important 
determinants of this upsurge and convergence in TFP growth rates. If Sweden 
was somewhat ahead in electrification, it remains in fact a tantalizing possibility 
that the American experience in the interwar years, however celebrated, was in 
fact heralded in the Swedish manifestation of rapid productivity growth rates and 
high degree of uniformity among industries after 1900. It remains to be seen in 
future work whether this bold conjecture withstands scrutiny. 
5.9. Conclusions 
For economic historians it is common knowledge that country experiences of 
industrialisation rest on foundations which are highly localised and idiosyncratic 
to particular trajectories and cultures. Yet the quest for similar patterns and 
generic explanations continues with relentless zeal. Arnold Harberger has 
presented two clear visions of the growth process: growth across firms and 
industries is either uneven and resembles mushrooms or it is even and resembles 
yeast. Based on the evidence from American manufacturing industries and 
Mexican firms in the manufacturing sector in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, he envisions a nature of the growth process closely resembling the 
mushroom metaphor. That vision is a challenge to the whole idea of searching 
for common underlying factors to account for the observed pattern of growth 
rates. Harberger argues that if the observed cost reductions among industries 
refuse to form any easily recognisable pattern, it becomes far fetched to think of 
a single underlying cause impinging on the conditions of progress. The quest for 
simple models to explain economic growth would therefore be elusive. The 
mushroom vision of the growth process is partly at odds with another idea that 
has crept into the language of economists and economic historians recently, 
namely that of general purpose technology (GPT). A prerequisite for thinking in 
GPT terms – a technology that initially has scope for improvement, eventually 
becomes widely used and has broad externalities – is that our evidence of cost 
reductions among firms or industries forms a quite uniform pattern. 
                                                 
 
130  Edquist and Henreksson 2006 attempted to measure the link between electrification and labour 
productivity growth by branches in manufacturing between 1913 and 1939. They found no 
significant link between the growth of electric motor capacity and the growth of labour 
productivity.  
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The number of historical investigations into the nature of productivity growth 
at the firm of industry level is limited, especially in the pre-World War I era. 
Thanks to the early and regular publication of Industrial Statistics, the Swedish 
growth record deserves close scrutiny. As previous writers have made clear, the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics suffers from a number of flaws which makes it an 
insufficient source of information on output and employment. A great deal of 
attention has therefore been given to measurement issues. Although some of 
them remain unresolved, the strength of the arguments adduced and the 
consistent manner in which evidence has been gathered make me inclined to 
sum up the major findings with assurance. 
Labour productivity in the manufacturing industry progressed reluctantly 
until the mid-1890s after which it was set onto a more upward track until 1912. 
Unlike in the US in about 1890, there is nothing in the Swedish evidence to 
indicate the existence of a shift from one growth regime, where the growth of 
labour productivity was mostly due to increasing capital intensity, to another, 
where TFP, through investments in intangible capital assets, played a more 
dominant role. The absence of a long-term tendency of change in the Swedish 
output to capital ratio defies the idea that Sweden underwent a similar transition. 
The measurement tool which Harberger proposes, based on the cumulative 
sum of real cost reductions, laid bare the pattern of real cost reductions across 
industries in five overlapping time periods between 1872 and 1912. Quite 
dissimilar rates of real cost reductions among industries prevailed until the turn 
of the century. With less than fifty per cent of the industries (measured as share 
of initial value added) sufficient to account for one hundred per cent of real cost 
reductions in all but the last sub-period, the image which comes to mind is 
inevitably more reminiscent of mushrooms than of yeast. Furthermore, the 
formal test, stability versus variety in the ranks of TFP performances, favours 
variety; shifts in ranks were commonplace. The absence of any clear tendency to 
form a more uniform pattern adds the Swedish case to the list of instances 
supporting Harberger’s vision of the growth process as something very elusive 
and difficult to model. This then casts doubt on the usefulness of searching for a 
specific underlying factor, attribute to it a quality that is sui generis and has far-
reaching consequences for productivity growth rates, and let it succinctly explain 
the observed pattern of growth rates. To a certain degree the result weakens the 
probability that a GPT was in operation in the decades which pre-dated the 
acceleration of productivity and formation of an even pattern of real cost 
reductions around the turn of the century. 
Still, the quest for generic patterns and succinct explanations should not cease 
because of this. A different approach used to distinguish between those 
industries that persistently underachieved and overachieved, one that selects 
those industries that achieved below one and above two per cent annual growth 
rates of productivity in at least 50 per cent of the sub-periods in which they 
appeared, illuminates some distinguished aspects of the Swedish 
industrialisation. Half of the 18 industries, which were burdened repeatedly by 
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moderate real cost reductions or even real cost increases, belonged to the food 
industry. Of the remaining ones at least half were consumer goods industries. Of 
the 13 industries that frequented the upper part of the productivity growth rank 
table, only two were consumer goods industries. Of the remaining ones most 
were modest in size, some newly established, others subjected to far reaching 
technological transformations, and in general seem to have been more capital 
and knowledge intensive. Thus, behind the mushroom-like advance of Swedish 
industrialisation before the turn of the century a rift was beginning to emerge 
between the slow growing, mostly, consumer goods industries on the one hand 
and the fast growing industries with dynamic attributes on the other. In addition, 
an equally clear finding is that the upsurge in the average growth rate of 
productivity after 1900 was accompanied by the formation of a strikingly even 
productivity growth pattern. In the period 1903–1912 no less than 82 per cent of 
all industries in the sample, their value added accounting for 93.63 per cent of 
the total sum of value added, took part in the accumulation of the 100 per cent 
real cost reduction. That may point to positive externalities flowing from 
investments in new technology affecting broad spectra of different processes. 
Some authors argue that electricity, at least in Sweden, may have been a lever 
for productivity improvements in the decade before World War I. The evidence 
of a yeasty growth process presented here bolsters this argument. 
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Appendix 5.1. Output, price deflator and 
employment in manufacturing 
TABLE A.5.1. Output, prices and employment in the Swedish manufacturing 
industry, 1868–1912 
 Gross output in 
current prices 
(‘000 000) 
Net output in 
current prices 
(‘000 000) 
Volume of net 
output, 
1868=100 
Gross output 
deflator, 
1868=100 
Number of 
workers (‘000) 
1868 359.0 119.4 100.0 100.0 123.2 
1869 397.4 130.8 111.1 94.3 125.1 
1870 402.7 131.6 115.3 95.2 129.5 
1871 441.3 142.8 121.6 101.1 136.8 
1872 561.3 200.2 136.0 117.5 146.0 
1873 634.1 235.1 142.6 129.1 152.5 
1874 673.2 244.8 156.2 124.9 158.8 
1875 650.4 232.9 164.6 114.4 162.7 
1876 630.3 225.2 166.3 111.5 163.2 
1877 636.5 223.0 170.6 108.1 163.2 
1878 514.8 172.4 154.5 96.2 154.0 
1879 505.4 175.5 157.4 93.7 154.5 
1880 571.3 217.9 161.1 106.1 160.0 
1881 636.0 210.3 183.7 99.5 168.1 
1882 637.8 229.5 188.9 100.6 172.0 
1883 646.8 237.3 189.6 100.1 173.5 
1884 629.5 216.2 198.8 93.2 177.3 
1885 659.3 222.1 205.5 89.1 180.1 
1886 589.2 210.6 192.5 85.0 178.2 
1887 590.2 222.0 193.8 84.4 179.1 
1888 628.1 242.4 200.3 88.0 191.6 
1889 704.6 278.0 221.4 92.0 204.6 
1890 764.5 300.2 232.7 93.3 210.3 
1891 793.9 292.0 238.2 91.3 223.0 
1892 832.7 297.4 242.1 88.5 223.8 
1893 817.6 294.4 252.0 84.6 225.1 
1894 856.5 334.8 265.1 85.1 233.6 
1895 874.3 351.9 276.7 85.7 245.6 
1896 996.1 413.1 316.3 88.1 266.7 
1897 1115.2 454.7 347.9 88.7 285.8 
1898 1213.4 481.2 369.7 91.4 303.4 
1899 1287.3 498.6 385.6 96.3 308.2 
1900 1413.4 555.0 412.9 99.0 316.2 
1901 1360.2 519.5 407.9 94.2 313.5 
1902 1383.3 535.4 425.0 91.9 312.7 
1903 1437.8 554.4 456.6 90.9 315.5 
1904 1510.7 580.4 486.9 90.5 321.8 
1905 1530.6 588.7 480.6 92.4 323.8 
1906 1763.7 681.2 545.1 96.1 343.5 
1907 1903.8 722.8 609.9 97.4 348.4 
1908 1804.1 668.2 565.4 97.2 341.0 
1909 1720.7 635.1 527.6 96.8 332.3 
1910 2009.9 746.7 631.6 95.5 344.2 
1911 2053.5 755.5 660.1 94.9 346.1 
1912 2212.4 801.6 708.5 96.3 354.8 
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Appendix 5.2. Margins of error 
Many of the components which underlie the final exploration of productivity are 
evidently subject to errors, because of measurement errors, omission of 
important variables or other information, or a flawed procedure. These errors 
may, furthermore, be either randomly or systematically distributed. Random 
errors have the desirable statistical property of a zero mean and are roughly 
symmetrical in distribution, thus making it possible to invoke normal statistical 
conventions regarding the distribution of errors. Systematic errors may cause a 
lot of harm to the accuracy of our final conclusions. These errors are under the 
influence of common underlying factors which make them form a particular 
pattern (Thomas & Feinstein 2002).  
The discussion so far has thus unfolded a number of areas in which the 
margin of error may be considerable. Sometimes tentative estimates of gross 
output underlie projections of employment as well as attempts to compute value 
added. In addition, it is not always straightforward to disentangle the truth from 
the Swedish Industrial Statistics. The margin of error for series of employment 
and value added can be large, perhaps as much as 25 percent. One way to check 
the consistency of the series of gross output and value added and employment is 
to compute the share of wages in value added for the different industries. Since 
the wage bill in 1913 is known (SOU 1923) we can project the share of wages in 
value added by drawing on Jungenfeldt’s (1959) annual wage series. We would 
expect labour’s share to vary within reasonable boundaries, at the very least the 
wage share cannot exceed unity (unless for a year or so). There are a handful of 
mostly small industries where the wage share displays extraordinary 
fluctuations, and also exceeds unity for a couple of years. Most of these 
instances occur in the first two decades of the period. The question then remains 
whether the error lurks behind the series of annual wages, value added or 
employment.  
Starting with the wage series, there is admittedly a shortage of industry-
specific annual wage series, and some of them hinge on a tenuous evidential 
basis, in fact a mere tiny number of preserved firm records for most industries. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the wage series there are reasons to believe 
that the source of error rests elsewhere. The pattern formed by the movement of 
wages for different industries is quite uniform; there are certain boundaries 
within which wages possibly could have ranged given that labour was a mobile 
factor. Concerning employment, we are left uninformed whether employment in 
the Swedish Industrial Statistics pre-1896 refers to the average number of 
workers or the number of workers engaged at a certain point in time. There are a 
couple of instances in the Swedish Industrial Statistics where, after actions have 
been taken to improve the coverage of an industry, the series of employment 
(and gross output) jump up suddenly. If the increase in the number of workers 
goes beyond the increase in gross output the firms’ liability to render accounts of 
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the number of employed may have changed during the period. Jörberg (1961 p. 
379) found a number of smaller firms which refused to submit the requested 
value of gross output but reported the number of workers. That explains some of 
the bizarre instances of wage shares exceeding unity. Neither do we know 
whether or not home workers in the textile industry were included (Jörberg 1961 
p. 374). Visual inspection and reasonable judgements as to the reliability of the 
employment series are the only way to decide whether or not it passes the test. 
All conspicuous discontinuities have been removed. 
Finally, a note on net output. The further back in time the series stretches the 
smaller is the industry, and the higher is the inclination to come across wage 
shares that exceed unity. At the beginning of the period small industries, at most 
a couple of thousand workers or so, conducted many operations by dint of 
handicraft-like technologies. The gradual substitution of machines for artisans 
increased the flow of materials, which decreased the value added share. The way 
value added is computed does not reckon with this shift in technology hence the 
level of value added is too low at the outset of the period, which in turn makes 
the wage bill exhaust value added. The first step is therefore to adjust the value 
added share somewhat upwards, raising the level of value added. That in turn 
makes the wage share attain more reasonable proportions. 
If the usefulness of some of the industry-specific series is overshadowed by 
doubts concerning their foundations, then what about groups of industries and 
the manufacturing industry as a whole? In fact, aggregation makes most of these 
problems go away, provided that errors in different sectors cancel out. 
Furthermore, larger industries (for which we have better data) dwarf the impact 
of the smaller industries. Formula (A.5.1) illustrates the issue at stake (Feinstein 
& Thomas 2002).  
( )1 22 2 2σ σ σ σ σ= + + /V X Y XY X Yr   (A.5.1) 
The standard error in any combined measure of two sectors y and x is the 
square root of the sum of the variances of x and y and the error attained from the 
measured interdependence of x and y. Thus the size of the overall standard 
deviation is affected by the assumed correlation between x and y. If the errors in 
x and y are independent ( 0=r ), the standard error is just the squared root of the 
sum of the squared variance of x and y. From a researcher’s point of view, the 
perfect case would be if the errors in x and y cancelled each other out completely 
( 1r = − ), minimising the standard error of the whole. The worst case would be if 
the error terms were compounded ( 1r = ), maximising the standard error of the 
whole. Most likely the errors in x and y are related to some degree; the 
correlation coefficient falls between the endpoints of 1−  and 1+ . The margin of 
error is then derived by multiplying the standard error of the whole by two (95 
percent confidence intervals). The message which should get across from this 
minor digression is that, provided that measurement errors in the various sectors 
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making up the whole are negatively correlated, aggregation goes along with 
diminishing standard errors of the whole. Although measurement errors plague 
some of the industry specific series, the reliability of our evidence improves as 
we add industries together. 
 
Appendix 5.3 Data sources  
The following account gives information on gross output, employment, prices of 
final products and prices of intermediate consumption. Volume C and D of the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics are hereafter called BiSOS C and BiSOS D (Bidrag 
till Sveriges officiella statistik). Words in italics mark entries in either of these 
two volumes. 
1. Iron, metal and engineering 
The point of departure is the identification of 6 main industries. BiSOS C reports 
physical output and employment for raw material-based industries like 
extraction of iron ore and other metals as well as processing of iron ore into pig 
iron and bar iron. Although BiSOS C also reports figures of ironware until 1891, 
it is clear that figures for most of the more refined metal products are to be found 
in BiSOS D. The physical quantities in BiSOS C need to be multiplied by prices 
to yield series of current gross output. Sometimes there is a perfect match 
between price series and quantities, as in the case of iron ore. More commonly, 
though, it has been necessary to combine different series of quantities into a 
more aggregate series. All series of quantities have then been transformed into 
series of relatives, with 1896 set to 100. To weight the different series of 
quantities I have used average gross output shares from 1896–1912. The 
resulting series is a de facto Laspeyres quantity index. Multiplying this quantity 
index so constructed by price indices gives an index series of gross output in 
current prices. In 1896 BiSOS C reported both physical quantities and gross 
output, making it possible, by using the index series of gross output, to 
extrapolate backwards from the level of gross output in 1896. 
BiSOS C reports employment for only three categories: iron ore 
(jerngrufvorna), iron work (jernverken) and other metal works and mines (andra 
verk med tillhörande grufvor). Iron ore and iron work are by far the most 
important industries and appear below as separate groups of industries. The 
heterogeneity of the third one, other metal works and mines, is a minor problem; 
most of the output, whose corresponding employment belongs to this category, 
has been allocated to metal 2.1 because similar, if more refined products, are 
also reported in BiSOS D. The rest of that output has been added to coal 2.6, 
paint 8.1 and chemicals 8.7. To raise the number of workers I simply use the 
gross output to employment ratio in BiSOS D. 
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A comparison of my level of gross output with Schön’s (1988) for group 1 
reveals that my level of gross output is markedly larger. In the 1870s and 1880s 
my level exceeds Schön’s by 20 per cent on average. The difference then 
disappears gradually. The reason for that difference probably goes back to what 
Lindahl et al. (1937) accomplished though it is beyond the scope of this study to 
further investigate the factors causing this divergence. 
1.1 Mechanical engineering, ironware and foundry 
The three most important categories are mechanical engineering, ironware, and 
foundry. Ideally, one would like to have separate series of gross output and 
employment for all these three categories. The classification of these categories 
in BiSOS D have, however, changed in ways that make it impossible to match 
gross output with employment for each of the categories from 1868 to 1912. 
Mechanical engineering and foundry appear jointly in 1868–1891, although 
from 1886 to 1891 it is possible to identify each category’s gross output (but not 
employment). Between 1892 and 1895 the three categories appear jointly. 
Again, it is possible to separate each of the category’s gross output but not 
employment. After 1896 foundry belongs to ironware while mechanical 
engineering appears as a separate category. Thus, only by lumping the three 
categories together is it possible to construct consistent series of gross output 
and employment. A further complication concerns the part of ironware that 
appears in BiSOS C before 1891. Instead of gross output, BiSOS C gives output 
in terms of physical quantities, which are multiplied by a proper price index of 
final products to yield gross output. The number of workers is adjusted by the 
gross output to employment ratio in BiSOS D. 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
Mechanical engineering: 
1868–1912: fabriksredskapsfabriker, fiskeredskapsfabriker, gevärsfabriker, 
aduceringsverk, gjuterier, mekaniska verkstäder, kirurgiska-, matematiska-, 
musikaliska- och optiska instrumentfabriker, kardfabriker, kulsprutor, sprut-
fabrik, symaskinsfabrik, solv- och vävskedsfabrik, urfabriker, åkdonsfabriker, 
fabriker för tillverkning av muddelverk. 
 
Ironware: 
1868–1912: bleckslageri, filhuggeri, hästskor, hästskosömn, jerntrådsdragerier, 
järn- och stålvaror, järn och stålmanufaktur, nålfabriker, träskruv. 
Additional output from BiSOS C 
1868–1891: Physical quantities of järn och stålmanufaktur that are multiplied by 
prices of iron and steel products (see below) to give gross output. 
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Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1991: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
A division into mechanical engineering, ironware and foundry identifies the 
three most important statistical categories, and separate price indices are created 
for each of them. For mechanical engineering, prices of various types of 
machines are used, while, for ironware, more refined goods made of iron and 
steel, and, for foundry, prices of castings of iron and steel are used. The final 
index is constructed by assigning to mechanical engineering the average weight 
of 0.56, ironware 0.31 and foundry 0.13 based on shares of gross output. 
 
The following sources are used: 
 
Mechanical engineering: 
1868–1888: prices of railway carriage (Modig 1971 table 15). 
1888–1912: price index of the mechanical engineering industry (Ljungberg 1990 
p. 512). 
 
Ironware: 
1868–1912: prices of horse shoes, horse-shoes nails and nails (Jörberg 1972 pp. 
583, 586–7, 713–4). 
1885–1912: same as in 1868–1912 and additionally a variety of nails and screws 
and shoes (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 291–2). 
 
Foundry: 
1885–1912: prices of iron girder, sheet iron, iron tube, castings of iron and steel 
(Ljungberg 1990 pp. 278–9). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A price index including pig iron and bar iron (Åmark 1921 p. 1275) and the 
price index of ironware, the weights being 0.71 and 0.29, form the final price 
index of intermediate material inputs. Fuel is represented by prices of charcoal 
(0.9) (Jörberg 1972 pp. 698–9) and coal (0.1) (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting 
for 7 per cent of total costs with a net output share of 0.54 (Schön 1988 p. 134; 
SOU 1923). 
1.2 Metal 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: förgyllerier, förnickling, hagel, kapsyler, knappfabriker, 
stämpelfabriker, galvanisering, guld- och silverarbeten, gulddragerier, 
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guldslageri, kopparvarufabriker, metall och bronsfabriker, metallduk och 
messingtråd, ornamentfabriker, stilhjuteri, skostiftsfabriker, tenngjuteri, skostift.  
Additional output from BiSOS C 
1868–1896: Physical quantities of arbeten av guld, silver (hel- och halvprodukt), 
koppar (inkl halv- och slutbehandlad produkt), messing, kopparsmide, gjutgods 
av annan produkt än järn, bly (inkl halv- och slutbehandlad produkt), zink (halv- 
och slutbehandlad produkt) are multiplied by prices of gold, silver, copper, tin 
and lead (see below) to give gross output. 
 
1868–1912: Gross output of arbeten av guld, silver (hel- och halvprodukt), 
koppar (inkl halv- och slutbehandlad produkt), messing, kopparsmide, gjutgods 
av annan produkt än järn, bly (inkl halv- och slutbehandlad produkt), zink (halv- 
och slutbehandlad produkt). 
Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1912: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
It is not possible to come by prices of the final products. Instead, a price index 
including the most important input materials is used, assuming the ratio of input 
to output prices remained quite stable over time. 
 
1868–1912: a weighted price index including gold (0.28), silver (0.07), copper 
(0.36), tin (0.09) and lead (0.21) where weights are based on shares of gross 
output in BiSOS C and BiSOS D in 1896. Prices of copper, lead and tin from 
Åmark (1921 pp. 1275, 1283) and prices of silver from Jörberg (1972 p. 580). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.37 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912. 
1.3. Ship yards 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1872–1912: skeppsvarv. 
Additional output 
1868–1871: Schön (1988 p. 76). 
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Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1872: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data from BiSOS D in 1872–1912 (see 
above). The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.904; R2=0.5; T-ratio=4.995. 
Prices of final products 
1888–1912: A price index of the shipyard industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 330). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A combined index (weights in parentheses) is constructed using the prices of 
final products in industry 1.6 (0.12), industry 1.1 (ironware) (0.36), industry 1.1 
(mechanical engineering) (0.43), industry 1.4 (0.02), industry 3.1 (0.05) and 
industry 8.1 (0.02). Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), 
accounting in 1913 for 6 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 
0.6 (SOU 1923). 
1.4. Electro mechanical industry 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1885–1912: elektromekaniska fabriker, elektriska belysningsapparater, 
elektriska kol- och vattenfilters, elektrisk ledningstråd, lampfabrik (glödlampor). 
Prices of final products 
1888–1912: a price index of the electro mechanical industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 
512).  
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A combined index (weights in parentheses) is constructed using the prices of 
final products in industry 1.6 (0.56), industry 1.2 (0.22) and industry 1.1 
(ironware) (0.22). Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), 
accounting in 1913 for 4 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 
0.6 (SOU 1923). 
1.5. Iron ore 
Physical quantities, gross output and employment from BiSOS C 
1868–1896: Physical quantities of järnmalm and sjö- och myrmalm are 
multiplied by prices of iron ore (see below) to give gross output. 
 
1896–1912: Gross output of järnmalm, sjö- och myrmalm. 
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Prices of final products 
1868–1887: prices of iron ore (Jörberg 1972 p. 703). 
1887–1912: prices of iron ore (Ljungberg 1990 p. 341). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
The cost share of materials is small, mostly in the form of explosives and wood 
but the cost share of fuel is large. The final price index is an arithmetic mean of 
prices of final products in industry 3.1 and industry 8.5. Fuel is represented by 
prices of charcoal (Jörberg 1972 pp. 698–9), accounting in 1913 for 32 per cent 
of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.86 (SOU 1923). 
1.6. Iron and steel works 
Physical quantities, gross output and employment from BiSOS C 
1868–1896: Physical quantities of tackjärn, gjutgods från masugn, gjutgods från 
tackjärns omsmältning, smältstycken, tångjärn, stål, bessermetall, martinmetall, 
stål av annat slag. They are transformed into a Laspeyres quantity index by 
using as weights their average gross output shares in 1896–1912. The quantity 
index is the price index below to give gross output. 
 
1896–1912: Gross output of tackjärn, gjutgods från masugn, gjutgods från 
tackjärns omsmältning, smältstycken, stångjärn, stål, bessermetall, 
martinmetall, stål av annat slag. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: The final index is an arithmetic mean of prices of pig iron and bar 
iron (Åmark (1921 p. 1275). 
1888–1912: a price index of steel and ironworks (Ljungberg 1990 p. 512). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
The only material input is iron ore (output price in industry 1.5) which combines 
with fuel to form the final price index. Fuel is represented by prices of charcoal 
(Jörberg 1972 pp. 698–9), accounting in 1913 for 40 per cent of total costs with 
a net to gross output ratio of 0.21 (Schön 1988 p. 134; SOU 1923). 
2. Stone, clay and glass 
BiSOS D provides gross output and employment for five of the six groups of 
industries in the stone, clay and glass industry. Only coal (2.6) originates from 
BiSOS C. The output of bricks 1868–1891, adjusted upwards in accordance with 
Schön’s recommendations, represents the only additional output besides what 
BiSOS gives. By implication, numbers of employment and gross output are quite 
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reliable for the stone, clay and glass industry. For the period as a whole my 
figures tally closely with Schön’s (1988); on average my figures are three per 
cent larger. 
2.1. Glass 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: fabriker för glastillverkning, fabriker för tillverkning av glaspulver. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: arithmetic mean of prices for window glass and bottles (Johansson 
1988 pp. 219–20). 
1888–1912: price index of the glass industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 514). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Lack of price information on sand, the most important material input, makes it a 
shaky project to construct a price index of material inputs. We have to be content 
with a weighted price index of materials comprising chemical products from 
industry 8.7 (0.83) and petroleum (0.17) (Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 1282). 
However, the share of fuel is large, lending certainty to the final index. Fuel is 
represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 50 
per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.67 (SOU 1923). 
2.2. Chinaware and tile 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1896: porslinsfabriker, kakelugns- och stenkärlsfabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1896: prices of tiles (Jörberg 1972 p. 561). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
As with the glass industry no information on the most important materials exists, 
but fuel represents the single most important cost item. The price index includes 
chemical products from industry 8.7 (0.13) and petroleum (0.87) (Åmark 1921 
pp. 1274, 1282). Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), 
accounting in 1913 for 37 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio 
of 0.72 (SOU 1923). 
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2.3. Quarrying and refined stone products 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: torv, stenhuggning, kalk- och kritbruk, sten- och lergods, coke- och 
asfaltsfabriker. 
Prices of final products 
The heterogeneity of this subgroup obstructs the construction of a price index for 
well defined products. A rather crude combination of prices of final products for 
cement 2.4, bricks 2.5 and tiles 2.2 is used instead. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.76 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant over time. 
2.4. Cement 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1874–1912: cementindustri, cementgjuteri. 
Prices of final products 
1874–1888: prices of cement (Åmarks 1921 s. 1273). 
1888–1912: arithmetic mean of various kinds of cement (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 
353–4). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.54 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1874–1912. 
2.5. Bricks 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1873–1912: tegelbruk. 
Additional output 
1868–1891: Schön (1988 pp. 35–7). 
Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1873: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on basis of the data from BiSOS D in 1874–1912 (see above). 
The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.722; T-ratio=7.409; R2=0.597. 
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1873–1891: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: prices of bricks (Jörberg 1972 pp. 698–9). 
1888–1912: a weighted (weights in parentheses) price index of building bricks 
(0.775), roofing tiles (0.15) and firebricks (0.015) (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 353–4). 
Weights are gross output shares from the Swedish Industrial Statistics in 1913. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.67 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912. 
2.6. Coal 
As in the Iron, steel, metal and engineering industry, output of coal reported in 
BiSOS C has been transformed into gross output by multiplying series of 
physical quantities with series of coal prices. Employment numbers for coal are 
hidden behind the heterogeneous label of other metal works and mines (andra 
verk med tillhörande grufvor) where employment is reported by geographical 
area. However, we know that coal mining only took place in Malmöhus and 
Kristianstads län and furthermore that no other mining activity occurred there. It 
means that employment numbers reported for these two geographical areas 
belong to the output of coal mining. 
Physical quantities, gross output and employment from BiSOS C 
1868–1896: Physical quantities of stenkol, eldfast lera, klinkerlera are multiplied 
by prices of coal (see below) to give gross output. 
 
1868–1912: Gross output of stenkol, eldfast lera, klinkerlera. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1912: prices of coal (Åmark 1921 s. 1274; 1282). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
The cost share of raw materials in gross output is moderate. The share of fuel is 
quite large (0.31) but fuel is the same as the final product, making it impossible 
to estimate fluctuations in the net to gross output ratio. I have assumed that the 
net to gross output ratio of 0.93 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–
1912. 
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3. Wood 
The absence of sawmills before 1896 is the most serious lacuna in BiSOS 
because they accounted for a large share of total output in the manufacturing 
industry. The first attempt to estimate pre-1896 gross output was made by 
Lindahl et al. (1937). Schön (1988) later on raised the level of gross output 
further, both before and after 1896. I have incorporated Schön’s revisions and 
my level of gross output tracks Schön’s precisely. The importance of sawmills 
justifies a closer look at the estimated number of workers and the estimated 
series of net output in current prices. Jungenfelt (1959) tries to make the number 
of workers correspond with the gross output as estimated by Lindahl et al. 
(1937). He estimates the number of workers by assuming that the cost share of 
wages in gross output in 1896 remained unchanged back to 1870. The wage sum 
divided by the average wage gives an estimate of the number of workers. He 
attains the average annual wage from a wage series in Bagge et al. (1933), which 
starts at a quite high level in 1870 and exhibits almost no growth until the 1890s. 
The high annual wage level implies a relatively low number of workers at the 
beginning of the period. The fixed cost share of wages in gross output in current 
prices makes the level of workers highly susceptible to changes in prices for 
final products. Instead changes in employment should be related to changes in 
the volume of gross output. Jungenfelt’s estimated number of workers relates to 
Lindahl et al.’s gross output, which is lower than Schön’s. My method, based on 
an estimated relationship between growth in volume output and growth in 
productivity, gives a series of employment whose level is on average somewhat 
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GRAPH A.5.1. Estimated number of workers in sawmills, 1868–1912 
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higher, which it should be, since it relates to Schön’s larger gross output. My 
series furthermore displays smaller fluctuations because it mirrors changes in 
volume of gross output, not gross output in current prices (graph A.5.1). 
As to the estimate of net output in current prices, graph A.5.2 shows Schön’s 
series of value added shares, after it is purged of handicraft production, and my 
series of net output shares for sawmills and refined wood products. For the 
period as a whole, Schön’s series declines from 0.52 to 0.34 while my series 
remains without significant trend. There are, however, large fluctuations in both 
series, which underscores the volatile nature of prices of final products, boards, 
and the most important intermediate consumption, wood. The two series are not 
strictly comparable though. Schön has subtracted from gross output the costs of 
materials and fuel as well as the costs of maintenance and repairs, and, therefore, 
his series deserves the prefix value added, while my series is not adjusted for 
maintenance and repair works, and should therefore be called net output (Schön 
1988 pp. 146-7). Another reason why the two series are not straightforwardly 
comparable is that I need to assume that the net output share in 1913, as 
estimated by the public investigation into cost shares (SOU 1923), was the same 
in 1912. Schön does not have to invoke this assumption since his series spans 
and continues after 1913. Yet, these differences cannot account for all the 
different behaviours of the series. Instead, the choice of price series used to 
extrapolate the net output share in 1913 may hold the key to understanding the 
differences. Schön (1988) gives no detailed information on the price series in 
use. 
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GRAPH A.5.2. Estimates of value added shares in current prices for the wood 
industry, 1868–1912 
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3.1. Sawmills and planing mills 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1896–1912: sågverk och hyvlerier. 
Additional output 
1868–1904: Schön (1988 pp. 43, 79–80). 
Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1896: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data from BiSOS D in 1896–1912 (see 
above). The following regression equation is estimated: 
ln(Output/Employment)=α+βlnOutput; β=0.622; T-ratio=4.971; R2=0.622. 
 
1896–1904: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: prices of battens (Åmark 1921 pp. 1273, 1282). 
1888–1912: price index of the wood industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 514).  
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed by taking the arithmetic mean of prices of log timber and 
pine wood (Jörberg 1972 pp. 546–9, 693–4). No information on the cost share of 
fuel exists. The net to gross output ratio is 0.39 for 1913 (SOU 1923). 
3.2. Refined wood products 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1872–1912: korg, kork, käpp, läst, möbel, persienn, skopligg, snickerifabriker. 
Additional output and employment based on extrapolation 
1872–1895: Backward extrapolation from 1896 based on movement of the 
industries recorded in BiSOS D (see above) in order to account for the sharp 
improvement of coverage in 1896. 
Prices of final products 
No prices of the most important products are available. Instead, the price index 
of final products for sawmills and planning mills is used. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.56 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1872–1912. 
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4. Paper 
For paper and paper pulp, BiSOS D provides reliable information on output and 
employment for the whole period. The coverage of the book printing industry 
was, however, markedly improved in 1896. Lindahl et al. (1937) adjusted the 
output upwards somewhat between 1896 and 1912, which caused an even larger 
discontinuity. I accept their adjustment after 1896 but try to smooth the series by 
backward extrapolations from 1896 to 1868 on the basis of the output and 
employment for the book printing industries recorded in BiSOS before 1896. 
That additional output raises output for the paper industry to a level that is on 
average 36 per cent higher than Schön’s (1988) before 1896. 
4.1. Paper pulp 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: trämassafabriker, pappersmassafabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: price index of pulp (Schön 1988 p. 205). 
1888–1912: a weighted (chained Fisher) index of prices of mechanical and 
chemical pulp (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 367–8) where weights are annual shares of 
gross output from BiSOS D. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (weights in parentheses) of prices of log timber (0.94) 
(Jörberg 1972 pp. 546–9) and chemical products in industry 8.7 (0.06) is 
constructed. Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), 
accounting in 1913 for 17 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio 
of 0.35 (Schön 1988 p. 134; SOU 1923). 
4.2. Paper 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1896: pappersbruk och pappfabriker, papperspåsar, kuvertfabriker, 
tapetfabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1885: price index of the paper industry (Schön 1988 p. 205). 
1888–1912: arithmetic mean of prices of various kinds of papers (Ljungberg 
1990 pp. 371–3). 
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Prices of intermediate consumption 
In the first step three types of price indices are constructed: paper mills 
producing plain paper where paper pulp in industry 4.2 is the only input 
material; paper mills producing more refined paper products where a weighted 
index (weights in parentheses) of paper (see above) (0.73), leather in industry 
8.2 (0.24) and rubber in industry 8.4 (0.02) represent prices of material inputs; 
and finally industries producing wall paper where metal in industry 1.2 (0.16), 
wood products in industry 3.1 (0.02), and paper (see above) (0.66) and paint in 
industry 8.1 (0.16) are combined. 
In the second step these indices are put together by weights based on average 
shares of gross output in 1868–1912: paper mills producing paper (0.46), paper 
mills producing more refined paper products (0.44) and wall paper industries 
(0.1). Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 
1913 for 11 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.42 (SOU 
1923). 
4.3. Book printing 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: kortfabriker, litografiska anstalter, bokbinderier. 
Additional output and employment based on extrapolation 
1868–1895: Backward extrapolation from 1896 based on movement of the 
industries recorded in BiSOS D (see above) in order to account for the sharp 
improvement in returns in 1896. 
Additional output 
1896–1912: Lindahl (1937 p. 191, table 90). 
Estimate of employment for additional output 
1896–1912: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: unit values of playing-cards from BiSOS D. 
1888–1912: price index of the graphical industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 516). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index of prices of paper in industry 4.2 (0.92), paint in industry 8.1 
(0.04) and petroleum (0.04) (Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 1282) is constructed. Fuel is 
represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 5 
per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.66 (SOU 1923). 
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5. Food and beverages 
BiSOS left many gaps in the food industry. The reason is that it excluded many 
industries closely related to agriculture. For instance the dairy industry did not 
enter the official industrial statistics until 1913. The small coverage in BiSOS 
has made the food industry the subject of intensified efforts to estimate output 
for the industries that were left out. We are now much better equipped with 
output data for food related industries but we are still short of employment data. 
Comparing the figures reported in BiSOS with Schön’s (1988) revision shows 
that on average BiSOS failed to report 85 per cent of the total output before 
1896. After 1896 the gap decreased gradually to 30 per cent. It testifies to the 
challenge posed when estimating the corresponding numbers of workers. The 
very low coverage before 1896 is due mostly to the absence of the flour mills, 
accounting as it did for fifty per cent of the gap. Before 1896 my level of gross 
output is on average 13 per cent higher than Schön’s (1988). After 1896 the 
difference vanishes. 
5.1. Flour mills 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1896–1912: mjöl och grynkvarnar. 
Additional output 
1868–1912: Schön (1988 pp. 83–4). 
Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1895: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data from BiSOS D in 1896–1912 (see 
above): The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.827; T-ratio=10.265; R2=0.883. 
 
1895–1912: BiSOS D excluded systematically small production units. Through 
Jörberg’s (1961) conducted investigation into the material underlying the 
published BiSOS volumes and classification of firms by size, we know that the 
smallest production units’ gross output to employment ratio was only forty per 
cent of the average production unit. The usual assumption of equal gross output 
to employment ratio for the industries recorded in BiSOS and the additional 
output provided by Lindahl et al. (1937) and Schön (1988) cannot be justified. I 
have reckoned with this lower productivity when estimating the number of 
workers. 
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Prices of final products 
1868–1888: weighted index of prices of rye flour (0.43) wheat flour (0.56) and 
rolled oats (0.01) (Myrdal 1933). 
1888–1912: price index of the flour mill industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 518). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (weights in parentheses) of prices of rye (0.2), wheat (0.5) and 
oats (0.3) (Jörberg 1972 pp. 635–6, 640–1) is constructed. Fuel is represented by 
prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 1 per cent of total 
costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.17 (SOU 1923). 
5.2. Pork butcheries 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1891–1912: slakterier. 
Additional output 
1885–1890: Lindahl et al. (1937 p. 195). 
Estimate of employment for additional output 
1885–1890: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on basis of the data from BiSOS D in 1897–1912 (see above). 
The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.217; T-ratio=1.573; R2=0.150. 
Prices of final products 
1885–1888: prices of bacon (Myrdal 1933 pp. 201–3, table B). 
1888–1912: price index of slaughterhouses (Ljungberg 1990 p. 516). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Prices of pork (Jörberg 1972 p. 656) are used. Fuel is represented by prices of 
coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 1 per cent of total costs with 
a net to gross output ratio of 0.15 (SOU 1923). 
5.3. Margarine 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1894–1912: margarinfabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1894–1912: price index of the oil and fat industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 518). 
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Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.25 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1894–1912. 
5.4. Sugar 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: sockerbruk, råsockerbruk, sockerraffinaderier, sockersågning. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: price index of sugar (Rönnbäck 2007). 
1888–1912: price index of the sugar industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 518). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
1885–1912: After the introduction of beet sugar during the middle of the 1880s, 
imports of unrefined cane sugar gradually ceased. The price index includes only 
beet sugar (Ljungberg (1990 pp. 250–1). Fuel is represented by prices of coal 
(Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 7 per cent of total costs with a net 
to gross output ratio of 0.21 (Schön 1988 p. 135; SOU 1923). 
5.5. Tobacco 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: tobaksindustri. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: price index of tobacco (Schön 1988 p. 205). 
1888–1912: price index of the tobacco industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 520). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
1868–1912: prices of raw tobacco (Åmark 1921 pp. 1273, 1282). Fuel is 
represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 2 
per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.54 (SOU 1923). 
5.6 Chocolate and candy 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: choklad, karamell och konfektyrindustri. 
Prices of final products 
1888–1912: price index of the chocolate and candy industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 
518). 
ASPIRING TO A HIGHER RANK 
 214 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights within parentheses), based on the prices 
of cacao (0.33) (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 404–5), milk (0.1) (Myrdal 1933) and sugar 
in industry 5.4 (0.57), is constructed. Fuel is represented by prices of coal 
(Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 2 per cent of total costs with a net 
to gross output ratio of 0.44 (SOU 1923). 
5.7. Breweries 
Schön (1988), in his revision of gross output, found the that gross output level of 
beer which was reported in BiSOS D was appreciably lower than special 
investigations in 1880, 1890 and 1897 concluded. He therefore raised the level 
of gross output for pre-1897 years. The difference between Schön’s estimate and 
BiSOS’ given output is added to the output series of breweries. Employment is 
raised by the assumption that productivity in the added industries did not differ 
from the ones represented in BiSOS. In 1892, BiSOS started reporting output 
and employment for punch breweries, and in 1896 also mineral water and soft 
drinks. The sudden introduction of these activities causes an unwelcome 
discontinuity. The only solution at hand is a backward extrapolation from the 
years in which these industries were introduced, assuming that the movement of 
their output and employment followed the breweries. 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1872–1912: maltbryggeri, mälterier, bärvin, vin och saft, mineralvatten och 
läsk, punchbryggerier. 
Additional output 
Punch: 
1868–1871: backward extrapolation from 1872 based on the movement of 
output for maltbryggeri as recorded in Schön (1988 pp. 81–2). 
 
1872–1891: backward extrapolation from 1891 based on the movement of 
output for maltbryggeri as recorded in BiSOS D. 
 
Mineralvatten och läsk: 
1868–1871: backward extrapolation from 1872 based on the movement of 
output for maltbryggeri as recorded in Schön (1988 pp. 81–2). 
 
1872–1896: backward extrapolation from 1896 based on the movement of 
output for maltbryggeri as recorded in BiSOS D. 
 
Maltbryggeri: 
1868–1897: Schön (1988 pp. 81–2). 
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Estimates of employment for additional output 
Punch:  
1872–1891: backward extrapolation from 1891 based on the movement of 
employment maltbryggeri as recorded in BiSOS D. 
 
1868–1871: backward extrapolation from 1872 based on average annual 
percentage change in employment for maltbryggeri in 1872–1890 as recorded in 
BiSOS D. 
 
Mineralvatten och läsk: 
1872–1896: backward extrapolation from 1896 based on the movement of 
employment for maltbryggeri as recorded in BiSOS D. 
 
1868–1871: backward extrapolation from 1872 based on average annual 
percentage change in employment for maltbryggeri in 1872–1890 as recorded in 
BiSOS D. 
 
Maltgryggeri och mälteri: 
1868–1871: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data from BiSOS D in 1897–1912 (see 
above): The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.525; T-ratio=4.438; R2=0.585. 
 
1872–1897: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: prices of beer (Jörberg 1972 p. 395). 
1888–1912: price index of the brewery industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 520). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index of prices of barley (0.58) and hops (0.19) (Jörberg 1972 pp. 
635–6, 675–6) and glass bottles (0.23) (Johansson 1988 p. 219) is constructed. 
Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 
for 13 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.13 (Schön 1988 
p. 135; SOU 1923). 
5.8. Spirit 
From 1896 onwards BiSOS first, then the modern post-1913 version of the 
Swedish Industrial Statistics, give gross output for unrefined spirit 
(brännvinsbrännerier) and refined spirit (destilleringsverk). On average the 
comparative levels of gross output are similar for these manufacturing processes. 
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BiSOS included unrefined spirit in 1892 and refined spirit in 1896. Lindahl et al. 
(1937) estimated gross output for the years preceding 1892 but let the problem 
with refined spirit go unnoticed, which means that the output series of the spirit 
industry contains an abrupt change in 1896. I presume that the ratio between the 
unrefined and refined spirit remained stationary before 1896, implying that I 
accept Lindahl et al.’s estimate of unrefined spirit as being a reasonable 
representation for refined spirit as well.  
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1892–1912: brännvinsbrännerier, destilleringsverk. 
Addtitional output 
Brännvinsbrännerier: 
1868–1891: Lindahl et al. (1937 p. 196, table 93). 
 
Destilleringsverk 
1868–1891: Lindahl et al. (1937 p. 196, table 93). 
1892–1895: Adjusted upwards to equal the output of brännvinsbrännerier. 
Estimates of employment for additional output 
Brännvinsbrännerier: 
1868–1891: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data for brännvinsbrännerier from BiSOS D 
in 1897–1912. The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.812; T-ratio=8.722; R2=0.845. 
 
Destilleringsverk: 
1868–1891: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data for destilleringsverk from BiSOS D in 
1897–1912. The following regression equation is estimated: 
ln(Output/Employment)=α+βlnOutput; β=0.3; T-ratio=1.669; R2=0.166. 
 
1892–1895: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: price of spirit (Lindahl et al. 1937 p. 196, table 93). 
1888–1912: price index of the spirit industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 520). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
After 1889 it is possible to construct separate indices of material inputs thanks to 
prices of both refined and unrefined spirit (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 412–3). The 
index of material inputs for unrefined spirit is an arithmetic mean of prices of 
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potatoes (Myrdal 1933 pp. 219–20, table C6) and barley (Jörberg 1972 pp. 635–
6). Material inputs going into distilleries consist of the price series for unrefined 
spirit. Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 
1913 for 1 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.12 (SOU 
1923). 
5.9. Bakery 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1890–1912: bagerier, käksfabriker. 
Additional output and employment based on extrapolation 
1890–1895: backward extrapolation from 1896 based on the movement of the 
industries from BiSOS D (see above) in order to account for the sharp 
improvement of returns in 1896. 
Prices of final products 
1890–1912: price index of bakeries (Ljungberg 1990 p. 518). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index of prices of flour in industry 5.1 (0.91), yeast (0.03) 
(Ljungberg 1990 p. 407), sugar in industry 5.4 (0.03) and salt (0.03) (Jörberg 
1972 p. 619). Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), 
accounting in 1913 for 10 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio 
of 0.57 (SOU 1923). 
5.10. Dairy 
The dairy industry never found its way into BiSOS. It appeared for the first time 
in the modern version of the Swedish Industrial Statistics in 1913. 
Gross output 
1868–1912: Lindahl et al. (1937 p. 194, table 92). 
Estimate of employment 
1868–1912: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on basis of the data for mejeriindustrin from the Swedish 
Industrial Statistics between 1913 and 1935. The following regression equation 
is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.773; T-ratio=11.322; R2=0.859. 
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Prices of final products 
1868–1888: Weighted average of prices of butter (0.8) and cheese (0.2) (Jörberg 
1972 pp. 665–6). 
1888–1912: price index of the dairy industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 516). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
1868–1885: Arithmetic mean of prices of skimmed and unskimmed milk 
(Myrdal 1933 pp. 201–3). 
1885–1912: Arithmetic mean of various kinds of milk (Ljungberg 1990 pp. 259–
60). Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 
1913 for 1 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.066 (SOU 
1923). 
5.11. Miscellaneous food industry 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1896: cikoriefabriker, kaffebrännerier, kaffesurrogat, makaroni, senaps-
brännerier, konserver, salt, senap, soja, glykos, kryddfabriker, kaffesurrogat, 
fiskberedning. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: weighted index of prices of coffee (Myrdal 1933 p. 242) and unit 
values of compressed yeast from BiSOS D. 
1888–1912: price index of the miscellaneous food industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 
518). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.28 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912. 
6. Textile and clothing 
This is one of the groups of industries with the most sufficient coverage in 
BiSOS. On average my numbers of gross output are 99.7 per cent of Schön’s 
(1988) revision. 
6.1. Textile 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: bomullslistfabriker, färgerier, bomullsspinneri, jutespinneri, 
hampaspinneri, linspinneri, ullspinneri, impregnering, kattuntryck, kemiska 
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blekerier, repslageri, vadmalsstampar, bomullsväveri, kädesväveri, hel och 
halvylleväveri, linneväveri, juteväveri, sidenväveri, schoddy, trassel. 
Prices of final products 
Many textile firms are vertically integrated; they produce both yarn and cloth. 
However, to construct a price index of final products and intermediate material 
inputs for the entire textile industry it is necessary to treat weaving and spinning 
separately; as though both sell their final products (yarn and cloth) and purchase 
their material inputs (yarn or raw material) at the going market rate. In the final 
price index of final products and intermediate material inputs, spinning is 
assigned the weight of 0.45 and weaving 0.55. 
 
1868–1885: 
Spinning: 
At the beginning of the period cotton yarn accounted for the lion’s share of gross 
output, but the significance of woollen yarn grew rapidly. Hemp and flax 
remained insignificant during the whole period. A chained Fisher index of prices 
of cotton yarn (Schön 1988 pp. 205–6) and woollen yarn, linen yarn (Jörberg 
1972 pp. 680–1) is constructed and the weights are annual shares of gross output 
from BiSOS D. 
 
Weaving: 
A chained Fisher price index, based on the prices of cotton and woollen cloth 
(Schön 1988 pp. 205–6) and linen fabric (Jörberg 1972 pp. 685–6), is 
constructed and the weights are annual shares of gross output from BiSOS D. 
 
1885–1912: 
Spinning: 
A chained Fisher price index, based on prices of cotton yarn (Ljungberg (1990 
pp. 428–9), woollen yarn and linen yarn (Jörberg 1972 pp. 680–1), is 
constructed and the weights are annual shares of gross output from BiSOS D1. 
 
Weaving: 
A chained Fisher price index, based on the prices of woollen and cotton cloth 
(Ljungberg 1990 pp. 435–7) and linen fabric (Jörberg 1972 pp. 685–6), is 
constructed and the weights are annual shares of gross output from BiSOS D.  
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Spinning: 
A chained Fisher price index, based on the prices of wool (Jörberg 1972 pp. 
680–1), cotton (Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 1282), hemp and flax (Jörberg 1972 pp. 
685–6, 675–6), is constructed and the weights are annual shares of gross output 
from BiSOS D.  
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Weaving: 
Price index of yarn: (see above). 
 
Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 
for 5 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.37 (Schön 1988 
p. 135; SOU 1923). 
6.2. Clothing 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: filtar, hattar, kardfabriker, lump- och lappull, maskinremmar, 
bomullsremmar, fisknät, gardin, hängslen, konstgjorda blommor, korsett, 
kravatt, markis, mössor, paraply, snörmakeri, spets, rullgardin, silkesrederi, 
sidenappteringsverk, sömnadsfabrik, vadd, band, segel, tältduk, trikå. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1879: unit values of socks, underpants and jumpers from BiSOS D. 
1879–1888: price index of final products in the textile industry 6.1 (weaving). 
1888–1912: price index of the clothing industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 520). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index of final products in the textile industry (weaving) is used. Fuel is 
represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 2 
per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.49 (SOU 1923). 
7. Leather hair and rubber 
The gross output of this group is very close to Schön’s; on average it is merely 
one per cent higher. No additional estimates are included. 
7.1 Tannery 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1890: garverier, läderfabriker, sämskmakerier, pelsvarufabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: prices of tanned cow hides (Jörberg 1972 p. 630).  
1888–1912: price index of tanneries (Ljungberg 1990 p. 522). 
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Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on the prices of 
raw hides (0.67) (Åmark 1921 pp. 1275, 1283), Swedish (0.3), imported (0.7), 
and chemical products in industry 8.7 (0.33), is constructed. Fuel is represented 
by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 1 per cent of 
total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.2 (SOU 1923). 
7.2. Products of leather and fur 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: handskar, portfölj, reseffekter, borstbinderi, nöthårsfiltfabriker, 
skonåtling, skinntröjfabriker, sadelmakerier. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: prices of gloves (Schön 1888 p. 206). 
1888–1912: unit values of leather gloves from BiSOS D. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on of prices raw 
hides (0.61) (Åmark 1921 p. 1275, 1283) Swedish (0.3), imported (0.7), output 
prices of tannery in industry 7.1 (0.23), output prices of clothing in industry 6.2 
(0.03) and output prices of textile in industry 6.1 (cloth) (0.13), is constructed. 
Fuel is represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 
for 1 per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.39 (SOU 1923). 
7.3. Shoes 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: skoindustrier. 
Prices of final products 
1888–1912: price index of the shoe industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 520). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on the prices of 
ironware in industry 1.1 (0.04), prices of paper in industry 6.2 (0.02), textile in 
industry 6.1 (cloth) (0.02) and hides in industry 7.1 (0.94), is constructed. Fuel is 
represented by prices of coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 1 
per cent of total costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.27 (SOU 1923). 
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7.4. Rubber 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1871–1912: gummifabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1888–1912: price index of the rubber industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 522). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.4 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1871–1912. 
8. Chemical 
Most industries are represented in BiSOS D with sufficient coverage. However, 
in terms of sheer size the most important industry in this group, the charcoal 
industry, was not reported in BiSOS until 1898. In 1868 the level of gross output 
of charcoal was, according to the estimates of Lindahl et al. (1937) and Schön 
(1988), almost three times higher than the rest of the chemical industries. Not 
until the beginning of the 1880s did gross output of the rest of the chemical 
industries catch up with the production of charcoal. Then of course the rest 
surged ahead; yet the share of charcoal never fell below 30 per cent. The close 
affinity of the charcoal production and iron works explains its weightiness. My 
level of gross output for the chemical industry as a whole tracks Schön’s (1988) 
revision accurately. The difference is on average less than 1 per cent. 
8.1. Paint 
The production of red paint (rödfärg), which was a by-product of the extraction 
of copper, is given in physical quantities in BiSOS C until 1896, after which it 
entered BiSOS D. The quantities have been multiplied by the price index (see 
below) to give gross output which has been added to the series of gross output 
from BiSOS D. 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: träolja, färg- och fernissfabriker, bresiljeqvarnar. 
Additional output from BiSOS C 
1868–1895: Physical quantities of rödfärg. They are multiplied by the prices of 
paint and linseed oil (see below) to give gross output. 
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Estimate of employment for additional output 
1868–1895: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1885: prices of linseed (Åmark 1921 pp. 1275, 1283). 
1885–1888: A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on 
the prices of paint (0.43) (Ljungberg 1990 p. 470) and linseed oil (0.57), is 
constructed. 
1888–1912: price index of the paint industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 522). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.26 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912. 
8.2. Soap and detergent 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: såpa- och tvålfabriker, stearinljus, parfym. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1888: A chained Fisher price index, based on the prices of soap (Schön 
1988 p. 206) and candles (Myrdal (1933 pp. 201–3), is constructed. Weights are 
annual shares of gross output from BiSOS D. 
1888–1912: A chained Fisher price index, based on the prices of soap and 
detergent (Ljungberg 1990 p. 522) and candles (Myrdal 1933 pp. 201–3), is 
constructed. Weights are annual shares of gross output from BiSOS D. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted price index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on the prices 
of final products in sawmills in industry 3.1 (0.125), paper in industry 4.2 
(0.125), oil in industry 8.3 (0.25), soap and detergent in industry 8.2 (0.25) and 
chemicals in industry 8.7 (0.25), is constructed. Fuel is represented by prices of 
coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for 2 per cent of total costs with 
a net to gross output ratio of 0.26 (SOU 1923). 
8.3. Oil  
This group is very heterogeneous. Most of the industries are small and difficult 
to classify. Some industries just appear for a short time while others exhibit 
improbable behaviours. BiSOS improved the coverage sharply in 1896, which 
caused discontinuity. Backward extrapolation from 1896 irons out the series of 
output and employment and raises the levels of output and employment. The 
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entire series may enter into the aggregate, but cannot be used to represent growth 
of productivity, at least not before 1896. 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: limkokeri, lackérfabriker, lackfabrik, mineralolja, oljeslagerier, 
vagnsmörjfabriker, collanolja, dextrin, fiskolja och tran, flott, glycerin, harts, 
hvalolja, karbolsyra, gelatin, olein och vasselin, oleomargarin, talg, valsmassa. 
Additional output and employment based on extrapolation 
1968–1995: Backwards extrapolation from 1896 based on the movement of the 
industries in BiSOS D (see above) in order to account for the sharp improvement 
of coverage in 1896. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1876: Arithmetic mean of petroleum (Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 1282) and 
rape oil (Jörberg 1972 p. 689). 
1876–1888: Arithmetic mean of petroleum and oilcake (Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 
1282). 
1888–1912: price index of the oil industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 254). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.26 in 1913 (Schön 1988 p. 135; SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912. 
8.4. Matches 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: tändsticksfabriker, tändsticksämnesfabriker. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1885: price index of matches (Schön 1988 p. 206). 
1885–1912: price index of matches (Ljungberg 1990 p. 489). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on the prices of 
chemicals in industry 8.7 (0.21), log timber (0.42) (Jörberg (1972 pp. 546–9) and 
paper in industry 4.2 (0.38), is constructed. Fuel is represented by prices of coal 
(Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for less than 1 per cent of total costs 
with a net to gross output ratio of 0.67 (SOU 1923). 
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8.5. Explosives 
Gross output and employment 
1868–1912: tändrör, sprängämnesfabriker, ammunitions- och patronfabriker, 
krutbruk. 
Prices of final products from BiSOS D 
Weighted index (chained Fisher) of unit values from BiSOS D of the following 
products: 
1885–1888: nitroglycerin, dynamite and other explosives. 
1888–1896: gunpowder, nitroglycerin, dynamite and other explosives. 
1896–1912: black powder, gun cotton and explosives made of nitroglycerin. 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
A weighted index (Laspeyres) (weights in parentheses), based on the prices of 
chemicals in industry 8.7 (0.4), Chilesalpeter (0.4), coal (0.1) and cotton (0.1) 
(Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 1282), is constructed. Fuel is represented by prices of 
coal (Åmark 1921 p. 1275), accounting in 1913 for less than 7 per cent of total 
costs with a net to gross output ratio of 0.41 (Schön 1988 p. 135; SOU 1923). 
8.6. Charcoal  
Charcoal did not enter BiSOS D until 1898, but even after that the coverage was 
insufficient because it did not record the charcoal production at iron works. The 
charcoal production has therefore been subjected to revisions by Lindahl et al. 
(1937) and Schön (1988). Their additional output is added to the present 
investigation. The output of tar also belongs to the charcoal industry, though in 
relation to charcoal the magnitude of the tar production is tiny. It appeared in 
BiSOS in 1896, but with deficient coverage. The additional output estimated by 
Lindahl et al. (1937) and Schön (1988) is incorporated here. 
Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1899–1912: träkolsverk, beck och- tjärkokerier, terpentin och träsprit. 
Additional output 
Träkolsverk: 
1868–1885: Schön (1988 pp. 86–7, table 11). 
1886–1912: Lindahl et al. (1937 p. 200, table 95). 
 
Tjärkokeri: 
1868–1871: Schön (1988 p. 88, table 12). 
1872–1911: Lindahl et al. (1937 p. 202, table 96). 
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Estimates of employment for additional output 
Träkolsverk: 
1868–1897: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data for träkolsverk in BiSOS D in 1898–
1912. The following regression equation is estimated: 
ln(Output/Employment)=α+βlnOutput; β=0.709; T-ratio=3.893; R2=0.538. 
 
1898–1912: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
 
Tjärkokeri: 
1868–1895: The elasticity of output with respect to the output to employment 
ratio is estimated on the basis of the data for beck- och tjärkokeri in BiSOS D in 
1896–1912. The following regression equation is estimated: 
Δln(Output/Employment)=α+βΔlnOutput; β=0.778; T-ratio=2.510; R2=0.310. 
 
1896–1912: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
A chained Fisher price index, based on the prices of tar and charcoal (Jörberg 
1972 pp. 698–9), is constructed. Weights are shares of gross output (see above). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.48 in 1913 (SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912. 
8.7. Chemicals and fertilizers 
It is evident that chemicals are notoriously difficult to classify in a consistent 
manner. The types of industries (kemisk-tekniska fabriker) classified as 
chemicals has not remained constant over time. For instance, it is not possible to 
distinguish the production of fertilizers from the production of chemicals in 
general because superphosphate – an important part of compound fertilizers and 
usually classified as a fertilizer industry – was labelled chemical pre-1896. 
Furthermore, margarine was also labelled chemical before being separately 
reported in 1893. Thus, the present series of the chemical and fertilizing industry 
contains a bit of pre-1893 margarine. A minor part of the output of chemical and 
fertilizers industry is given in physical quantities in BiSOS C. It concerns copper 
sulphate and iron sulphate. Multiplying physical quantities by prices gives gross 
output which has been added to the series of gross output from BiSOS D. 
Employment has been raised by assuming equal gross output to employment 
ratio. 
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Gross output and employment from BiSOS D 
1868–1912: benmjölsfabriker, pudrettfabriker, fiskguano, superfosfat, 
thomasfosfat, andra gödningsfabriker, kemisk-tekniska fabriker, ammoniak, 
klorat, kristallsoda, salpetersoda, svafvelsyrad lerjord, svafvelsyra. 
Additional output from BiSOS C 
1868–1896: Physical quantities of svavel, kopparvitriol and järnvitriol are 
multiplied by prices of chemical products (see below) to give gross output. 
 
1896–1912: Gross output of svavel, kopparvitriol and järnvitriol. 
Estimates of employment for additional output 
1868–1912: Estimated by using the gross output to employment ratio from 
BiSOS D. 
Prices of final products 
1868–1872: prices of Chilesalpeter (Åmark 1921 pp. 1274, 1282). 
1872–1888: weighted index (chained Fisher) of unit values of superphosphate 
and sulphuric. 
1888–1912: arithmetic mean of price indices of the chemical industry and the 
fertilizer industry (Ljungberg 1990 p. 522; 524). 
Prices of intermediate consumption 
Price index constructed on the assumption that the net to gross output ratio of 
0.44 in 1913 (Schön 1988 p. 135; SOU 1923) remained constant in 1868–1912.  
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